This research paper focuses on the mental health needs, the need for mental health interventions and barriers in mental healthcare of women living in rural Maharashtra, India. Using a mixed-methods approach, the study has collected data from a sample of women living in the rural areas of Maharashtra through in-depth interviews. The data collected has been analyzed to identify the barriers and obstacles in mental healthcare, how the existing community support serves as a resource as well as the desire for potential mental healthcare interventions among participants. The findings of the study are expected to contribute to the development of effective mental health interventions tailored to the specific needs of women living in the rural areas of Maharashtra. Overall, this research paper aims to improve the understanding of the mental health needs of women in rural Maharashtra and provide insights for policymakers and mental health practitioners to develop effective interventions to promote their mental well-being.

This paper examines the measures available to improve operational energy efficiency from the perspective of onboard crew, the barriers associated with implementing those measures and how crew behaviour can be nudged using incentives. A total of 25 semi-structured interviews and subsequent surveys with 42 onboard crew were carried out to gather qualitative information on two main domains: operational efficiency and incentive schemes. In-depth thematic analysis of interviews showed the central and recurring themes such as stakeholder hierarchy, autonomy and accountability, temporal restrictions, profitability and type of charter. Due to the heterogeneity in interview responses on the topic of incentives, online surveys were conducted. The findings of the study show that whilst speed reduction was seen as the single most important measure to optimise, it was also the most difficult to implement in practice due to several barriers. These include contractual obligations, a complex web of accountability and perverse incentives to increase speed. Other measures such as trim–draft optimisation and auxiliary engine load optimisation have smaller efficiency gains but were found to have more potential for increasing implementation through behavioural changes and encouraged through incentives. Both monetary and non-monetary incentives were perceived to be important and going beyond the status quo of incentivising captains so that rewards are shared equitably amongst the crew. Whilst not generalisable, preliminary findings suggest that there is room to consider alternatives to the current approaches on incentives, which do not take advantage of the importance of acknowledgment and recognition, as well as fostering positive interpersonal relationships.

We conduct experimental economic games designed to study how reputational concern influences people's economic decisions. Donors make a series of ``Dictator Game'' decisions, splitting an endowment between themselves and a recipient. Crucially, recipients are not anonymous strangers, but are other individuals from the same community as the donor, presented to donors via photographs. By varying the identity of the recipient and whether or not the recipient will come to know the identity of the donor, we can effectively vary the reputational stake of the donor's decision. We expect that when Dictator Game allocation decisions have greater reputational stakes, donors will be more generous.Greater reputational stakes could arise from: the revelation of the donor's identity, the social proximity of donor and recipient, and the general network position of donor and recipient, all of which we consider. We conduct these games in eight rural communities in five countries, where we already have full sociodemographic and social network data on players and their connections. While there is substantial cross-site variation in the amounts given, we find strikingly similar effects of revelation and social proximity on allocation decisions: in all sites, donors give only slightly more in contexts where their identity is revealed, as opposed to being kept anonymous. Whether anonymous or revealed, donors give appreciably less to recipients who are more socially distant, with the largest drop occurring between immediate connections and connections-of-connections. We find mixed evidence that the effect of revealing a donor's identity diminishes with social distance. Finally, we do not find clear effects for the network position of donor and recipient. These results improve our understanding of how economic behaviour is intertwined with reputational dynamics in a wide variety of contexts. While altruistic behaviour does increase with reputational concern cross-culturally, it also appears that in tight-knit, small communities, absence of reputational concern may, contra expectations, lead only to a small increase in selfishness.