Virtual field‐programmable gate array (FPGA) is an emerging technology to put multiple users in the same FPGA fabric with logical isolation. Security researchers have studied new threats in virtual FPGA and proposed attacks on the logical isolation by exploiting analogue natures of FPGA. These attacks use an oscillator comprising a combinatorial loop to have access to the analogue domain using digital components only. Interestingly, the system in the field prohibits a combinatorial loop by a design rule check. In this Letter, the authors study if prohibiting a combinatorial loop is sufficient to thwart the conventional attacks. They negatively answer the question by showing oscillators without a combinatorial loop. They also show how to detect and reject the proposed oscillators by a design rule check.
27 September 2018 in IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits
Laser fault injection (LFI) attack on cryptographic processors is a serious threat to information security. This paper proposes a sense-and-react countermeasure against LFI. A distributed bulk-current sensor monitors the abnormal current conduction caused by laser irradiation to a silicon substrate. The single sensor occupies only 286 F 2 /Cell and it is distributed across the entire cryptographic core for 100% attack detection coverage. Upon detection of LFI attack, a flush code eraser prevents a leakage of faulty ciphertext by immediately shunting the core supply path within nano-second order. In addition, the core supply during the shunting is electrically isolated from the global supply line to prevent side-channel information leakage of intermediate faulty codes. A test chip was designed and fabricated in 0.18- $\mu \text{m}$ standard CMOS, integrating a 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cryptographic processor with the proposed countermeasures. A protected AES processor can disable LFI attack with only +28% layout area penalty compared to an unprotected core.
The first contribution of our paper is that we propose a platform, a design strategy, and evaluation criteria for a fair and consistent hardware evaluation of the second-round SHA-3 candidates. Using a SASEBO-GII field-programmable gate array (FPGA) board as a common platform, combined with well defined hardware and software interfaces, we compare all 256-bit version candidates with respect to area, throughput, latency, power, and energy consumption. Our approach defines a standard testing harness for SHA-3 candidates, including the interface specification for the SHA-3 module on our testing platform. The second contribution is that we provide both FPGA and 90-nm CMOS application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) synthesis results and thereby are able to compare the results. Our third contribution is that we release the source code of all the candidates and by using a common, fixed, publicly available platform, our claimed results become reproducible and open for a public verification.