This article presents ACLED, an Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset. ACLED codes the actions of rebels, governments, and militias within unstable states, specifying the exact location and date of battle events, transfers of military control, headquarter establishment, civilian violence, and rioting. In the current version, the dataset covers 50 unstable countries from 1997 through 2010. ACLED’s disaggregation of civil war and transnational violent events allow for research on local level factors and the dynamics of civil and communal conflict. Findings from subnational conflict research challenges conclusions from larger national-level studies. In a brief descriptive analysis, the authors find that, on average, conflict covers 15% of a state’s territory, but almost half of a state can be directly affected by internal wars.
28 March 2001 in American Political Science Review
Coherent democracies and harshly authoritarian states have few civil wars, and intermediate regimes are the most conflict-prone. Domestic violence also seems to be associated with political change, whether toward greater democracy or greater autocracy. Is the greater violence of intermediate regimes equivalent to the finding that states in political transition experience more violence? If both level of democracy and political change are relevant, to what extent is civil violence related to each? Based on an analysis of the period 1816–1992, we conclude that intermediate regimes are most prone to civil war, even when they have had time to stabilize from a regime change. In the long run, since intermediate regimes are less stable than autocracies, which in turn are less stable than democracies, durable democracy is the most probable end-point of the democratization process. The democratic civil peace is not only more just than the autocratic peace but also more stable.
In the literature on civil war onset, several empirical results are not robust or replicable across studies. Studies use different definitions of civil war and analyze different time periods, so readers cannot easily determine if differences in empirical results are due to those factors or if most empirical results are just not robust. The authors apply a methodology for organized specification tests to check the robustness of empirical results. They isolate causes of variation in empirical results by using the same definition of civil war and analyzing the same time period while systematically exploring the sensitivity of eighty-eight variables used to explain civil war in the literature. Several relationships with the onset of civil wars prove robust: large population and low income levels, low rates of economic growth, recent political instability and inconsistent democratic institutions, small military establishments and rough terrain, and war-prone and undemocratic neighbors. Variables representing ethnic difference in the population are robust only in relation to lower level armed conflict.
Two studies question whether economic interdependence promotes peace, arguing that previous research has not adequately considered the endogeneity of trade. Using simultaneous equations to capture the reciprocal effects, they report that trade does not reduce conflict, though conflict reduces trade. These results are puzzling on logical grounds. Trade should make conflict less likely, ceteris paribus, if interstate violence adversely affects commerce; otherwise, national leaders are acting irrationally. In re-analyzing the authors’ data, this article shows that trade does promote peace once the gravity model is incorporated into the analysis of conflict. Both trade and conflict are influenced by nations’ sizes and the distance separating them, so these fundamental exogenous factors must be included in models of conflict as well as trade. One study errs in omitting distance when explaining militarized disputes. The other does not adequately control for the effect of size (or power). When these theoretically informed changes are made, the pacific benefit of trade again appears. In new simultaneous analyses, the article confirms that trade promotes peace and conflict contemporaneously reduces commerce, even with extensive controls for traders’ rational expectations of violence. Previous studies that address the endogeneity of trade by controlling for the years of peace — as virtually all have done since 1999 — have not overstated the benefit of interdependence. Commerce promotes peace because violence has substantial costs, whether these are paid prospectively or contemporaneously.
19 September 2006 in American Journal of Political Science