This paper takes a close look at the landscape of the Automatic Identification System (AIS) as a major source of information for maritime situational awareness (MSA) and identifies its vulnerabilities and challenges for safe navigation and shipping. As an important subset of cyber threats affecting many maritime systems, the AIS is subject to problems of tampering and reliability; indeed, the messages received may be inadvertently false, jammed, or intentionally spoofed. A systematic literature review was conducted for this article, complemented by a case study of a specific spoofing event near Elba in December 2019, which confirmed that the typical maritime AIS could be easily spoofed and generate erroneous position information. This intentional spoofing has affected navigation in international waters and passage through territorial waters. The maritime industry is neither immune to cyberattacks nor fully prepared for the risks associated with the use of modern digital systems. Maintaining seaworthiness in the face of the impact of digital technologies requires a robust cybersecurity framework.

This paper provides a close investigation into the landscape of both cyber threats and actual incidents in the maritime sector, identifying the cyber trends and challenges as they relate to safe navigation and marine shipping. As an important subset of cyber threats that impact many maritime systems, the vulnerabilities of satellite navigation systems, in particular the Global Positioning System (GPS), receive special attention. For this article, a systematic literature review was conducted, complemented by the research and analysis of a specific spoofing event. Analyzing available resources, we might summarize that a shift in mind-set is essential to direct more attention and resources toward cybersecurity as well as the necessity for manufacturers to improve the cybersecurity of their products, as shipping systems currently remain vulnerable to cybercriminals. There is a need for multiple positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) systems onboard maritime vessels to complement GPS-only navigation. The use of multiple satellite navigation constellations, public as well as private, in combination with the terrestrial components of an enhanced LOng-RAnge Navigation (eLoran) system and ports’ laser-based aid system for berthing and docking should provide the shipping industry with the direly needed increased protection from cyber-attackers for the foreseeable future.

The maritime industry is undergoing a profound transformation with the integration of autonomous technologies, which brings new challenges and opportunities for the education and training of seafarers. This article aims to examine the evolving landscape of autonomous ships and its impact on maritime education, with a focus on the changing roles and responsibilities of seafarers. The levels of autonomy defined by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) provide a framework for understanding the evolution towards fully autonomous ships and highlight the changing roles and responsibilities of seafarers. Using a systematic review based on the preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses (PRISMA), this study examines maritime education for maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS). Using Scopus, Web of Science (WoS) and Google Scholar, a comprehensive search was conducted to identify relevant studies focusing on seafarer training and the impact of automation in the maritime sector. The analysis included bibliometric assessments, historical reviews and a categorization of research topics. This systematic review contributes to a deeper understanding of the current state and trends in maritime education for autonomous shipping. The findings inform educators and industry stakeholders about the critical aspects of education and training needed to address the challenges and realize the potential benefits of autonomous technologies in the maritime sector. The inclusion of bibliometric analysis enriches the study by providing a comprehensive overview of the researchers.

The development of contemporary navigation and positioning systems have significantly improved reliability and speeds in maritime navigation. At the same time, the vulnerabilities of these systems to cyber threats represent a remarkable issue to the safety of navigation. Therefore, the maritime community has raised the question of cybersecurity of navigation systems in recent years. This paper aims to analyse the vulnerabilities of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), Electronic Chart Display Information System (ECDIS) and Automatic Identification System (AIS). The concepts of these systems were developed at a time when cybersecurity issues have not been among the top priorities. Open broadcasts, the absence of or limited existence of data encryption and authentication can be considered as their primary security weaknesses. Therefore, these systems are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The GPS as the data source of a ship’s position can relatively easily be jammed and/or spoofed, increasing the vulnerabilities of ECDIS and AIS. A systematic literature review was conducted for this article, supplemented by a SWOT analysis of the AIS service and particular case studies of recent cyber-attacks on these systems. The analysis of selected case studies confirmed that these systems could easily be spoofed and become a subject of data manipulation with significant consequences for the safety of navigation. The paper provides conclusions and recommendations highlighting the necessity for the users to be aware of the vulnerabilities of modern navigation systems.

This article takes a close look at the landscape of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing. It is well known that automated identification system (AIS) spoofing can be used for electronic warfare to conceal military activities in sensitive sea areas; however, recent events suggest that there is a similar interest of spoofing AIS signals for commercial purposes. The shipping industry is currently experiencing an unprecedented period of deceptive practices by tanker operators seeking to evade sanctions. Last year’s announcement of a price cap on Russian crude oil and a new ban on Western companies insuring Russian cargoes is setting the stage for an increase in illegal activity. Our research team identified and documented the AIS position falsification by tankers transporting Russian crude oil in closed ship-to-ship (STS) oil transfers. The identification of the falsified positions is based on the repeated instances of discrepancies between AIS location suggestions and satellite radar imagery indications. Using the data methods at our disposal, we reconstructed the true movements of certain tankers and encountered some surprising behavior. These false ship positions make it clear that we need effective tools and strategies to ensure the reliability and robustness of AISs.

The application of fuzzy logic is an effective approach to a variety of circumstances, including solutions to maritime anti-collision problems. The article presents an upgrade of the radar navigation system, in particular, its collision avoidance planning tool, using a decision model that combines dynamic parameters into one decision—the collision avoidance course. In this paper, a multi-parametric decision model based on fuzzy logic is proposed. The model calculates course alteration in a collision avoidance situation. First, the model collects input data of the target vessel and assesses the collision risk. Using time delay, four parameters are calculated for further processing as input variables for a fuzzy inference system. Then, the fuzzy logic method is used to calculate the course alteration, which considers the vessel’s safety domain and International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs). The special feature of the decision model is its tuning with the results of the database of correct solutions obtained with the manual radar plotting method. The validation was carried out with six selected cases simulating encounters with the target vessel in the open sea from different angles and at any visibility. The results of the case studies have shown that the decision model computes well in situations where the own vessel is in a give-way position. In addition, the model provides good results in situations when the target vessel violates COLREG rules. The collision avoidance planning tool can be automated and serve as a basis for further implementation of a model that considers the manoeuvrability of the vessels, weather conditions, and multi-vessel encounter situations.