In order to support economic development across all European Union regions, €351.8 billion –almost a third of the total EU budget– has been set aside for the Cohesion Policy during the 2014–2020 period. The distribution of this budget is made through five main structural and investment funds, after long and difficult negotiations among the EU member states. This paper analyzes the problem of allocating the limited resources of the European Regional Development Fund as a conflicting claims problem. Specifically, we attempt to show how the conflicting claims approach fits this actual problem, and we propose alternative ways of distributing the budget via (i) claims solutions or (ii) the imposition of bounds (guarantees) to each of the regions. By applying this approach we also show that there is a claims solution that performs better than the others by reducing inequality and promoting convergence to a greater degree. It is clear that political bargaining will always be part of the allocation process. However, having an intuitive initial proposal may help politicians to find the best agreement. To that effect, we propose the use of a claims solution as a way to find an initial proposal for future policy changes concerning the allocations of the EU structural funds.
A minimum cost spanning tree problem analyzes how to efficiently connect a group of individuals to a source. Once the efficient tree is obtained, the addressed question is how to allocate the total cost among the involved agents. One prominent solution in allocating this minimum cost is the so-called Folk solution. Unfortunately, in general, the Folk solution is not easy to compute. We identify a class of mcst problems in which the Folk solution is obtained in an easy way. This class includes elementary costmcst problems.
Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a correspondence between classical bargaining solutions and usual claims rules. In particular, we show that the constrained equal losses, the truncated constrained equal losses and the contested garment (Babylonian Talmud) rules can be obtained throughout the Nash bargaining solution.
22 September 2022 in European Journal of Operational Research