Sebastian J. Goerg

Sebastian J. Goerg


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

20Years (2007-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 September 2009 in The Stata Journal: Promoting communications on statistics and Stata
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Journal Article
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SGSebastian J. Goerg
Sebastian J. Goerg
JKJohannes Kaiser
Johannes Kaiser
In statistics, two-sample tests are used to determine whether two samples have been drawn from the same population. An example of such a test is the widely used Kolmogorov–Smirnov two-sample test. There are other distribution-free tests that might be applied in similar occasions. In this article, we describe a two-sample omnibus test introduced by Epps and Singleton, which usually has a greater power than the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test although it is distribution free. The superiority of the Epps–Singleton characteristic function test is illustrated in two examples. We compare the two tests and supplement this contribution with a Stata implementation of the omnibus test.

1 December 2010 in Journal of Economic Psychology
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Journal Article
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SGSebastian J. Goerg
Sebastian J. Goerg
GWGari Walkowitz
Gari Walkowitz

1 October 2010 in Journal of Labor Economics
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Journal Article
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SGSebastian J. Goerg
Sebastian J. Goerg
SKSebastian Kube
Sebastian Kube
RZRo’i Zultan
Ro’i Zultan
The importance of fair and equal treatment of workers is at the heart of the debate in organizational management. In this regard, we study how reward schemes and production technologies affect effort provision in teams. Our experimental results demonstrate that unequal rewards can potentially increase productivity by facilitating coordination and that the effect strongly interacts with the exact shape of the production function. Taken together, our data highlight the relevance of the production function for organization construction and suggest that equal treatment of equals is neither a necessary nor a sufficient prerequisite for eliciting high performance in teams.

1 April 2016 in Public Choice
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Journal Article
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ETEmanuel V. Towfigh
Emanuel V. Towfigh
SGSebastian J. Goerg
Sebastian J. Goerg
AGAndreas Glöckner
Andreas Glöckner
PLPhilip Leifeld
Philip Leifeld
ALAniol Llorente-Saguer
Aniol Llorente-Saguer
CKCarlos Kurschilgen
Carlos Kurschilgen
Are direct-democratic decisions more acceptable to voters than decisions arrived at through representative procedures? We conduct an experimental online vignette study with a German sample to investigate how voters’ acceptance of a political decision depends on the process through which it is reached. For a set of different issues, we investigate how acceptance varies depending on whether the decision is the result of a direct-democratic institution, a party in a representative democracy, or an expert committee. Our results show that for important issues, direct democracy generates greater acceptance; this finding holds particularly for those voters who do not agree with a collectively chosen outcome. However, if the topic is of limited importance to the voters, acceptance does not differ between the mechanisms. Our results imply that a combination of representative democracy and direct democracy, conditional on the distribution of issue importance among the electorate, may be optimal with regard to acceptance of political decisions.

1 September 2012 in Games and Economic Behavior
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Journal Article
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TCThorsten Chmura
Thorsten Chmura
SGSebastian J. Goerg
Sebastian J. Goerg
RSReinhard Selten
Reinhard Selten

3 June 2013 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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IFIlan Fischer
Ilan Fischer
AFAlex Frid
Alex Frid
SGSebastian J. Goerg
Sebastian J. Goerg
SLSimon A. Levin
Simon A. Levin
DRDaniel I. Rubenstein
Daniel I. Rubenstein
RSReinhard Selten
Reinhard Selten
Although cooperation and trust are essential features for the development of prosperous populations, they also put cooperating individuals at risk for exploitation and abuse. Empirical and theoretical evidence suggests that the solution to the problem resides in the practice of mimicry and imitation, the expectation of opponent’s mimicry and the reliance on similarity indices. Here we fuse the principles of enacted and expected mimicry and condition their application on two similarity indices to produce a model of mimicry and relative similarity. Testing the model in computer simulations of behavioral niches, populated with agents that enact various strategies and learning algorithms, shows how mimicry and relative similarity outperforms all the opponent strategies it was tested against, pushes noncooperative opponents toward extinction, and promotes the development of cooperative populations. The proposed model sheds light on the evolution of cooperation and provides a blueprint for intentional induction of cooperation within and among populations. It is suggested that reducing conflict intensities among human populations necessitates (i) instigation of social initiatives that increase the perception of similarity among opponents and (ii) efficient lowering of the similarity threshold of the interaction, the minimal level of similarity that makes cooperation advisable.