Siegfried Berninghaus

Prof. Dr. Siegfried Berninghaus

TAKON GmbH. Spieltheoretische Beratung Schwalbenweg 5 95445 Bayreuth, Germany

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

17Years (2010-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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18 January 2012 in Economic Inquiry
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SBSiegfried Berninghaus
Siegfried Berninghaus
SBSabrina Bleich
Sabrina Bleich
WGWerner Güth
Werner Güth

26 April 2013 in Games
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SBSiegfried Berninghaus
Siegfried Berninghaus
WGWerner Güth
Werner Güth
SSStephan Schosser
Stephan Schosser
In repeated public good experiments, reciprocity helps to sustain high levels of cooperation. Can this be achieved by location choices in addition to making contributions? It is more realistic to rely on an intuitive neighborhood model for community members who interact repeatedly. In our experiments, participants can locate their contribution, yielding a small benefit for the participant, who receives the contribution and a small disadvantage for the participant, at the opposite location. This mechanism of individually targeted sanctions helps to foster initial cooperation. It decreases over time, however. Location choices are used to reciprocate, but may not suffice to stabilize voluntary cooperation as an effect observed in the field.

31 July 2014 in Games
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SBSiegfried Berninghaus
Siegfried Berninghaus
TNThomas Neumann
Thomas Neumann
BVBodo Vogt
Bodo Vogt
Our study analyzes theories of learning for strategic interactions in networks. Participants played two of the 2 × 2 games used by Selten and Chmura [1]. Every participant played against four neighbors. As a distinct aspect our experimental design allows players to choose different strategies against each different neighbor. The games were played in two network structures: a lattice and a circle. We analyze our results with respect to three aspects. We first compare our results with the predictions of five different equilibrium concepts (Nash equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium) which represent the long-run equilibrium of a learning process. Secondly, we relate our results to four different learning models (impulse-matching learning, action-sampling learning, self-tuning EWA, and reinforcement learning) which are based on the (behavioral) round-by-round learning process. At last, we compare the data with the experimental results of Selten and Chmura [1]. One main result is that the majority of players choose the same strategy against each neighbor. As other results, we observe an order of predictive success for the equilibrium concepts that is different from the order shown by Selten and Chmura and an order of predictive success for the learning models that is only slightly different from the order shown in a recent paper by Chmura, Goerg and Selten [2].

1 January 2010
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SBSiegfried Berninghaus
Siegfried Berninghaus
KEKarl-Martin Ehrhart
Karl-Martin Ehrhart
WGWerner Güth
Werner Güth

1 January 2010
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Book Chapter
Closed access
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SBSiegfried Berninghaus
Siegfried Berninghaus
KEKarl-Martin Ehrhart
Karl-Martin Ehrhart
WGWerner Güth
Werner Güth

1 January 2010
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
SBSiegfried Berninghaus
Siegfried Berninghaus
KEKarl-Martin Ehrhart
Karl-Martin Ehrhart
WGWerner Güth
Werner Güth