In this paper, we propose Kripke-style models for the logics of evidence and truth and . These logics extend, respectively, Nelson’s logic and the logic of first-degree entailment () with a classicality operator ∘ that recovers classical logic for formulas in its scope. According to the intended interpretation here proposed, these models represent a database that receives information as time passes, and such information can be positive, negative, non-reliable, or reliable, while a formula means that the information about A, either positive or negative, is reliable. This proposal is in line with the interpretation of and as information-based logics, but adds to the four scenarios expressed by them two new scenarios: reliable (or conclusive) information (i) for the truth and (ii) for the falsity of a given proposition.
In this paper I sketch some lines of response to Mark Colyvan’s (2008) indispensability arguments for the existence of inconsistent objects, being mainly concerned with the indispens ability of inconsistent mathematical entities. My response will draw heavily on Jody Azzouni’s (2004) deflationary nominalism.