Wanyuan Wang

Dr. Wanyuan Wang

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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26 January 2017 in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WWWeiwei Wu
Weiwei Wu
WWWanyuan Wang
Wanyuan Wang
MLMinming Li
Minming Li
JWJianping Wang
Jianping Wang
XFXiaolin Fang
Xiaolin Fang
JLJunzhou Luo
Junzhou Luo
In crowdsourcing markets, a requester announces a task and calls for contribution from potential participants. With strategic participants, the requester needs to reward the participants to introduce the incentives of participation. However, it is natural to ask whether it is worth introducing incentives if the total payment for eliciting incentives is too high. This paper addresses such a fundamental concern by designing a frugal mechanism with minimum payment used to procure the total amount of service contributions demanded. We design two mechanisms to provide the incentives of participation while minimizing the payment used by the requester. We first propose a frugal auction-based mechanism, which stimulates participants to truthfully report their information. We theoretically prove that the payment used is not more than the optimal cost (with no incentive considered) plus a bounded additive. We then design a Stackelberg-game-based mechanism, in which the requester fixes a certain total payment at the very beginning so as to encourage the participants to compete for it and participate in the task. We verify the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium (NE) and develop a novel algorithm to find the NE, as well as the optimal payment to extract the NE. Our simulation results show that the payment used in these mechanisms is close to the optimal solution with no incentive considered, while the extra payment caused by introducing truthfulness in auction-based mechanism is about twice that of the NE in Stakelberg-game-based mechanism.

5 February 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YXYuhang Xu
Yuhang Xu
WWWanyuan Wang
Wanyuan Wang
GXGuangwei Xiong
Guangwei Xiong
XLXiang Liu
Xiang Liu
WWWeiwei Wu
Weiwei Wu
KLKai Liu
Kai Liu
Ride-hailing systems (RHSs) provide passengers with convenient and flexible mobility services, have played an important role in modern urban transportation. With the limited vehicles, RHSs wish to optimize the dispatch of vehicles to requests with the objective of serving as many requests as possible. To address such a city-scale vehicle dispatch problem with thousands of vehicles and requests in each epoch, existing algorithms always take a tradeoff between effectiveness (i.e., real-time) and efficiency (i.e., service rate), such as ignoring future demands to guarantee real-time or solving a complex combinatorial optimization to improve service rate. To guarantee the service rate in a real-time fashion, this paper proposes two novel network flow-based vehicle dispatch algorithms. A network flow-based algorithm (NFBA) is provided to deal with offline scenarios. By constructing the vehicle-shareability network, a min-cost flow is built to find the optimal dispatch of vehicles to requests. To improve the request service rate in real-time, an efficient multi-sample multi-network flow-based algorithm (MNFBA) is proposed for the online scenarios. Each min-cost flow is utilized for a sample of future requests, and online vehicle dispatch policy is averaged over these flows. Extensive simulations based on real-world trip datasets in New York City are conducted. The experimental results show that compared to the benchmarks, our proposed algorithm can generate the dispatch of vehicles to requests within seconds, but can greatly increase the daily request service rate.

5 September 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XLXIANG Liu
XIANG Liu
CFChenchen Fu
Chenchen Fu
WWWeiwei Wu
Weiwei Wu
MLMinming Li
Minming Li
WWWanyuan Wang
Wanyuan Wang
JLJunzhou Luo
Junzhou Luo
In a crowdsensing platform, users are invited to provide data services, and multiple requesters compete for desired services. Due to users' costs of providing services, it is critical to design incentive mechanisms to incentivize users with (monetary) rewards. Meanwhile, requesters may have individual budgets and compete for services with different procurement abilities. Such a setting falls into the budget-feasible mechanism design. However, most of the existing budget-feasible mechanisms focus on one-sided markets with a single requester rather than the two-sided markets with multiple requesters having different procurement abilities. Moreover, requesters and users can be selfish and strategic with their private information, which requires preventing information manipulation on both requesters' and users' sides. In this paper, we investigate budget-feasible mechanisms in two-sided crowdsensing markets where multiple strategic requesters come with private budgets to obtain services from the strategic users. We also consider the fairness on the requesters' side, i.e. , a requester with more budget should obtain more service. We propose budget-feasible mechanisms for two models by distinguishing the types of services, i.e. , the homogeneous or heterogeneous services. All proposed mechanisms satisfy fairness, budget feasibility, truthfulness on both users' and requesters' sides, and the constant approximation ratio. Numerical experiment results further demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed mechanisms.

7 October 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WWWanyuan Wang
Wanyuan Wang
HZHaipeng Zhang
Haipeng Zhang
TQTianchi Qiao
Tianchi Qiao
JMJinming Ma
Jinming Ma
JJJiahui Jin
Jiahui Jin
YJYichuan Jiang
Yichuan Jiang
Traffic signal control (TSC) has been one of the most useful ways for reducing urban road congestion. The challenge of TSC includes 1) real-time signal decision, 2) the complexity in traffic dynamics, and 3) the network-level coordination. Reinforcement learning (RL) methods can query policies by mapping the traffic state to the signal decision in real-time, however, are inadequate for different traffic flow environment. By observing real traffic information, online planning methods can compute the signal decisions in a responsive manner. Unfortunately, existing online planning methods either require high computation complexity or get stuck in local coordination. Against this background, we propose an explicit multiagent coordination (EMC)-based online planning methods that can satisfy adaptive, real-time and network-level TSC. By multiagent, we model each intersection as an autonomous agent, and the coordination efficiency is modeled by a cost function between neighbor intersections. By network-level coordination, each agent exchanges messages of cost function with its neighbors in a fully decentralized manner. By real-time, the message-passing procedure can interrupt at any time when the real time limit is reached and agents select the optimal signal decisions according to current message. Finally, we test our EMC method in both synthetic and real road network datasets. Experimental results are encouraging: compared to RL and conventional transportation baselines, our EMC method performs reasonably well in terms of adapting to real-time traffic dynamics, minimizing vehicle travel time and scalability to city-scale road networks.

21 March 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Services Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WWWeiwei Wu
Weiwei Wu
WWWanyuan Wang
Wanyuan Wang
XFXiaolin Fang
Xiaolin Fang
JLJunzhou Luo
Junzhou Luo
Athanasios V. VasilakosAthanasios V. Vasilakos
Athanasios V. Vasilakos
Despite the salient feature of cloud computing, the cloud provider still suffers from electricity bill, which mainly comes from 1) the power consumption of running physical machines and 2) the dynamically varying electricity price offered by smart grids. In the literature, there exist viable solutions adaptive to electricity price variation to reduce the electricity bill. However, they are not applicable to serving time-sensitive VM requests. In serving time-sensitive VM requests, it is potential for the cloud provider to apply proper consolidation strategies to further reduce the electricity bill. In this work, to address this challenge, we develop electricity-price-aware consolidation algorithms for both the offline and online scenarios. For the offline scenario, we first develop an consolidation algorithm with constant approximation, which always approaches the optimal solution within a constant factor of 5. For the online scenario, we propose an $O(\log(\frac{L_{max}}{L_{min}}))$ -competitive algorithm that is able to approach the optimal offline solution within a logarithmic factor, where $\frac{L_{max}}{L_{min}}$ is the ratio of the longest length of the processing time requirement of VMs to the shortest one. Our trace-driven simulation results further demonstrate that the average performance of the proposed algorithms produce near-optimal electricity bill.

1 February 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WWWanyuan Wang
Wanyuan Wang
ZDZichen Dong
Zichen Dong
BABo An
Bo An
YJYichuan Jiang
Yichuan Jiang