Kazuo Sakiyama

Kazuo Sakiyama

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

21Years (2006-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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7 November 2011 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KSKazuo Sakiyama
Kazuo Sakiyama
YLYang Li
Yang Li
MIMitsugu Iwamoto
Mitsugu Iwamoto
KOKazuo Ohta
Kazuo Ohta
This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of differential fault analysis (DFA) attacks on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) from an information-theoretic perspective. Injecting faults into cryptosystems is categorized as an active at tack where attackers induce an error in operations to retrieve the secret internal information, e.g., the secret key of ciphers. Here, we consider DFA attacks as equivalent to a special kind of passive attack where attackers can obtain leaked information without measurement noise. The DFA attacks are regarded as a conversion process from the leaked information to the secret key. Each fault model defines an upper bound for the amount of leaked information. The optimal DFA attacks should be able to exploit fully the leaked information in order to retrieve the secret key with a practical level of complexity. This paper discusses a new DFA methodology to achieve the optimal DFA attack by deriving the amount of the leaked information for various fault models from an information-theoretic perspective. We review several previous DFA at tacks on AES variants to check the optimality of their attacks. We also propose improved DFA attacks on AES-192 and AES-256 that reach the theoretical limits.

27 September 2018 in IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KMKohei Matsuda
Kohei Matsuda
TFTatsuya Fujii
Tatsuya Fujii
NSNatsu Shoji
Natsu Shoji
TSTakeshi Sugawara
Takeshi Sugawara
KSKazuo Sakiyama
Kazuo Sakiyama
NMNoriyuki Miura
Noriyuki Miura
Laser fault injection (LFI) attack on cryptographic processors is a serious threat to information security. This paper proposes a sense-and-react countermeasure against LFI. A distributed bulk-current sensor monitors the abnormal current conduction caused by laser irradiation to a silicon substrate. The single sensor occupies only 286 F 2 /Cell and it is distributed across the entire cryptographic core for 100% attack detection coverage. Upon detection of LFI attack, a flush code eraser prevents a leakage of faulty ciphertext by immediately shunting the core supply path within nano-second order. In addition, the core supply during the shunting is electrically isolated from the global supply line to prevent side-channel information leakage of intermediate faulty codes. A test chip was designed and fabricated in 0.18- $\mu \text{m}$ standard CMOS, integrating a 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cryptographic processor with the proposed countermeasures. A protected AES processor can disable LFI attack with only +28% layout area penalty compared to an unprotected core.

23 October 2012 in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
DYDai Yamamoto
Dai Yamamoto
KSKazuo Sakiyama
Kazuo Sakiyama
MIMitsugo Iwamoto
Mitsugo Iwamoto
KOKazuo Ohta
Kazuo Ohta
MTMasahiko Takenaka
Masahiko Takenaka
KIKouichi Itoh
Kouichi Itoh
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are expected to represent an important solution for secure ID generation and authentication etc. In general, manufactured PUFs are considered to be more secure when the pattern of outputs (the variety of responses) is larger, i.e., the response bit length is longer (e.g., 192-bit response is more secure than 128-bit one). However, the actual bit length is reduced because some response bits are inconsistent (random) for repeated measurements, which are regarded as unnecessary for ID generation and discarded. Latch-based PUFs with \(N\) RS latches, for example, generate ideally \(2^{N}\) responses depending on binary values output from RS latches (0/1). However, some RS latches output random responses which are inconsistent and cannot be used for reliable ID generation, so the variety of responses becomes smaller than \(2^{N}\). In this paper, we propose a novel Latch-based PUF structure, which outputs larger variety of responses by utilizing location information of the RS latches outputting the random responses. Differently from random responses themselves, this location information is determined during a manufacturing process, so almost fixed once PUFs are manufactured. The proposed PUF generates \(3^{N}\approx 2^{1.58N}\) responses by considering random responses as the third stable value: using ternary values (0/1/random). We estimate the variety of responses generated by the proposed PUFs. According to our experiment with 40 FPGAs, a Latch-based PUF with 128 RS latches can improve it from \(2^{116}\) to \(2^{192.7}\), this being maximized when the 128 latches outputs 0s, 1s, or random outputs with equal probability. We also show the appropriate RS latch structure for satisfying this condition, and validate it using two kinds of different Xilinx FPGAs: Spartan-3E and Spartan-6. The average error rate of responses is only 5.3 % when the core voltage is changed within the rated voltage range of the FPGAs. Our proposed PUF using ternary values enhances dramatically the variety of responses while keeping the reliability.

