This paper discusses the impact of a trade credit policy on alleviating conflicts arising on a dual‐channel supply chain that includes one manufacturer and one value‐added retailer. We use the Stackelberg game to model the problem and characterize optimal pricing strategies for each supply chain partner, examining different circumstances in terms of retail price and trade credit contracts. When a consistent price strategy is applied in the dual channels under conditions of an exogenous credit period, trade credit can help both partners to achieve win‐win situations in the following circumstances: (1) when the retail channel's market share is small and the retailer's interest rate is high; or (2) when the retail channel's market share is large and the retailer's interest rate is lower than the manufacturer's. The study also concludes that when an inconsistent price strategy is applied, a trade credit contract can alleviate channel conflicts when the retailer's interest rate is higher than the manufacturer's. Otherwise, the partners may terminate cooperation. However, when the manufacturer has the power to determine and set the credit period, trade credit cannot alleviate channel conflicts under consistent price and inconsistent price scenarios.

This study considers a low-carbon supply chain model comprised of a capital-constrained manufacturer and a retailer under a cap-and-trade system. These two parties can choose from two financing modes: bank financing or mixed financing, in which the latter combines bank financing with equity financing. Two decision-making power structures are formulated, namely the Nash game model and the retailer-led Stackelberg game model. Subsequently, a comparative analysis of equilibrium outcomes for both parties within these power structures is performed, yielding the following insights: (1) In the bank financing mode, retailers find greater profitability in adopting dominance. When emission reduction efficiency is high, manufacturers obtain more profit within a Nash game context. However, when emission reduction efficiency is low, manufacturers accrue more profit in a Stackelberg game context. In the mixed financing mode without cap-and-trade regulations, supply chain participants do not express a preference for any specific game structure. (2) Without cap-and-trade regulation, in both the Nash and Stackelberg game models, the supply chain participants find more profitability in mixed financing when carbon emission reduction efficiency is high. Meanwhile, bank financing proves more profitable when the carbon emission reduction is low. Moreover, this study investigates the impact of wholesale and retail prices of low-carbon products on the financing strategies of the supply chain participants under different power structures and financing modes. Additionally, extended models are considered, including the manufacturer-led Stackelberg game structure and the capital-constrained manufacturer with a certain amount of initial capital.