Ro’i Zultan

Ro’i Zultan

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Ro’i Zultan

Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva, Israel

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

20Years (2007-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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15 July 2013 in Cognitive Science
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DLDavid A. Lagnado
David A. Lagnado
TGTobias Gerstenberg
Tobias Gerstenberg
RZRo'I Zultan
Ro'I Zultan
How do people attribute responsibility in situations where the contributions of multiple agents combine to produce a joint outcome? The prevalence of over‐determination in such cases makes this a difficult problem for counterfactual theories of causal responsibility. In this article, we explore a general framework for assigning responsibility in multiple agent contexts. We draw on the structural model account of actual causation (e.g., Halpern & Pearl, 2005) and its extension to responsibility judgments (Chockler & Halpern, 2004). We review the main theoretical and empirical issues that arise from this literature and propose a novel model of intuitive judgments of responsibility. This model is a function of both pivotality (whether an agent made a difference to the outcome) and criticality (how important the agent is perceived to be for the outcome, before any actions are taken). The model explains empirical results from previous studies and is supported by a new experiment that manipulates both pivotality and criticality. We also discuss possible extensions of this model to deal with a broader range of causal situations. Overall, our approach emphasizes the close interrelations between causality, counterfactuals, and responsibility attributions.

1 December 2012 in Cognition
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RZRo’i Zultan
Ro’i Zultan
TGTobias Gerstenberg
Tobias Gerstenberg
DLDavid A. Lagnado
David A. Lagnado
Attributions of responsibility play a critical role in many group interactions. This paper explores the role of causal and counterfactual reasoning in blame attributions in groups. We develop a general framework that builds on the notion of pivotality: an agent is pivotal if she could have changed the group outcome by acting differently. In three experiments we test successive refinements of this notion - whether an agent is pivotal in close possible situations and the number of paths to achieve pivotality. In order to discriminate between potential models, we introduced group tasks with asymmetric structures. Some group members were complements (for the two to contribute to the group outcome it was necessary that both succeed) whereas others were substitutes (for the two to contribute to the group outcome it was sufficient that one succeeds). Across all three experiments we found that people's attributions were sensitive to the number of paths to pivotality. In particular, an agent incurred more blame for a team loss in the presence of a successful complementary peer than in the presence of a successful substitute.

1 November 2016 in European Economic Review
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OWOri Weisel
Ori Weisel
RZRo׳I Zultan
Ro׳I Zultan

1 October 2010 in Journal of Labor Economics
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SGSebastian J. Goerg
Sebastian J. Goerg
SKSebastian Kube
Sebastian Kube
RZRo’i Zultan
Ro’i Zultan
The importance of fair and equal treatment of workers is at the heart of the debate in organizational management. In this regard, we study how reward schemes and production technologies affect effort provision in teams. Our experimental results demonstrate that unequal rewards can potentially increase productivity by facilitating coordination and that the effect strongly interacts with the exact shape of the production function. Taken together, our data highlight the relevance of the production function for organization construction and suggest that equal treatment of equals is neither a necessary nor a sufficient prerequisite for eliciting high performance in teams.

1 November 2017 in Economics Letters
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ISIvan Soraperra
Ivan Soraperra
OWOri Weisel
Ori Weisel
RZRo’i Zultan
Ro’i Zultan
SKSys Kochavi
Sys Kochavi
MLMargarita Leib
Margarita Leib
SSShaul Shalvi
Shaul Shalvi

1 June 2012 in Journal of Economic Psychology
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RZRo’i Zultan
Ro’i Zultan