Anthony Boardman

Prof. Anthony Boardman

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

23Years (2004-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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24 April 2012 in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics
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Journal Article
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Anthony BoardmanAnthony Boardman
Anthony Boardman
Aidan R. ViningAidan R. Vining
Aidan R. Vining

1 September 2005 in Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice
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Journal Article
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Aidan R. ViningAidan R. Vining
Aidan R. Vining
Anthony BoardmanAnthony Boardman
Anthony Boardman
FPFinn Poschmann
Finn Poschmann
Governments in many industrialized nations have made concerted efforts to reduce their immediate expenditures and to reduce the cost of major infrastructure projects. Public–private partnerships (P3s) are one emerging method that might do so. Despite the increased use of P3s, there is little independent research on the effectiveness of P3s as a public policy instrument. This article considers the major rationales for P3s, including cost savings and keeping project financing off government budgets. It then presents a transaction cost model that suggests that P3s can often be prone to conflict, high contracting costs, opportunism and failure. Evidence from six major infrastructure projects and a summary analysis of US prisons is then presented. These cases confirm that contracting costs have been high, as predicted by the model. Specifically, high contracting costs reflect the presence of complexity/uncertainty, asset specificity, the potential for ex post bilateral opportunism and a lack of contract management skills by governments. Given these circumstances, the private sector can behave opportunistically at the expense of the public sector as there has sometimes been a political imperative to prevent projects from terminating. Public partners have also behaved opportunistically after projects are in place. Unless public sector managers recognize that they must design contracts that both compensate private sector partners for risk and then ensure that they actually bear it, P3s have little chance of being efficient or effective service delivery mechanisms.

16 June 2016 in Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice
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Journal Article
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Anthony BoardmanAnthony Boardman
Anthony Boardman
MHMark Hellowell
Mark Hellowell
Governments throughout the world are turning to public‒private partnerships (PPPs) as a means of providing new infrastructure. The decision to adopt a PPP over conventional government procurement is usually based on a value for money (VfM) appraisal, but this analysis is conducted differently in different countries. This article describes the correct way to conduct VfM analysis if the goal is to minimize the present value of the costs to the Treasury and if the goal is to maximize social welfare. It then compares the documented methodologies of nine specialist PPP units. It identifies four ways in which these methodologies depart from either of the correct approaches, and shows how each departure favors the PPP option. Finally, it shows how the UK approach might be augmented to determine the best value to society.

1 December 2004 in Industrial and Corporate Change
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Anthony BoardmanAnthony Boardman
Anthony Boardman
EHErica Susan Hewitt
Erica Susan Hewitt
This paper identifies and discusses the problems associated with contracting out labor-intensive government services. It examines in detail the contracting out of the orderly service at Sir Charles Gairdner Hospital (SCGH) in Western Australia and its subsequent return to in-house delivery. When the orderly service was contracted out, the result was poor in terms of cost, quality and externalities. Subsequent return of the service to in-house provision reduced costs and improved quality. The problems that led to failure of contracting out and subsequent success of in-house provision can be explained in terms of transaction cost economics.

12 September 2015 in Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice
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Journal Article
Open access
Anthony BoardmanAnthony Boardman
Anthony Boardman
CGCarsten Greve
Carsten Greve
GHGraeme A. Hodge
Graeme A. Hodge
Infrastructure public–private partnerships, also known as PPPs or P3s, continue to be a fascinating aspect of public policy around the globe. It has been more than two decades since John Major’s go...