Recently, a number of scholars have warned against the risk of a new form of deliberately deceptive communication companies use to assure stakeholders of their good intentions in the adoption and development of digital technologies and advanced information systems based on artificial intelligence. This corporate behaviour, defined as machinewashing, in an attempt to empower engagement processes in the stakeholders’ network and satisfy stakeholder expectations with regard to the ethical implications of the use of artificial intelligence, has, in the final instance, the prevailing purpose of achieving better levels of corporate performance and reputation. However, thus far, scholars have not provided any empirical studies on the existence of corporate machinewashing strategies, and there is a significant lack of clarity as to how to measure machinewashing. Utilising the corporate digital responsibility theory, this paper offers an original methodological contribution to the nascent research field dedicated to machinewashing behaviour. Particularly, this paper provides considerations for detecting machinewashing through an analysis based on the comparison between the information capacity of the reporting and the information reliability level as a proxy for machinewashing strategies and, thus, for the real impact of digitalisation strategies on stakeholders. To this end, we conducted an exploratory content analysis of the reports of 10 Italian‐listed companies from 10 different industries. Overall, looking at the gap between what companies say about the impact of digitalisation from an ethical perspective, and what really happens, our results define a possible path for identifying machinewashing, the fields where it happens and the practices that companies use in order to realise these strategies.

We investigate whether and how strongly Basel 3 chief innovations jointly affected in different ways individual Eurozone banks’ stability (z-score) across six business models (BMs). We study this issue in the initial years when adaptation was most intense (2011–2014) and the Eurozone underwent a phase with sovereign crises abated by ECB policies easing financial conditions. In parallel, we run this exercise over 2000–2010 data, a time frame over which Basel 3 did not apply yet to see through the eyes of the regulator. Irrespective of BMs, we identify the leverage ratio as the most effective driver of banks’ stability. However, the impact on z-score of Basel 3 chief drivers does not seem to differ significantly on 2011–2014 vs. 2000–2010. Next, interactions with banks’ BMs suggest that Basel 3 innovations improve z-scores the most at traditionally focused banks (cooperative and savings banks), vis-à-vis diversified banks. Our results suggest Basel regulatory decisions were questionable. First, the front loading of the increased minimum capital requirements vs. the backloading of the leverage ratio phasing in may have lured banks from credit to financial assets. Second, our findings support the desirability of revising the current “one-size-fits-all” European prudential framework, which disregards BMs.

The aim of the present study is the usage of social media in the banking sector. We investigate why banks have decided to use social media and the obstacles they face. We describe the different goals of social banking: advertising purposes (showcase) versus interaction with clients and prospects in order to develop strong relationships through open, continuous, and transparent communication. We seek to understand the reasons behind any usage of social banking and, thus, the expected objectives banks wish to achieve in terms of visibility, loyalty, brand awareness, engagement, and reputation. Finally, we present a development path of the social media process in banks, focusing on the use of marketing tools. We also explore the relationship between social media strategies, customer behaviors, and reputation in the banking system, compared to other sectors.

The article investigates the intellectual capital disclosure of Italian banks over the years 2016–2017, applying the specific lens of healthy and distressed banks. To this end, we used content analysis and encoding techniques. The main results point out that intellectual capital (IC) disclosure is generally poor and that the intensity of disclosure varies slightly between healthy and distressed banks. Regarding the quality of disclosure, healthy banks present a higher, albeit modest, tendency to disclose non-qualitative and forward-looking information, maybe due to the fact that they are more focused on the strategies and the relationships with stakeholders as opposed to a more short-term approach of the distressed banks. To complement our study on healthy and distressed banks, we repeated the analysis focusing on bank size and independent directors. In this case, results do not show relevant differences in terms of IC disclosure. Hence, our findings suggest the need to consider banks’ IC disclosure as a strategic asset for increasing, among others, transparency and reputation.

The issues raised by Basel III, with specific reference to the introduction of more stringent capital requirements, are numerous and touch upon different aspects, such as cost and profitability-related problems and the repercussions concerning strategies implemented by banks. Our aim is to clarify the impact on Italian banks. We will first present some general considerations addressing the main implications for bank management, before illustrating the results of a survey aimed at detecting possible fears and doubts, on the part of banks, with reference to the extent to which some of the capitalisation proposals included in the reform can actually be pursued