Precision Agriculture (PA) refers to applications asking for reliable and highly available precise positions, at centimeter level, in most of operational scenarios. Machinery guidance, automatic steering and controlled traffic farming enable machinery to move along repeatable tracks on the field, minimizing pass-to-pass errors and overlaps. In the recent years, satellite-based navigation has also opened the door to (semi) autonomous machineries for some specific farming scenarios and operations. Farming industry is now looking to use small robots to bring efficiencies and benefits to farms, capable of complex tasks that have not been possible with traditional large-scale agricultural machinery. Even though the state-of-the-art Real Time Kinematic (RTK) Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers usually match the requirements posed by PA applications in open fields, propagation effects degrade the performance under foliage or with surrounding obstacles. This paper presents an experimental testbed and methodology suitable to assess the real performance of RTK GNSS-based devices in operational environments. Such testbed and methodology were effective to compare different devices, which resulted to be equivalent in open-sky conditions, but with significant differences in other types of environments. The paper also discusses opportunities and current limits of GNSS for emerging PA applications based on small robots and artificial intelligence.

Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) spoofing is a pernicious type of intentional interference where a GNSS receiver is fooled into tracking counterfeit signals, with the purpose of inducing a misleading information into the application it is used for. A possible technique able to identify a GNSS spoofing attack is a dual-antenna method based on the analysis of the dispersion of the double differences (D3) of carrier-phase measurements. Such technique has been recently presented as a relatively simple method to detect situations where even only a subset of counterfeit signals is tracked by the receiver. However, the D3 technique has not been analyzed in a rigorous theoretical way so far and the detection threshold was, for instance, set only empirically. Aiming at filling these gaps, this article intends to revise the main concepts of the aforementioned technique in a clear mathematical way. Thus, the detection threshold will be given according to a target probability of missed detection. Moreover, the article provides a thorough analysis of expected performance in terms of probability of missed detection and probability of false alarm, addressing them first as pairwise probability, then as overall probability. The effect of the signal C/N0 ratio on these detection performances is analyzed. Methods to reduce the occurrence of events of false alarm are also discussed. Eventually, an assessment of performance of the ${{\rm{D}}^3}$ algorithm is evaluated through a set of tests that emulate real working conditions.

Nowadays, the Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) technology is not the primary means of navigation for civil aviation and Air Traffic Control, but its role is increasing. Consequently, the vulnerabilities of GNSSs to Radio Frequency Interference, including the dangerous intentional sources of interference (i.e., jamming and spoofing), raise concerns and special attention also in the aviation field. This panorama urges for figuring out effective solutions able to cope with GNSS interference and preserve safety of operations. In the frame of a Single European Sky Air traffic management Research (SESAR) Exploratory Research initiative, a novel, effective, and affordable concept of GNSS interference management for civil aviation has been developed. This new interference management concept is able to raise early warnings to the on-board navigation system about the detection of interfering signals and their classification, and then to estimate the Direction of Arrival (DoA) of the source of interference allowing the adoption of appropriate countermeasures against the individuated source. This paper describes the interference management concept and presents the on-field tests which allowed for assessing the reached level of performance and confirmed the applicability of this approach to the aviation applications.

The authentication of the navigation signals can be considered as the contribution of the system to the robustness against spoofing attacks and it is becoming an important requirement for a growing number of user communities. GPS and Galileo systems are proposing evolutions of their civil signals to embed features of authentication. For Galileo, the Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) is integrated in the Galileo E1 OS signal. For the GPS, the Chips-Message Robust Authentication (Chimera) solution, designed for the GPS L1C signal, is foreseen to be tested soon. On the other hand, suitable signal processing techniques can be implemented inside the receiver to monitor the quality of the received signals and protect against spoofing attacks. Such techniques shall work as a complement to the authentication strategies, to further increase the signals’ robustness. Within this context, the paper presents the Joint Chimera/OSNMA scheme, designed to be adopted by a multi-constellation receiver that already exploits both OSNMA and Chimera enhancements. The idea is to further strengthen the robustness with respect to the individual use of the two solutions, to tackle sophisticated spoofing attacks, which are able to avoid detection from navigation message authentication (NMA) techniques. The manuscript proves the high performance of the joint scheme, presenting the results of a wide bench of tests, under different scenarios of spoofing, and user conditions.

The Software Defined Radio (SDR) technology, applied to the reception of Global Navigation Satellite Signals (GNSS), allows the implementation of a positioning device with a high flexibility level. The advantage is twofold: not only the GNSS SDR receiver can be easily updated during its operational life, but it becomes an outstanding tool in prototyping innovative algorithms for signal processing and signal quality monitoring. These aspects have been the key-drivers to the implementation of the NGene fully software receiver, developed by the NavSAS group in Torino. This paper exemplifies some of the opportunities opened by SDR in the field of GNSS receivers.

The Public Observation (PO) Test Phase of the Galileo Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) signal is officially opened since November 15th 2021, by the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA). During this phase, any interested users is allowed to access the Signal in Space (SIS) for testing purposes, while the crypto material needed to process the message and verify its authenticity is made available on the European GNSS Service Centre (GSC) web portal. This paper describes the processing of the Galileo E1-B navigation message, as observed during the first days of PO. The purpose is to analyze the crypto and authenticated data carried by the SIS and apply the OSNMA protocol to authenticate the navigation message. The SIS has been processed with the NGene real time software receiver which verifies the authenticity of the navigation data, before evaluating the position fix. The work is completed by an assessment of OSNMA-ready receiver performance, mainly in terms of position accuracy.