We present two experiments on the behavioral effects of prospective relative performance information (RPI) when facing multiple reference groups that differ in their implicit performance standard. In Study 1, employees are exogenously assigned to either a high- or low-standard reference group. Our results suggest that employees generally seek to enhance their sense of belonging by conforming to the standard. However, RPI boosts the performance of high-performers assigned to the low-standard group, whereas low-performers assigned to the high-standard group show decreased performance. This indicates that RPI may reinforce a sense of not belonging. In Study 2, where employees self-select their reference group, our results suggest that they generally sort themselves according to their sense of belonging. Anticipating RPI, however, can induce employees to select the high-standard group as a self-set target, spurring motivation. Overall, our studies shed more light on the costs and benefits of RPI and self-selection options. Data Availability: The full experimental instrument and data are available from the authors upon request. JEL Classifications: C91; D91; M41; M54.
1 July 2022 in Production and Operations Management
This paper considers price competition in a market where two firms sell a homogeneous service to a continuum of customers differing with respect to some exogenous characteristic. Our paper's novelty consists of explicitly acknowledging a distinctive property of many services in that firms incur customer‐specific service costs after the contract is signed. Hence, not only the customers' willingness‐to‐pay and as such demand but also the firms' supply are related to customer characteristics. In this paper, we shed light on the implications thereof for optimal pricing and market segmentation strategies in a monopoly as well as a duopoly market. Importantly, we stress the profitability of services by demonstrating that firms in highly competitive industries still earn positive expected profits in equilibrium.
In this note, I discuss the article of Dorner et al. who experimentally study the issue of generating high-quality online product reviews under two different incentive schemes. I first classify their work in the existing literature on marketing and information systems and highlight their contribution. I then argue that the existence of cognitive dissonance costs serve as a reasonable explanatory factor for their main results. Two further critical issues warn against the limited generalizability of the present study to the real review market and ability to provide practical implications.