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By combining upper echelon theory with meso theory of management, this study investigates the relationship between both corporate and country corruption risk and the performance of CEOs, while controlling for a set of individual-level variables. We used a sample of 455 observations related to 249 listed companies from a list published by the Harvard Business Review of the world's best-performing CEOs, in both developed and emerging countries, over the 5-year period between 2013 and 2017. We implemented hierarchical linear models in a three-level approach based on country- (macro), firm- (meso), and individual-level (micro) variables. We found that corporate corruption risk negatively impacts CEO performance, although this relationship is also significantly moderated by the corruption risk at the country level. Our results support the view that corporate corruption prevention devices play a strong governance role in countries with high corruption risk. By exploring the interplay between these macro- and meso-factors in explaining the micro-level of CEO performance, our paper aims to build a contextualized meso-theory of corruption risk.
Fabio La Rosa; Francesca Bernini; Simone Terzani. Does corporate and country corruption risk affect CEO performance? A study of the best-performing CEOs worldwide. European Management Journal 2021, 1 .
AMA StyleFabio La Rosa, Francesca Bernini, Simone Terzani. Does corporate and country corruption risk affect CEO performance? A study of the best-performing CEOs worldwide. European Management Journal. 2021; ():1.
Chicago/Turabian StyleFabio La Rosa; Francesca Bernini; Simone Terzani. 2021. "Does corporate and country corruption risk affect CEO performance? A study of the best-performing CEOs worldwide." European Management Journal , no. : 1.
In A Treatise on Virtues and Rewards, Dragonetti (1769) advances a theory of action based on rewards for virtues. The idea of rewards, especially of awards, relies on the hypothesis that intrinsic motivations drive the actions of good or virtuous citizens. We apply this theory to virtuous entrepreneurs who voluntarily adopt ethical principles as promoted by a recent Italian law. These firms receive an ethical rating (ER) by the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) and can access a set of economic and non-economic benefits (i.e. rewards). We survey a sample of 152 private companies with an ER and examine their views on the economic and social motivations and benefits as well as the perceived usefulness of the ER for improving ethical behaviour. An exploratory factor analysis detects four categories of motivation (economic, competitive, social, and responsiveness) and two categories of benefits (economic and competitive), which we use in regression models to test Dragonetti’s theory. Overall, respondents see the ER as an effective tool, except in terms of improving economic performance. We also find that entrepreneurs with lower economic and higher responsiveness motivations attain higher ERs. However, in the respondents’ opinions, the ER is (still) not producing any concrete benefits since we find no relationship between the ER and economic or competitive rewards. These findings have implications for the ICA as well as for private companies.
Fabio La Rosa; Francesca Bernini. Punishing Vices or Rewarding Virtues? The Motivations for and Benefits of Ethical Ratings for Private Italian Companies. Journal of Business Ethics 2021, 1 -19.
AMA StyleFabio La Rosa, Francesca Bernini. Punishing Vices or Rewarding Virtues? The Motivations for and Benefits of Ethical Ratings for Private Italian Companies. Journal of Business Ethics. 2021; ():1-19.
Chicago/Turabian StyleFabio La Rosa; Francesca Bernini. 2021. "Punishing Vices or Rewarding Virtues? The Motivations for and Benefits of Ethical Ratings for Private Italian Companies." Journal of Business Ethics , no. : 1-19.