There is a new generation of emoticons, called emojis, that is increasingly being used in mobile communications and social media. In the past two years, over ten billion emojis were used on Twitter. Emojis are Unicode graphic symbols, used as a shorthand to express concepts and ideas. In contrast to the small number of well-known emoticons that carry clear emotional contents, there are hundreds of emojis. But what are their emotional contents? We provide the first emoji sentiment lexicon, called the Emoji Sentiment Ranking, and draw a sentiment map of the 751 most frequently used emojis. The sentiment of the emojis is computed from the sentiment of the tweets in which they occur. We engaged 83 human annotators to label over 1.6 million tweets in 13 European languages by the sentiment polarity (negative, neutral, or positive). About 4% of the annotated tweets contain emojis. The sentiment analysis of the emojis allows us to draw several interesting conclusions. It turns out that most of the emojis are positive, especially the most popular ones. The sentiment distribution of the tweets with and without emojis is significantly different. The inter-annotator agreement on the tweets with emojis is higher. Emojis tend to occur at the end of the tweets, and their sentiment polarity increases with the distance. We observe no significant differences in the emoji rankings between the 13 languages and the Emoji Sentiment Ranking. Consequently, we propose our Emoji Sentiment Ranking as a European language-independent resource for automated sentiment analysis. Finally, the paper provides a formalization of sentiment and a novel visualization in the form of a sentiment bar.

Social media are increasingly reflecting and influencing behavior of other complex systems. In this paper we investigate the relations between a well-known micro-blogging platform Twitter and financial markets. In particular, we consider, in a period of 15 months, the Twitter volume and sentiment about the 30 stock companies that form the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) index. We find a relatively low Pearson correlation and Granger causality between the corresponding time series over the entire time period. However, we find a significant dependence between the Twitter sentiment and abnormal returns during the peaks of Twitter volume. This is valid not only for the expected Twitter volume peaks (e.g., quarterly announcements), but also for peaks corresponding to less obvious events. We formalize the procedure by adapting the well-known “event study” from economics and finance to the analysis of Twitter data. The procedure allows to automatically identify events as Twitter volume peaks, to compute the prevailing sentiment (positive or negative) expressed in tweets at these peaks, and finally to apply the “event study” methodology to relate them to stock returns. We show that sentiment polarity of Twitter peaks implies the direction of cumulative abnormal returns. The amount of cumulative abnormal returns is relatively low (about 1–2%), but the dependence is statistically significant for several days after the events.

According to the World Economic Forum, the diffusion of unsubstantiated rumors on online social media is one of the main threats for our society. The disintermediated paradigm of content production and consumption on online social media might foster the formation of homogeneous communities (echo-chambers) around specific worldviews. Such a scenario has been shown to be a vivid environment for the diffusion of false claim. Not rarely, viral phenomena trigger naive (and funny) social responses—e.g., the recent case of Jade Helm 15 where a simple military exercise turned out to be perceived as the beginning of the civil war in the US. In this work, we address the emotional dynamics of collective debates around distinct kinds of information—i.e., science and conspiracy news—and inside and across their respective polarized communities. We find that for both kinds of content the longer the discussion the more the negativity of the sentiment. We show that comments on conspiracy posts tend to be more negative than on science posts. However, the more the engagement of users, the more they tend to negative commenting (both on science and conspiracy). Finally, zooming in at the interaction among polarized communities, we find a general negative pattern. As the number of comments increases—i.e., the discussion becomes longer—the sentiment of the post is more and more negative.

What are the limits of automated Twitter sentiment classification? We analyze a large set of manually labeled tweets in different languages, use them as training data, and construct automated classification models. It turns out that the quality of classification models depends much more on the quality and size of training data than on the type of the model trained. Experimental results indicate that there is no statistically significant difference between the performance of the top classification models. We quantify the quality of training data by applying various annotator agreement measures, and identify the weakest points of different datasets. We show that the model performance approaches the inter-annotator agreement when the size of the training set is sufficiently large. However, it is crucial to regularly monitor the self- and inter-annotator agreements since this improves the training datasets and consequently the model performance. Finally, we show that there is strong evidence that humans perceive the sentiment classes (negative, neutral, and positive) as ordered.

Social media are an important source of information about the political issues, reflecting, as well as influencing, public mood. We present an analysis of Twitter data, collected over 6 weeks before the Brexit referendum, held in the UK in June 2016. We address two questions: what is the relation between the Twitter mood and the referendum outcome, and who were the most influential Twitter users in the pro- and contra-Brexit camps? First, we construct a stance classification model by machine learning methods, and are then able to predict the stance of about one million UK-based Twitter users. The demography of Twitter users is, however, very different from the demography of the voters. By applying a simple age-adjusted mapping to the overall Twitter stance, the results show the prevalence of the pro-Brexit voters, something unexpected by most of the opinion polls. Second, we apply the Hirsch index to estimate the influence, and rank the Twitter users from both camps. We find that the most productive Twitter users are not the most influential, that the pro-Brexit camp was four times more influential, and had considerably larger impact on the campaign than the opponents. Third, we find that the top pro-Brexit communities are considerably more polarized than the contra-Brexit camp. These results show that social media provide a rich resource of data to be exploited, but accumulated knowledge and lessons learned from the opinion polls have to be adapted to the new data sources.