In the context of co-opetition (cooperation and competition), technological innovation endows manufacturers with new competitiveness and vitality. Through patent technology licensing, manufacturers can achieve technology upgrading and efficiency improvement. To study the patent licensing decisions of manufacturers based on co-opetition, this paper constructs a production patent licensing game model that comprises two manufacturers that cooperate in the upstream component market and compete in the downstream consumer market. We conduct a comparative analysis of the game equilibrium of three patent licensing scenarioscompetition (no licensing), unilateral licensing and cross-licensingand analyse the impact mechanism of key parameters, such as market share and cost advantage (cost burden). The research results are as follows. (1) When the product substitutability (competition intensity) is not very high and the market share of manufacturer 1 is relatively small or the product substitutability (competition intensity) is large and the cost advantage of both manufacturers 1 and 2 is moderate, Pareto improvement under cross-licensing scenario is better than that under unilateral licensing and competition scenarios. (2) The Pareto improvement in the unilateral licensing scenario is always better than that in the other two scenarios. (3) When the cost advantage of manufacturer 1 is small or large, the Pareto improvement in the competition scenario is better than that in the other two licensing scenarios. The paper also analyses consumer surplus in three licensing scenarios. The conclusions can provide a decision-making basis and support for manufacturers to select appropriate licensing strategies and government participation to guide enterprise technology upgrading under different situations.

In the Business to Consumer (B2C) environment, it is important to alleviate the mismatch between delivery capacity and demand in the express delivery supply chain. To do this, we propose three contracts to improve supply chain performance: the advanced payment contract, penalty contract, and time insurance contract. To assess these contracts, we considered the supply chain of one e-retailer and one express delivery provider. We discussed which contract is better for the supply chain partners when the three contracts can coordinate the supply chain. We found that when its unit cost of delayed orders is lower, the e-retailer will choose the advance payment contract among three contracts. When its unit cost of delayed orders is medium, the e-retailer will opt for the time insurance contract. When its unit cost of delayed orders is high, the e-retailer will not choose the advanced payment contract. In this case, whether the e-retailer chooses the time insurance contract and penalty contract depends on the value of wholesale price.

To reduce carbon emissions during automobile transportation, automobile manufacturers cooperate with competitors to conduct green technology research and development (R&D). Cooperation modes include investment sharing (IS) and innovation sharing (IN) mode, aiming to share risks. Using game theory, this study analyzes the effects of three R&D modes on optimal price, quality, profit, and total greenness. The main focus is on the impact of potential market size, quality demand coefficient, and technology uncertainty on the strategic choices of manufacturers and competitors. Under independent R&D (ID) mode, the increase in the potential market size of competitors does not necessarily weaken the manufacturer’s competitiveness and profits. Under IS mode, when the positive impact of quality ondemand increases, the competitor is not motivated to increase the share of investment cost allocation. Under IN mode, when the potential market size of the Manufacturer increases, there is not necessarily an inhibitory effect on the competitor’s product quality and price. In the ID and IN modes, the increase in technological uncertainty can lead competitors to adopt mitigation strategies to mitigate risks. In the IS mode, competitors consider their competitive advantages and adopt strategies to increase and reduce the allocation ratio to avoid price wars and transfer risks, to mitigate the impact of technological uncertainty. As the potential market size of the Manufacturer decreases, the dominance of ID mode (IN mode) is shifting to that of IS mode in terms of total greenness and profit.