In this paper, we propose Kripke-style models for the logics of evidence and truth and . These logics extend, respectively, Nelson’s logic and the logic of first-degree entailment () with a classicality operator ∘ that recovers classical logic for formulas in its scope. According to the intended interpretation here proposed, these models represent a database that receives information as time passes, and such information can be positive, negative, non-reliable, or reliable, while a formula means that the information about A, either positive or negative, is reliable. This proposal is in line with the interpretation of and as information-based logics, but adds to the four scenarios expressed by them two new scenarios: reliable (or conclusive) information (i) for the truth and (ii) for the falsity of a given proposition.
20 May 2015 in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
In this paper, I investigate whether the intuitions that make connexive logics seem plausible might lie in pragmatic phenomena, rather than the semantics of conditional statements. I conclude that pragmatics indeed underwrites these intuitions, at least for indicative statements. Whether this has any effect on logic choice (and what that effect might be), however, heavily depends on one’s semantic theory of conditionals and on how one chooses to logically treat pragmatic failures.
In this paper, we introduce a new logic, which we call AM3. It is a connexive logic that has several interesting properties, among them being strongly connexive and validating the Converse Boethius Thesis. These two properties are rather characteristic of the difference between, on the one hand, Angell and McCall’s CC1 and, on the other, Wansing’s C. We will show that in other aspects, as well, AM3 combines what are, arguably, the strengths of both CC1 and C. It also allows us an interesting look at how connexivity and the intuitionistic understanding of negation relate to each other. However, some problems remain, and we end by pointing to a large family of weaker logics that AM3 invites us to further explore.
In this paper we re-assess the philosophical foundation of Exactly True Logic ( $$\mathcal {ET\!L}$$ ), a competing variant of First Degree Entailment ( $$\mathcal {FDE}$$ ). In order to do this, we first rebut an argument against it. As the argument appears in an interview with Nuel Belnap himself, one of the fathers of $$\mathcal {FDE}$$ , we believe its provenance to be such that it needs to be taken seriously. We submit, however, that the argument ultimately fails, and that $$\mathcal {ET\!L}$$ cannot easily be dismissed. We then proceed to give an overview of the research that was inspired by this logic over the last decade, thus providing further motivation for the study of $$\mathcal {ET\!L}$$ and, more generally, of $$\mathcal {FDE}$$ -related logics that result from semantical analyses alternative to Belnap’s canonical one. We focus, in particular, on philosophical questions that these developments raise.