Previous studies report mixed evidence regarding the effect of political connections on firm value. We seek new evidence in China, an important emerging market with a hallmark of a relationship-based economy. Using financially distressed firms (special treatment or ST firms) as a unique sample, we identify a direct channel through which political connections enhance firm value by showing that politically connected firms receive more government subsidies. Moreover, such effect becomes stronger for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), for firms with a better chance of survival, and after the government implemented a new policy to more strictly enforce the delisting in 2012.

In recent years, the issue of sustainable development has become increasingly important in the port industry. As port policies are altered under decentralization and governance models, the application of corporate responsibility (CR) is expanding. It is now expected that ports take on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) responsibilities. This paper focuses on the application of an ESG framework to the port industry in China, with a specific emphasis on social responsibilities. By focusing on ESG-focal issues in the port industry, we establish a model for evaluating the sustainability of ports that takes into account the three dimensions of environment, society, and governance. An empirical analysis of Shanghai Port in China is presented to illustrate the application of the framework. The paper highlights the main contribution of the ESG framework to support sustainable port development and provides recommendations for promoting the implementation of ESG and sustainable development in the industry.

Using data on private placements in China from 2007 to 2014, we show that abnormal returns of issuing companies’ stocks are significantly positive on the announcement day, but they become significantly negative during the event window [−20, +20]. Participation by institutional investors has a significant and negative impact on the short-term stock returns. This negative effect is also present in issuing companies’ long-term stock returns and profitability. Furthermore, we find that participation by institutional investors reduces dividend payments after private placements. Overall, our findings do not support the monitoring hypothesis of institutional investors’ role in corporate finance but are consistent with the management entrenchment hypothesis and shareholder pessimism hypothesis.

To control the uniqueness risk in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects of transportation infrastructure, we design a simplified uniqueness contract model by incorporating the impact of the initial investment which is based on the Bertrand model. The nonlinear programming method is adopted to derive the optimal uniqueness contracts for incumbent private capital, the public, and the social welfare, respectively. The simulation results show that the achievement of the optimal uniqueness contract is essentially the result of a compromise between the private capital, the public, and social welfare. The extent to which such a contract reduces the probability of uniqueness risk mainly depends on the equilibrium relation between the interests of private capital and the public. The initial investment is not related to the government default when the contract does not take into account the interests of the private capital. Furthermore, the uniqueness contracts between private capital and the government are mainly for anticompetitive purpose in the PPP market of transportation infrastructure. Unless the contract terms focus on the improvement of social welfare, entering a uniqueness contract will cause social welfare losses.

Stringent government policies, in general, and strict containment and closure policies in particular including workplace closing, restrictions on gatherings, close of public transport, stay-at-home order, restrictions on internal movement, and international travel control are associated with a lower spread rate of COVID-19 cases. On the other hand, school closures and public event cancellations have not been found to be associated with lower COVID-19 spread. Restrictions on international travel and the closing of public transport are two policies that stand out and have a consistent and slowing effect on the spread of COVID-19. The slowing effect of the containment and closure policies on the spread of COVID-19 becomes stronger one week after the policies have been implemented, consistent with the SARS-CoV-2 transmission pattern and the incubation period evolution. Furthermore, the slowing effect becomes stronger for culturally tight countries and countries with a higher population density. Our findings have important policy implications, implying that governments need to carefully implement containment and closure policies in their own countries’ social and cultural contexts, with an emphasis on the ideas of the common interest, personal responsibility, and the sense of community.

In this paper, we consider the relative efficiency of unit taxation and ad valorem taxation in terms of welfare implications in different imperfectly competitive markets. Under the assumption that these two taxations can produce the same total output in equilibrium, which is also used by Anderson ( 2001 ), we show that ad valorem taxation is always welfare superior to unit taxation under full nationalisation, full privatisation, and partial privatisation.