We address the problem of how to “obfuscate” texts by removing stylistic clues which can identify authorship, whilst preserving (as much as possible) the content of the text. In this paper we combine ideas from “generalised differential privacy” and machine learning techniques for text processing to model privacy for text documents. We define a privacy mechanism that operates at the level of text documents represented as “bags-of-words”—these representations are typical in machine learning and contain sufficient information to carry out many kinds of classification tasks including topic identification and authorship attribution (of the original documents). We show that our mechanism satisfies privacy with respect to a metric for semantic similarity, thereby providing a balance between utility, defined by the semantic content of texts, with the obfuscation of stylistic clues. We demonstrate our implementation on a “fan fiction” dataset, confirming that it is indeed possible to disguise writing style effectively whilst preserving enough information and variation for accurate content classification tasks. We refer the reader to our complete paper [ 15 ] which contains full proofs and further experimentation details.
Quantitative Information Flow (QIF) and Differential Privacy (DP) are both concerned with the protection of sensitive information, but they are rather different approaches. In particular, QIF considers the expected probability of a successful attack, while DP (in both its standard and local versions) is a max-case measure, in the sense that it is compromised by the existence of a possible attack, regardless of its probability. Comparing systems is a fundamental task in these areas: one wishes to guarantee that replacing a system A by a system B is a safe operation, that is the privacy of B is no-worse than that of A. In QIF, a refinement order provides strong such guarantees, while in DP mechanisms are typically compared (w.r.t. privacy) based on the ε privacy parameter that they provide. In this paper we explore a variety of refinement orders, inspired by the one of QIF, providing precise guarantees for max-case leakage. We study simple structural ways of characterising them, the relation between them, efficient methods for verifying them and their lattice properties. Moreover, we apply these orders in the task of comparing DP mechanisms, raising the question of whether the order based on ε provides strong privacy guarantees. We show that, while it is often the case for mechanisms of the same "family" (geometric, randomised response, etc.), it rarely holds across different families.
We combine Kronecker products, and quantitative information flow, to give a novel formal analysis for the fine-grained verification of utility in complex privacy pipelines. The combination explains a surprising anomaly in the behaviour of utility of privacy-preserving pipelines - that sometimes a reduction in privacy results also in a decrease in utility. We use the standard measure of utility for Bayesian analysis, introduced by Ghosh at al. [1], to produce tractable and rigorous proofs of the fine-grained statistical behaviour leading to the anomaly. More generally, we offer the prospect of formal-analysis tools for utility that complement extant formal analyses of privacy. We demonstrate our results on a number of common privacy-preserving designs.