In a world where ideas flow freely across multiple platforms, people must often rely on others' advice and opinions without an objective standard to judge whether this information is accurate. The present study explores the hypothesis that an individual's internal decision confidence can be used as a signal to learn the accuracy of others' advice, even in the absence of feedback. According to this "agreement-in-confidence" hypothesis, people can learn about an advisor's accuracy across multiple interactions according to whether the advice offered agrees with their own initial opinions, weighted by the confidence with which these initial opinions are held. We test this hypothesis using a judge-advisor system paradigm to precisely manipulate the profiles of virtual advisors in a perceptual decision-making task. We find that when advisors' and participants' judgments are independent, people can correctly learn advisors' features, like their accuracy and calibration, whether or not objective feedback is available. However, when their judgments (and thus errors) are correlated-as is the case in many real social contexts-predictable distortions in trust can be observed between feedback and feedback-free scenarios. Using agent-based simulations, we explore implications of these individual-level heuristics for network-level patterns of trust and belief formation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
1 August 2016 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
When deciding whether or not to bring an umbrella to work, your confidence will be influenced by the sky outside the window (direct evidence) as well as by, for example, whether or not people walking in the street have their own umbrella (indirect or contingent evidence). These 2 distinct aspects of decision confidence have not yet been assessed independently within the same framework. Here we study the relative contributions of stimulus-specific and social-contingent information on confidence formation. Dyads of participants made visual perceptual decisions, first individually and then together by sharing their wagers in their decisions. We independently manipulated the sensory evidence and the social consensus available to participants and found that both type of evidence contributed to wagers. Consistent with previous work, the amount people were prepared to wager covaried with the strength of sensory evidence. However, social agreements and disagreement affected wagers in opposite directions and asymmetrically. These different contributions of sensory and social evidence to wager were linearly additive. Moreover, average metacognitive sensitivity-namely the association between wagers and accuracy-between interacting dyad members positively correlated with dyadic performance and dyadic benefit above average individual performance. Our results provide a general framework that accounts for how both social context and direct sensory evidence contribute to decision confidence. (PsycINFO Database Record
For well over a century, researchers in the field of Collective Intelligence have shown that groups can outperform individuals when making decisions, predictions, and forecasts. The most common methods for harnessing the intelligence of groups treats the population as a “crowd” of independent agents that provide input in isolation in the form of polls, surveys, and market transactions. While such crowd-based methods can be effective, they are markedly different from how natural systems harness group intelligence. In the natural world, groups commonly form real-time closed-loop systems (i.e. “swarms”) that converge on solutions in synchrony. The present study compares the predictive ability of crowds and swarms when tapping the intelligence of human groups. More specifically, the present study tasked a crowd of 469 football fans and a swarm of 29 football fans in a challenge to predict 20 Prop Bets during the 2016 Super Bowl. Results revealed that the crowd, although 16 times larger in size, was significantly less accurate (at 47% correct) than the swarm (at 68% correct). Further, the swarm outperformed 98% of the individuals in the full study. These results suggest that swarming, with closed-loop feedback, is potentially a more effective method for tapping the insights of groups than traditional polling.
Bots’ ability to influence public discourse is difficult to estimate. Recent studies found that hyperpartisan bots are unlikely to influence public opinion because bots often interact with already highly polarized users. However, previous studies focused on direct human-bot interactions (e.g., retweets, at-mentions, and likes). The present study suggests that political bots, zealots, and trolls may indirectly affect people’s views via a platform’s content recommendation system's mediating role, thus influencing opinions without direct human-bot interaction. Using an agent-based opinion dynamics simulation, we isolated the effect of a single bot—representing 1% of nodes in a network—on the opinion of rational Bayesian agents when a simple recommendation system mediates the agents’ content consumption. We compare this experimental condition with an identical baseline condition where such a bot is absent. Across conditions, we use the same random seed and a psychologically realistic Bayesian opinion update rule so that conditions remain identical except for the bot presence. Results show that, even with limited direct interactions, the mere presence of the bot is sufficient to shift the average population’s opinion. Virtually all nodes—not only nodes directly interacting with the bot—shifted towards more extreme opinions. Furthermore, the mere bot’s presence significantly affected the internal representation of the recommender system. Overall, these findings offer a proof of concept that bots and hyperpartisan accounts can influence population opinions not only by directly interacting with humans but also by secondary effects, such as shifting platforms’ recommendation engines’ internal representations. The mediating role of recommender systems creates indirect causal pathways of algorithmic opinion manipulation.