In a crowdsensing platform, users are invited to provide data services, and multiple requesters compete for desired services. Due to users' costs of providing services, it is critical to design incentive mechanisms to incentivize users with (monetary) rewards. Meanwhile, requesters may have individual budgets and compete for services with different procurement abilities. Such a setting falls into the budget-feasible mechanism design. However, most of the existing budget-feasible mechanisms focus on one-sided markets with a single requester rather than the two-sided markets with multiple requesters having different procurement abilities. Moreover, requesters and users can be selfish and strategic with their private information, which requires preventing information manipulation on both requesters' and users' sides. In this paper, we investigate budget-feasible mechanisms in two-sided crowdsensing markets where multiple strategic requesters come with private budgets to obtain services from the strategic users. We also consider the fairness on the requesters' side, i.e. , a requester with more budget should obtain more service. We propose budget-feasible mechanisms for two models by distinguishing the types of services, i.e. , the homogeneous or heterogeneous services. All proposed mechanisms satisfy fairness, budget feasibility, truthfulness on both users' and requesters' sides, and the constant approximation ratio. Numerical experiment results further demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed mechanisms.

In many IoT applications, information needs to be gathered from multiple heterogeneous sources to the base station for real-time processing and follow-up actions. Undoubtedly, information freshness, measured by age of information (AoI), is critical in taking responsive actions. Recent studies have taken AoI into the consideration of transmission scheduling over wireless channels. However, existing studies on guaranteeing AoI either assume error-free wireless channels or priorly known link reliability, which is unrealistic. In this paper, we tackle the AoI-guaranteed transmission scheduling problem over an unreliable channel with the aim of throughput maximization, which is modelled as an AoI-Guaranteed Multi-Armed Bandit (AG-MAB) problem. Since the problem has not been studied in the literature even for the oracle case with given link reliability, we first propose an optimal stationary randomized sampling (SRS) policy for the oracle case. For the AG-MAB problem with unknown link reliability, we propose learning algorithms that meet the AoI requirements with probability 1 and incur sublinear regret compared to Oracle SRS, which can also detect the unsatisfiability of the AoI constraint and switch to the fallback policy promptly with guaranteed accuracy. Numerical results show that our algorithm outperforms the AoI-constraint-aware baselines on throughput with per-source AoI requirement guaranteed.

Mobile crowdsourcing has emerged as a popular approach for organizations to leverage the collective intelligence of a crowd of users to obtain services. Considering users’ costs for providing services, it is vital for the requester to design incentive mechanisms to encourage users’ participation in crowdsourcing under the budget constraint. This aligns with the concept of budget-feasible mechanism design. Existing budget-feasible mechanisms often assume immediate user reachability and willingness of joining the crowdsourcing, which is unrealistic. To address this issue, a promising approach is to have participating users diffuse auction information to potential users in the social network. However, this brings another challenge in that participating users can be strategic and therefore hesitant to invite more potential competitors to join the crowdsourcing platform. In this paper, we focus on developing diffusion mechanisms that incentivize strategic users to actively diffuse auction information through the social network. This helps to attract more informed users and ultimately increases the value of the procured services. Specifically, we propose optimal budget-feasible diffusion mechanisms that simultaneously guarantee individual rationality, budget-feasibility, strong budget-balance, incentive-compatibility (i.e., users report real costs and diffuse auction information to all their neighbors) and approximation. Experiment results under real datasets further demonstrate the efficiency of proposed mechanisms.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) swarm offers extended coverage and is a vital solution for many applications. A key issue in UAV swarm control is to cover all targets while maintaining connectivity among UAVs, referred to as a multi-target coverage problem. With existing dynamic routing protocols, the flying ad hoc network suffers outdated and incorrect route information due to frequent topology changes. This might lead to failures of time-critical tasks. One mitigation solution is to keep the physical topology unchanged, thus maintaining a fixed communication topology and enabling static routing. However, keeping physical topology unchanged may sacrifice the coverage. In this paper, we propose to maintain a fixed communication topology among UAVs, which allows certain changes in physical topology, so that to maximize the coverage. We develop a distributed motion planning algorithm for the online multi-target coverage problem with the constraint of keeping communication topology intact. As the communication topology needs to be timely updated when UAVs leave or arrive at the swarm, we further design a topology-management protocol. Experimental results from the ns-3 simulator show that under our algorithms, UAV swarms of different sizes achieve significantly improved delay and loss ratio, efficient coverage, and rapid topology update.

Metaverse has been viewed as the next generation of human-computer interaction, which requires collecting information from both the physical and virtual world. One potential way is to employ virtual service providers (VSPs) to finish collection tasks by designing posted-pricing mechanisms via the crowdsensing platform. As VSPs’ costs and values are usually unknown, learning the optimal posted-pricing policy under uncertainty is undoubtedly critical to utilize the budget efficiently. However, existing posted-pricing learning algorithms assume that agents provide services without blocking and agents’ attributes follow an independent identical distribution, both of which are unrealistic in Metaverse, e.g ., VSPs should continuously sense the physical world to make provided services realistic, which makes the long working VSP unavailable/blocked for a certain period of time. In this paper, we address the budgeted pricing problem under uncertainty by considering blocking constraints and unknown non-identical VSPs’ attributes. The problem is modeled as a Budgeted-pricing Blocking Bandit (B ² -bandit) problem, which remains unaddressed even for the oracle case with known VSPs’ information. We thus first propose a pricing policy for the oracle case with an instance-dependent approximation ratio to the global optimum. For the general B ² -bandit problem with unknown information, we propose an online learning algorithm satisfying blocking constraints and incurring an accumulated regret up to O ( MK log B ) as compared to the oracle approximation algorithm, where M , K , B are the number of VSPs, candidate prices and the budget, respectively. Experiments on real datasets validate that the proposed algorithm improves more than 172% accumulated value compared to baseline pricing algorithms.