18 January 2024 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MYMingyu Yang
Mingyu Yang
TATanvir Ahmed
Tanvir Ahmed
SISaya Inagaki
Saya Inagaki
KSKazuo Sakiyama
Kazuo Sakiyama
YLYang Li
Yang Li
YHYuko Hara-Azumi
Yuko Hara-Azumi
With the growth of Internet of Things (IoT) era, the protection of secret information on IoT devices is becoming increasingly important. For IoT devices, attacks that target information leakage through physical side-channels (e.g., a power side-channel) are a major threat in many use cases because IoT devices can be accessed easily by a hostile third party. However, securing resource-constrained IoT devices against side-channel attacks is a challenging issue. Generally, it is difficult to satisfy the requirements on side-channel protection while maintaining the low-power and real-time constrains of IoT devices. In this paper, we propose a hardware/software cooperative design for cryptosystems that is suitable for resource-constrained IoT devices. Combining a security-oriented processor design (i.e., an instruction set architecture definition and its architectural structure) and careful implementations of masked software implementation for cipher algorithms can effectively improve the power-performance-area (PPA) while suppressing power side-channel leakage. In our evaluation, for three ciphers (Chaskey, Simon, and AES), we demonstrate that our work is superior to state-of-the-art works (two RISC-V processors and a small-scale low-power processor) in terms of both PPA and power side-channel protection.

28 February 2020 in Japanese Journal of Applied Physics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
KMKohei Matsuda
Kohei Matsuda
STSho Tada
Sho Tada
MNMakoto Nagata
Makoto Nagata
YKYuichi Komano
Yuichi Komano
YLYang Li
Yang Li
NMNoriyuki Miura
Noriyuki Miura
Laser fault injection (LFI) attacks on cryptographic processor ICs are a critical threat to information systems. This paper proposes an IC-level integrated countermeasure employing an information leakage sensor against an LFI attack. Distributed bulk current sensors monitor abnormal bulk current density caused by laser irradiation for LFI. Time-interleaved sensor operation and sensitivity tuning can obtain partial secret key leakage bit information with small layout area penalty. Based on the leakage information, the secret key can be securely updated to realize high-availability resilient systems. The test chip was designed and fabricated in a 0.18 μm standard CMOS, integrating a 128-bit advanced encryption standard cryptographic processor with the proposed information leakage sensor. This evaluation successfully demonstrated bulk current density and leakage bit monitoring.

1 June 2010
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
KKKazuyuki Kobayashi
Kazuyuki Kobayashi
JIJun Ikegami
Jun Ikegami
MKMiroslav Knezevic
Miroslav Knezevic
EGEric Xu Guo
Eric Xu Guo
SMShin'IChiro Matsuo
Shin'IChiro Matsuo
KOKazuo Ohta
Kazuo Ohta
The objective of the SHA-3 NIST competition is to select, from multiple competing candidates, a standard algorithm for cryptographic hashing. The selected winner must have adequate cryptographic properties and good implementation characteristics over a wide range of target platforms, including both software and hardware. Performance evaluation in hardware is particularly challenging because of the large design space, wide range of target technologies, and multitude of optimization criteria. We describe the efforts of three research groups to evaluate SHA-3 candidates using a common prototyping platform. Using a SASEBO-GII FPGA board as a starting point, we evaluate the performance of the 14 remaining SHA-3 candidates with respect to area, throughput, and power consumption. Our approach defines a standard testing harness for SHA-3 candidates, including the interface specifications for the SHA-3 module on the SASEBO testing board.