This article takes a close look at the landscape of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing. It is well known that automated identification system (AIS) spoofing can be used for electronic warfare to conceal military activities in sensitive sea areas; however, recent events suggest that there is a similar interest of spoofing AIS signals for commercial purposes. The shipping industry is currently experiencing an unprecedented period of deceptive practices by tanker operators seeking to evade sanctions. Last year’s announcement of a price cap on Russian crude oil and a new ban on Western companies insuring Russian cargoes is setting the stage for an increase in illegal activity. Our research team identified and documented the AIS position falsification by tankers transporting Russian crude oil in closed ship-to-ship (STS) oil transfers. The identification of the falsified positions is based on the repeated instances of discrepancies between AIS location suggestions and satellite radar imagery indications. Using the data methods at our disposal, we reconstructed the true movements of certain tankers and encountered some surprising behavior. These false ship positions make it clear that we need effective tools and strategies to ensure the reliability and robustness of AISs.
The berthing of an ultra large ship is always a difficult issue and becomes yet more complex when vessels must be handled in restricted manoeuvring areas of limited depth, exposed to a forceful crosswind, or manoeuvring in a strong current, or all three. The final approaching manoeuvre and precise positioning is particularly demanding at container terminals where many STS cranes are located along the quay, seriously limiting margin for error in the process of mooring a ship, especially when the cranes are located nearby a bridge wing or at the very edge of the pier. In order to avoid collisions, the final manoeuvre (side-push) must be fully controlled; the ship’s orientation must be parallel with the quay while maintaining the minimum lateral approaching velocity without significantly shifting the vessel longitudinally. The mooring of a Ro-Ro vessel is occasionally even more challenging: a precise docking manoeuvre is normally executed without any towing assistance. In this paper low cost laser-based berthing and docking systems developed for the ports of Koper and Swinousce are presented and several berthing manoeuvres are analysed and compared with the most commonly used GNSS-based navigational aid system portable pilot units (PPU).
Accidents in port areas are generally relatively minor given the lower prevailing speeds, but dangerous cargo terminals located in the vicinity of populated areas present some risk of accidents with catastrophic consequences. The maritime risk assessment frameworks have been developed in many ports, but few include studies incorporating collisions between sailing and moored ships. This paper presents the risk assessment framework for such accidents. Moreover, it presents the important role of harbour regulations in the navigation risk management process within the port area. Today’s port regulations are created mostly based on the good practice of pilots and other experts, whereas quantitative methods are used less frequently. The intention of the presented case study was to demonstrate how quantitative risk assessment may be used in port policy development, which is why the method created is general and may be used in any terminal with dangerous cargo. The multi-stage method consists of several steps that make up a complex methodology, consisting of expert study, real-time simulation—a simulation of a collision in port is presented—and analytical-empirical calculations for consequence assessment. The case studies of the developed method are presented based on two real accidents, one in the Police port along the Świnoujście-Szczecin waterway, and the second in the Port of Koper in Slovenia. The results of this study present the parameters of the ship’s safe approach to the terminal area, such as velocity and approaching angle. These parameters are used to calculate the impact forces in the case of a collision between a moored and passing ship and its consequences on ship integrity as well as on mooring arrangement. Based on probability and consequences, the risk is evaluated and discussed in the sense of port safety. The presented method could be used as the framework for risk assessment of collisions in a port area, particularly when dealing with dangerous cargo or sensitive vessels such as cruise ships.