Many real-life applications involve systems that change dynamically over time. Thus, throughout the continuous operation of such a system, it is required to compute solutions for new problem instances, derived from previous instances. Since the transition from one solution to another incurs some cost, a natural goal is to have the solution for the new instance close to the original one (under a certain distance measure). In this paper we develop a general framework for combinatorial repotimization, encompassing classical objective functions as well as the goal of minimizing the transition cost from one solution to the other. Formally, we say that \(\mathcal{A}\) is an \((r, \rho )\)-reapproximation algorithm if it achieves a \(\rho \)-approximation for the optimization problem, while paying a transition cost that is at most r times the minimum required for solving the problem optimally. Using our model we derive reoptimization and reapproximation algorithms for several classes of combinatorial reoptimization problems. This includes a fully polynomial time \((1+\varepsilon _1, 1+\varepsilon _2)\)-reapproximation scheme for the wide class of DP-benevolent problems introduced by Woeginger (Proceedings of Tenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 1999 ), a (1, 3)-reapproximation algorithm for the metric k-Center problem, and (1, 1)-reoptimization algorithm for polynomially solvable subset-selection problems. Thus, we distinguish here for the first time between classes of reoptimization problems by their hardness status with respect to the objective of minimizing transition costs, while guaranteeing a good approximation for the underlying optimization problem.

We study cost-sharing games in real-time scheduling systems where the server’s activation cost in every time slot is a function of its load. We focus on monomial cost functions and consider both the case when the degree is less than one (inducing positive congestion effect for the jobs) and when it is greater than one (inducing negative congestion effect for the jobs). For the former case, we provide tight bounds on the price of anarchy, and show that the price of anarchy grows to infinity as a polynomial of the number of jobs in the game. For the latter, we observe that existing results provide constant and tight (asymptotically in the degree of the monomial) bounds on the price of anarchy. We then turn to analyze payment mechanism with arbitrary cost-sharing, that is, when the strategy of a player includes also its payment. We show that our mechanism reduces the price of anarchy of games with n jobs and unit server costs from $\mathsf{\Theta }\left(\sqrt{n}\right)$ to 2. We also show that, for a restricted class of instances, a similar improvement is achieved for monomial server costs. This is not the case, however, for unrestricted instances of monomial costs, for which we prove that the price of anarchy remains super-constant for our mechanism. For systems with load-independent activation costs, we show that our mechanism can produce an optimal solution which is stable against coordinated deviations.