Because auditors have access to corporate information, a firm’s decision to protect material trade secrets should, in principle, not influence audit effort. We analyze the effects of trade secrecy protection on the audit fees, documenting that firms with redacted information pay significantly higher fees than those that do not redact information. In cross-sectional tests, we further document that the relationship between redaction and audit fees is significantly influenced by both auditor and client characteristics. Consistent with the premise that redaction increases the complexity of the audit—particularly if auditors view redacted disclosures as indicators of potential business or litigation risk—the regression results indicate that the main effect is moderated by auditor factors such as specialization, tenure, and quality, as well as client factors like existing relationships, bargaining power, and reporting quality. These insights contribute to ongoing discussions in audit policy by illustrating how confidential disclosure practices affect audit effort and costs. Overall, our results inform policymakers seeking to reconcile firms’ proprietary information protection with public interest in transparent and credible financial reporting.
Independent directors play a critical role in overseeing company management, safeguarding the interests of both the company and its shareholders, and ensuring that decisions made by the board are scientific, rational, and fair. Directors with industry expertise bring greater experience and knowledge to their roles, enabling them to prevent short-sighted decision-making while preserving their professional reputations. This research empirically examines whether the industry expertise trait of independent directors can inhibit the irregularities of the companies they serve, using a fixed-effects model that controls for industry, company, and year, with Chinese A-share-listed companies from 2003 to 2023 as the observational sample. Endogeneity issues are addressed by using the Heckman two-stage model and the propensity score matching (PSM) model. The findings reveal that (1) independent directors with industry expertise significantly mitigate corporate violations; and (2) their influence primarily stems from improvements in the quality of information disclosure, enhancements to internal control systems, and the resolution of principal–agent conflicts. Further analysis indicates that the restraining effect of independent directors with industry expertise is particularly pronounced in environments characterized by low institutional ownership and fewer analysts, highlighting their stronger supervisory role in such contexts.