Scott Gates

Scott Gates

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Scott Gates

Peace Research Institute Oslo, Oslo, Norway

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

22Years (2005-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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19 September 2006 in American Journal of Political Science
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Journal Article
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SGScott Gates
Scott Gates
HHHåvard Hegre
Håvard Hegre
MJMark P. Jones
Mark P. Jones
HSHåvard Strand
Håvard Strand

28 January 2005 in Review of Development Economics
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Journal Article
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SMS. Mansoob Murshed
S. Mansoob Murshed
SGScott Gates
Scott Gates

1 September 2015 in British Journal of Political Science
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Journal Article
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KSKaare W. Strøm
Kaare W. Strøm
SGScott Gates
Scott Gates
BGBenjamin A.T. Graham
Benjamin A.T. Graham
HSHåvard Strand
Håvard Strand
Arrangements for sharing political power serve three purposes: to give all relevant groups access to important political decisions; to partition the policy process, thereby granting groups relevant autonomy; and to constrain holders of political power from abusing authority. A new global dataset of political power sharing institutions, 1975–2010, is introduced here, disaggregated these along three institutional dimensions: inclusive, dispersive, and constraining. Existing literature associates power sharing with democracy and civil conflict resolution. Unlike the existing literature, this dataset shows inclusive institutions are common in post-conflict states, though least strongly associated with electoral democracy. Conversely, constraining institutions, though comparatively rare in states with current or recent civil conflicts, are highly correlated with electoral democracy.

6 December 2018 in American Journal of Political Science
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NBNils‐Christian Bormann
Nils‐Christian Bormann
LCLars‐Erik Cederman
Lars‐Erik Cederman
SGScott Gates
Scott Gates
BGBenjamin A. T. Graham
Benjamin A. T. Graham
SHSimon Hug
Simon Hug
JWJulian Wucherpfennig
Julian Wucherpfennig
Grievances that derive from the unequal treatment of ethnic groups are a key motivation for civil war. Ethnic power sharing should therefore reduce the risk of internal conflict. Yet conflict researchers disagree on whether formal power‐sharing institutions effectively prevent large‐scale violence. We can improve our understanding of the effect of power‐sharing institutions by analyzing the mechanisms under which they operate. To this effect, we compare the direct effect of formal power‐sharing institutions on peace with their indirect effect through power‐sharing behavior. Combining data on inclusive and territorially dispersive institutions with information on power‐sharing behavior, we empirically assess this relationship on a global scale. Our causal mediation analysis reveals that formal power‐sharing institutions affect the probability of ethnic conflict onset mostly through power‐sharing behavior that these institutions induce.

1 September 2017 in Journal of Peace Research
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Journal Article
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SGScott Gates
Scott Gates
Unable to attract enough voluntary recruits, many rebel groups rely on force to fill their ranks. Given that the group used force to compel individuals to join, a coerced conscript would be presumed unlikely to be loyal and would be expected to desert at the first opportunity. Yet, groups that have relied on coerced recruitment retain their members just as well as, if not better than, rebel armies that rely on voluntary methods of recruitment. This is a puzzle. How do rebel groups maintain allegiance and prevent desertion, especially if they rely on abduction to staff their ranks? A recruit can be forced to join a rebel group, but continuing to rely on coercion to enforce retention is too costly and not sustainable. These groups must find a way to reduce the costs of retention. The solution to this puzzle rests in the mechanisms of socialization that shape the allegiance of forcibly recruited soldiers. Socialization mechanisms are traced through three outcomes: compliance (or Type 0 socialization), role learning (Type I socialization), and norm internalization (Type II socialization). Integrating socialization theory and a rational choice analysis demonstrates that mechanisms that alter preferences through Type II socialization are effective in retaining recruits; the highest level of retention occurs when several mechanisms work in concert. Illustrative case studies of the Lord’s Resistance Army from Uganda, the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, the Maoists in Nepal, and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) show that a reliance on child soldiers, group assets (pecuniary and non-pecuniary), organizational structure, and the nature of military contestation shape when different mechanisms are effective or not.

29 January 2019 in Conflict and Health
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Journal Article
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PDPhilippa Druce
Philippa Druce
EBEkaterina Bogatyreva
Ekaterina Bogatyreva
FSFrederik Francois Siem
Frederik Francois Siem
SGScott Gates
Scott Gates
HKHanna Kaade
Hanna Kaade
SSSylvia Sylvia
Sylvia Sylvia
The escalation of conflict in the Middle East coincides with an emerging trend of attacks on healthcare. Protection of health personnel, health services and humanitarian workers is no longer respected. This compromises the achievement of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 3 – towards health for all, and 16 – towards justice and peace. The Centre for Global Health at the University of Oslo, the Peace Research Institute Oslo and the Norwegian Red Cross co-organised a meeting exploring how conflict impacts health systems and potential solutions to protect and maintain health care services.