Centre for North American Business Studies (CNABS), Segal Graduate School of Business, Simon Fraser University, 500 Granville Street, Vancouver, BC, V6C 1W6, Canada
Prof. Dr. Aidan R. Vining
Centre for North American Business Studies (CNABS), Segal Graduate School of Business, Simon Fraser University, 500 Granville Street, Vancouver, BC, V6C 1W6, Canada
Governments in many industrialized nations have made concerted efforts to reduce their immediate expenditures and to reduce the cost of major infrastructure projects. Public–private partnerships (P3s) are one emerging method that might do so. Despite the increased use of P3s, there is little independent research on the effectiveness of P3s as a public policy instrument. This article considers the major rationales for P3s, including cost savings and keeping project financing off government budgets. It then presents a transaction cost model that suggests that P3s can often be prone to conflict, high contracting costs, opportunism and failure. Evidence from six major infrastructure projects and a summary analysis of US prisons is then presented. These cases confirm that contracting costs have been high, as predicted by the model. Specifically, high contracting costs reflect the presence of complexity/uncertainty, asset specificity, the potential for ex post bilateral opportunism and a lack of contract management skills by governments. Given these circumstances, the private sector can behave opportunistically at the expense of the public sector as there has sometimes been a political imperative to prevent projects from terminating. Public partners have also behaved opportunistically after projects are in place. Unless public sector managers recognize that they must design contracts that both compensate private sector partners for risk and then ensure that they actually bear it, P3s have little chance of being efficient or effective service delivery mechanisms.
3 March 2011 in International Public Management Journal
Strategy matters in the public sector as well as in the private sector. Michael Porter's “five competitive forces” (5 Forces) framework (Porter 1979 Porter , M. E. 1979 . “How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy.” Harvard Business Review 57 ( 2 ): 137 – 145 . [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar] ; 1980 Porter , M. E. 1980 . Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors . New York : Free Press . [Google Scholar] ; 2008 Porter , M. E. 2008 . “The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy.” Harvard Business Review 86 ( 1 ): 78 – 97 . [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar] ) is widely used by private-sector firms to analyze the external environment and specific external forces. Can public agency managers use some version of 5 Forces analysis to effectively analyze the external environments of their programs? What modifications are required for public agency use? The case is made that a version of the 5 Forces framework can be useful when appropriately modified for public agency programs. The public agency version of the 5 Forces framework that is presented specifically considers public agency goals from three perspectives: descriptive, instrumental, and normative. The descriptive focus on autonomy is laid out. Another modification to the standard framework explicitly introduces political influence as an external force. Thus, the modified framework considers and integrates both political and economic external forces. Several significant modifications to Porter's other forces are also proposed and discussed. A number of strategic implications of public program 5 Forces analysis are discussed. The modified 5 Forces framework is illustrated both in terms of autonomy (descriptive level) and social efficiency (normative perspective).
14 February 2014 in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics