22 October 2024 in Nature Human Behaviour
7 July 2025 in Experimental Economics
This paper investigates the collusive and competitive effects of algorithmic price recommendations on market outcomes. These recommendations are often non-binding and common in many markets. We develop a theoretical framework and derive two algorithms that recommend collusive pricing strategies. Utilizing a laboratory experiment, we find that sellers condition their prices on the recommendation of the algorithms. The algorithm with a soft punishment strategy lowers market prices and has a pro-competitive effect. The algorithm that recommends a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy increases the range of market outcomes, including more collusive ones.
1 January 2023 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Algorithms play an increasingly important role in economic situations. Often these situations are strategic, where the artificial intelligence may or may not be cooperative. We study the determinants and forms of algorithmic cooperation in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. We run a sequence of computational experiments, accompanied by additional repeated prisoner's dilemma games played by humans in the lab. We find that the same factors that increase human cooperation largely also determine the cooperation rates of algorithms. However, algorithms tend to play different strategies than humans. Algorithms cooperate less than humans when cooperation is very risky or not incentive compatible.
6 June 2026 in Games and Economic Behavior
25 June 2026 in Nature Communications
Online behavioural research faces a growing methodological and epistemic threat as participants increasingly rely on large language models: LLM Pollution. Amid accumulating empirical evidence of contamination, we introduce a conceptual framework that distinguishes three variants — Partial LLM Mediation, Full LLM Delegation, and LLM Spillover. Their interaction distorts samples, biases inferences, and fuels an escalating methodological arms race. We outline mitigation strategies spanning researcher practices, platform accountability, and community adaptation.
30 April 2025 in Experimental Economics
Volunteering is a widespread allocation mechanism in the workplace. It emerges naturally in software development or the generation of online knowledge platforms. Using a field experiment with more than 2,000 workers, we study the effect of team size on volunteering in an online labor market. In contrast to our theoretical predictions and previous research, we find no effect of team size on volunteering, although workers react to free-riding incentives, and volunteering is perceived as costly. Eliciting workers’ beliefs about their co-workers’ volunteering reveals conditional volunteering as the primary driver of our results: Workers tend to volunteer more when they believe that others are volunteering, even when doing so is highly inefficient. Using additional experiments, we identify the importance of the task itself as an essential mitigating factor for those results.