Purpose: The sudden outbreak of COVID-19 has become a major public health emergency of global concern. Studying the Internet public opinion dissemination mechanism of public health emergencies is of great significance for creating a legalized network environment, and it is also helpful for managers to make scientific decisions when encountering Internet public opinion crisis.Design/methodology/approach: Based on the analysis of the process of spreading the Internet public opinion in major epidemics, a dynamic model of the Internet public opinion spread system was constructed to study the interactive relationship among the public opinion events, network media, netizens and government and the spread of epidemic public opinion. The Shuanghuanglian event in COVID-19 in China was taken as a typical example to make simulation analysis.Findings: Research results show three points: (1) the government credibility plays a decisive role in the spread of Internet public opinion; (2) it is the best time to intervene when Internet public opinion occurred at first time; (3) the management and control of social media are the key to public opinion governance. Besides, specific countermeasures are proposed to assist control of Internet public opinion dissemination.Originality/value: The epidemic Internet public opinion risk evolution system is a complex nonlinear social system. The system dynamics model is used to carry out research to facilitate the analysis of the Internet public opinion propagation mechanism and explore the interrelationship of various factors.

The extensive application of algorithm recommendation technology not only meets the information needs of network users but also leads to the emergence of “information cocoons”. On the basis of summarizing three generating mechanisms, namely, the theory of technological innovation, the theory of interest-driven, and the theory of emotional identity, this paper constructs a game model of bilateral evolution between information platforms and network users and simulates the influence path of key factors on the evolution of both parties’ main strategies. The research shows that algorithm recommendation technology is the root of “information cocoons” in the algorithm era. As the algorithm technology matures day by day, the cost of using algorithm recommendations on information platforms and the loss cost of accepting algorithm recommendations by network users are constantly decreasing, which causes the information platforms and network users’ strategy choice for algorithm recommendation to evolve from {give up and conflict} to {use and accept}, and finally leads to the long-term existence of “information cocoons”.

Under the catalysis of knowledge anxiety and cognitive surplus, knowledge payment has developed rapidly. However, coordinating the relationship between knowledge demanders and knowledge providers and maintaining the benefits of the platform itself remains the focus of knowledge payment platforms. This paper constructs a tripartite game modeland analyzes the relationship among knowledge demanders, knowledge providers and knowledge payment platforms. The effects of quality level, price, value-added service level of knowledge products, and the proportion of transaction commission on the decision-making of each game subject are compared and tripartite decision-making in the game model is simulated.

Purpose: This paper aims to clarify the impact of information asymmetry on users' payment rates and examine the role of perceived uncertainty (PU) and acceptable price (AP) in the relationship between information asymmetry and users' payment rates. Design/methodology/approach: To test the influences of information asymmetry on users' payment rates, this paper collects 18,489 transaction data from the Chinese knowledge payment platform Zhihu with a Python crawler. This paper constructs a mediation model to define the relationship between information asymmetry and users' payment rates by introducing PU and AP as the mediators. Findings: Information asymmetry negatively affects users' payment rates. In addition, PU and AP mediate the information asymmetry in users' payment rates bond. Research limitations/implications: This study only explores the mediators of the information asymmetry users’ payment rates bond, ignoring the effect of potential moderators, which would be an important direction for future research. Practical implications: The findings of this paper suggest that information communication is essential in knowledge market transactions. Knowledge providers, as well as knowledge platforms, should enhance information exchange with consumers in order to increase product sales. Social implications: This paper provides a new perspective for understanding how information asymmetry affects users' payment rates and helps to guide suppliers to improve product quality. The research framework of this paper is universal to a certain extent. Originality/value: This paper is one of the first to propose using PU and AP to construct a mediation model to study the information asymmetry between users' payment rates relationship. It provides a new perspective for understanding the channel of information asymmetry in customer behavior.