The authentication of the navigation signals can be considered as the contribution of the system to the robustness against spoofing attacks and it is becoming an important requirement for a growing number of user communities. GPS and Galileo systems are proposing evolutions of their civil signals to embed features of authentication. For Galileo, the Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) is integrated in the Galileo E1 OS signal. For the GPS, the Chips-Message Robust Authentication (Chimera) solution, designed for the GPS L1C signal, is foreseen to be tested soon. On the other hand, suitable signal processing techniques can be implemented inside the receiver to monitor the quality of the received signals and protect against spoofing attacks. Such techniques shall work as a complement to the authentication strategies, to further increase the signals’ robustness. Within this context, the paper presents the Joint Chimera/OSNMA scheme, designed to be adopted by a multi-constellation receiver that already exploits both OSNMA and Chimera enhancements. The idea is to further strengthen the robustness with respect to the individual use of the two solutions, to tackle sophisticated spoofing attacks, which are able to avoid detection from navigation message authentication (NMA) techniques. The manuscript proves the high performance of the joint scheme, presenting the results of a wide bench of tests, under different scenarios of spoofing, and user conditions.

The Public Observation (PO) Test Phase of the Galileo Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) signal is officially opened since November 15th 2021, by the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA). During this phase, any interested users is allowed to access the Signal in Space (SIS) for testing purposes, while the crypto material needed to process the message and verify its authenticity is made available on the European GNSS Service Centre (GSC) web portal. This paper describes the processing of the Galileo E1-B navigation message, as observed during the first days of PO. The purpose is to analyze the crypto and authenticated data carried by the SIS and apply the OSNMA protocol to authenticate the navigation message. The SIS has been processed with the NGene real time software receiver which verifies the authenticity of the navigation data, before evaluating the position fix. The work is completed by an assessment of OSNMA-ready receiver performance, mainly in terms of position accuracy.

The design of a solution for the authentication of both navigation data bits and spreading code chips, referred to as SNAP and suitable for the evolution of the Galileo E1 OS signal, is presented in the paper. Though the technique is innovative and able to achieve predefined authentication performance, it exploits the structure of the legacy Galileo signal and the characteristics of the OS NMA. A detailed overview of the open choices for the design of signal components dedicated to authentication is provided, together with an analysis of signal parameters definition. A possible implementation option of the SNAP solution is also presented.

With corrections transmitted through the E6 signal, the Galileo High Accuracy Service (HAS) provides the information necessary to execute a stand-alone precise point positioning algorithm in real time. Once fully operational, the service aims to deliver an accuracy of 20 cm and 40 cm (at the 95% confidence level) in the horizontal and vertical channels, respectively. While most of the current literature focuses on analyzing the performance of HAS in static and open-sky signal reception scenarios, this study presents the results of tests conducted in both static and dynamic conditions, including open-sky and urban canyon scenarios. The tests clearly demonstrate that utilizing HAS corrections leads to a significant reduction in positioning error across all tested environments. Furthermore, a specific analysis of HAS message availability in a harsh environment indicates that the corrections obtained from the signal in space are available approximately 95% of the time during dynamic scenario tests.

Many GNSS applications have been experiencing some constantly growing needs in terms of security and reliability. To address some of them, both GPS and Galileo are proposing evolutions of their legacy civil signals, embedding features of authentication. This paper focuses on the Galileo Open Signal Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) and describes its implementation within a real-time software receiver for ARM-based embedded platforms. The innovative contributions of the paper include the software profiling analysis for the OSNMA add on, along with the comparison among performances obtained with different platforms. In addition, specific evaluations on the computational load of the whole receiver complete the analysis. The receiver used for the implementation belongs to the NGene receivers family—real-time fully-software GPS and Galileo receivers, tailored for different platforms and sharing the same core processing. In detail, the paper deals with the introduction of the OSNMA support inside the eNGene, the version of the receiver executable by ARM-based embedded platforms.

The Galileo Signal Authentication Service (SAS) is the next new feature to be offered by Galileo, the European GNSS. Its signal-in-space initial capability is expected already in the next months of 2025, starting with the L3 (Launch 3) Galileo elliptical-orbit satellites. It is the first-ever navigation signal authentication feature offered globally and openly. Galileo SAS uses the existing Galileo E6-C signal to be encrypted, in combination with OSNMA (Open Service Navigation Message Authentication), through the so-called semi-assisted authentication concept. In this concept, portions of the E6-C are re-encrypted with OSNMA future keys and published in a server. The concept allows signal authentication openly and for free, and without private key management by users. In exchange, the time between authentications is 30 s, inherited from OSNMA, and it introduces a latency between the E6-C signal reception and its authentication down to a few seconds. This work presents the status of Galileo SAS. It outlines its latest technical definition, already shared in previous publications. It will also present the MMARIO (Message and Measurement Authentication Receiver for Initial Operations) project, developing the first SAS server, receiver and testing platform. The paper also outlines the Galileo SAS plans for the near future, up to the Initial Service Declaration.