Josep E. Peris

Prof. Josep E. Peris


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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23 December 2021 in Review of Regional Research
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MSMaría-José Solís-Baltodano
María-José Solís-Baltodano
JGJosé-Manuel Giménez-Gómez
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez
JPJosep E. Peris
Josep E. Peris
In order to support economic development across all European Union regions, €351.8 billion –almost a third of the total EU budget– has been set aside for the Cohesion Policy during the 2014–2020 period. The distribution of this budget is made through five main structural and investment funds, after long and difficult negotiations among the EU member states. This paper analyzes the problem of allocating the limited resources of the European Regional Development Fund as a conflicting claims problem. Specifically, we attempt to show how the conflicting claims approach fits this actual problem, and we propose alternative ways of distributing the budget via (i) claims solutions or (ii) the imposition of bounds (guarantees) to each of the regions. By applying this approach we also show that there is a claims solution that performs better than the others by reducing inequality and promoting convergence to a greater degree. It is clear that political bargaining will always be part of the allocation process. However, having an intuitive initial proposal may help politicians to find the best agreement. To that effect, we propose the use of a claims solution as a way to find an initial proposal for future policy changes concerning the allocations of the EU structural funds.

1 September 2016 in Operations Research Letters
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BSBegoña Subiza
Begoña Subiza
JGJosé-Manuel Giménez-Gómez
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez
JPJosep E. Peris
Josep E. Peris
A minimum cost spanning tree problem analyzes how to efficiently connect a group of individuals to a source. Once the efficient tree is obtained, the addressed question is how to allocate the total cost among the involved agents. One prominent solution in allocating this minimum cost is the so-called Folk solution. Unfortunately, in general, the Folk solution is not easy to compute. We identify a class of mcst problems in which the Folk solution is obtained in an easy way. This class includes elementary costmcst problems.

5 March 2015 in Games
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JGJosé-Manuel Giménez-Gómez
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez
AOAntónio Osório
António Osório
JPJosep E. Peris
Josep E. Peris
Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a correspondence between classical bargaining solutions and usual claims rules. In particular, we show that the constrained equal losses, the truncated constrained equal losses and the contested garment (Babylonian Talmud) rules can be obtained throughout the Nash bargaining solution.

22 September 2022 in European Journal of Operational Research
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Journal Article
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PHPenélope Hernández
Penélope Hernández
JPJosep E. Peris
Josep E. Peris
JVJuan Vidal-Puga
Juan Vidal-Puga

1 January 2022 in Mathematical Social Sciences
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Journal Article
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JAJosé Alcalde
José Alcalde
JPJosep E. Peris
Josep E. Peris

1 October 2016 in Journal of Mathematical Economics
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Journal Article
Closed access
PHPenélope Hernández
Penélope Hernández
JPJosep E. Peris
Josep E. Peris
JSJosé A. Silva-Reus
José A. Silva-Reus