We study the financial determinants of cash holdings and discuss the importance of firm size in the post-crisis period. We employ panel data regression analysis on a sample of 6629 non-financial and non-utility listed companies in the United Kingdom from 2010 to 2018. We focus on the comparative analysis of large, medium, and small size firms in terms of cash holdings. Our findings indicate that cash levels are higher for firms with riskier cash flows, more growth opportunities, and higher R&D expenditures. In contrast, the firms’ cash holdings decrease when the substitutes of cash, cash flows, and capital expenditures increase. We show that small-sized firms tend to hold more cash than their larger counterparts due to precautionary motives. Further, we confirm a significant and varying association between managerial ownership and cash holdings. The study is robust to different regression specifications, additional analyses, and endogeneity tests. Overall, we add to the prior literature by identifying the effect of firm-level attributes and governance characteristics on cash policy during the post-crisis period. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first work that provides insights on the way that firm characteristics impact cash holdings, considering the differences among firm size groupings.

The purpose of this study is to explore the association between cash holdings and business strategy for nonfinancial and nonutility US firms over the period from 1970 to 2016. The authors have used Miles and Snow's (1978, 2003) theoretical background and followed Bentley et al. (2013) to construct a strategy index. Thus, the authors have distinguished two extreme corporate strategies, prospectors and defenders, based on a firm's resource allocation and investment behavior patterns. Following the methodology of Bates et al. (2009), the authors have used the multiple regression analysis to explore the relationship between business strategy and corporate cash holdings. The empirical results show that business strategy is positively related to cash holdings. Prospectors are more likely to hold higher cash levels than defenders. Furthermore, the authors have found that cash holding's speed of adjustment (SOA) is slower for prospectors than for defenders, suggesting that business strategy influences cash holding's trend. Interestingly, the results show that the market value of cash increases significantly only for the firms that pursue a defender strategy. The results of this work have valuable implications for researchers, by unveiling the relationship between corporate strategy and firm's cash holdings. This study, however, is limited to a sample of US firms; empirical evidence based on international samples of firms would add value to the current literature. The findings could be useful to financial managers and investment strategists, who seek to maximize firm value through the adoption of an effective liquidity policy. What is more, this study provides support for the view that strategic choice and optimal cash management are of great importance for firms' market value. This study enriches the knowledge of business strategy's impact on financing policy of firms and contributes to the empirical literature of cash holdings' determinants. In addition, it complements previous studies on US firms by documenting the effect of business strategy on the SOA in cash holdings and firm value.

Purpose: This paper aims to examine the impact of corruption on firm performance considering the interventional role of cash policy in the emerging market of Greece.Design/methodology/approach: The current study utilizes a sample of 142,079 firm-year observations for the period 2006–2014. Descriptive statistics, multiple regression analyses and robustness checks are used to test the study's hypotheses.Findings: The results reveal that firm performance is positively related to the control of institutional corruption, implying that firms perform better when operating in a low-corruption environment. All other things being equal, we also find that firm cash holding strengthens the positive association between control of corruption and corporate financial performance.Research limitations/implications: This research paper takes a more holistic approach by considering institutional factors in conjunction with corporate financial policies and outcomes. In a pervasive corrupt environment, the article illustrates how firm-level mechanisms can preclude political rent-seeking to improve corporate performance. The study's main limitation is that it focuses exclusively on a single country setting, based on the extreme-critical case's logic.Practical implications: The findings might be useful for business executives and regulators seeking a better understanding of the planning and implementation of firms' asset allocation strategies and anti-corruption policies.Originality/value: The study augments the relevant literature on the firm-level implications of corruption by providing empirical evidence for the interventional role of cash management in the relation between corruption and firm performance, in the context of an emerging economy.

Purpose: This paper examines the role of managerial discretion in the relation between managerial ability on the level of corporate cash.Design/methodology/approach: Conjoining the upper echelons theory's premises and the theoretical framework of cash holdings, we posit that the managerial ability's effect on cash policy varies with managerial discretion using firm-level data. To test the empirical prediction, we employ a linear regression model with fixed effects with a sample of US listed firms from 1980 to 2016.Findings: The findings reveal that the positive association between the ability of chief executive officers and corporate cash savings is weakened by firm-level managerial discretion. The results are robust to various additional analyses, namely lagged independent variables regression, reduced form regression and granger causality test. Overall, the findings are generally consistent with the cash holding motives yielding transaction and precautionary demand for money. However, our findings also shed light on whether managerial discretion moderates or exacerbates agency problems related to top executives' cash holding policies.Originality/value: This work's distinct characteristic is the investigation of the joint effect of managerial talent and discretion on a firm's cash holding, which remains unexplored in the literature.