Jingjing Xia

Jingjing Xia


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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9 November 2023 in Finance Research Letters
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Journal Article
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JXJingjing Xia
Jingjing Xia

4 June 2023 in European Accounting Review
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Journal Article
Closed access
JXJingjing Xia
Jingjing Xia
RZRengong Zhang
Rengong Zhang

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PGPeng Gao
Peng Gao
KHKarel Hrazdil
Karel Hrazdil
JLJiyuan Li
Jiyuan Li
JXJingjing Xia
Jingjing Xia
Because auditors have access to corporate information, a firm’s decision to protect material trade secrets should, in principle, not influence audit effort. We analyze the effects of trade secrecy protection on the audit fees, documenting that firms with redacted information pay significantly higher fees than those that do not redact information. In cross-sectional tests, we further document that the relationship between redaction and audit fees is significantly influenced by both auditor and client characteristics. Consistent with the premise that redaction increases the complexity of the audit—particularly if auditors view redacted disclosures as indicators of potential business or litigation risk—the regression results indicate that the main effect is moderated by auditor factors such as specialization, tenure, and quality, as well as client factors like existing relationships, bargaining power, and reporting quality. These insights contribute to ongoing discussions in audit policy by illustrating how confidential disclosure practices affect audit effort and costs. Overall, our results inform policymakers seeking to reconcile firms’ proprietary information protection with public interest in transparent and credible financial reporting.

6 August 2023 in Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics
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JXJingjing Xia
Jingjing Xia

23 May 2026 in International Review of Economics & Finance
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Open access
WLWeiping Li
Weiping Li
HZHanfang Zhang
Hanfang Zhang
JXJingjing Xia
Jingjing Xia

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Journal Article
Open access
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JXJingjing Xia
Jingjing Xia
This paper challenges the prevailing view that intra-industry information transfers are primarily driven by public information. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I find that investors in late-announcing firms impound more private information after early-announcing peers report earnings. This increase is substantial, leading to an 18.2% decrease in analyst forecast consensus and a 24.9% increase in forecast precision. Moreover, the probability of informed trading rises by 2% on days with peer announcements. This finding is important because investors tend to overweight (underweight) private (public) signals, thereby exacerbating over- and underreaction anomalies. Our study confirms that these anomalies are more pronounced when early announcements stimulate private information production, offering a theoretical explanation for their puzzling coexistence. These findings have significant implications for investor behavior and market efficiency. Investors should diligently evaluate both public and private information, particularly following peer announcements. Policymakers can leverage these findings to design regulations that promote transparency and foster efficient information dissemination.