Annabelle McIver

Annabelle McIver

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Annabelle McIver

Macquarie University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

40Years (1987-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 May 1996 in ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CMCarroll Morgan
Carroll Morgan
AMAnnabelle McIver
Annabelle McIver
KSKaren Seidel
Karen Seidel
Probabilistic predicates generalize standard predicates over a state space; with probabilistic predicate transformers one thus reasons about imperative programs in terms of probabilistic pre- and postconditions. Probabilistic healthiness conditions generalize the standard ones, characterizing “real” probabilistic programs, and are based on a connection with an underlying relational model for probabilistic execution; in both contexts demonic nondeterminism coexists with probabilistic choice. With the healthiness conditions, the associated weakest-precondition calculus seems suitable for exploring the rigorous derivation of small probabilistic programs.

1 April 1997 in Science of Computer Programming
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HJHe Jifeng
He Jifeng
KSK. Seidel
K. Seidel
AMA. McIver
A. McIver

1 March 2014 in Performance Evaluation
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
FGFriedrich Gretz
Friedrich Gretz
JKJoost-Pieter Katoen
Joost-Pieter Katoen
AMAnnabelle McIver
Annabelle McIver

3 April 2019
Verified
Book Chapter
Open access
PDF file
NFNatasha Fernandes
Natasha Fernandes
MDMark Dras
Mark Dras
AMAnnabelle McIver
Annabelle McIver
We address the problem of how to “obfuscate” texts by removing stylistic clues which can identify authorship, whilst preserving (as much as possible) the content of the text. In this paper we combine ideas from “generalised differential privacy” and machine learning techniques for text processing to model privacy for text documents. We define a privacy mechanism that operates at the level of text documents represented as “bags-of-words”—these representations are typical in machine learning and contain sufficient information to carry out many kinds of classification tasks including topic identification and authorship attribution (of the original documents). We show that our mechanism satisfies privacy with respect to a metric for semantic similarity, thereby providing a balance between utility, defined by the semantic content of texts, with the obfuscation of stylistic clues. We demonstrate our implementation on a “fan fiction” dataset, confirming that it is indeed possible to disguise writing style effectively whilst preserving enough information and variation for accurate content classification tasks. We refer the reader to our complete paper [ 15 ] which contains full proofs and further experimentation details.

1 January 2010
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
JKJoost-Pieter Katoen
Joost-Pieter Katoen
AMAnnabelle K. McIver
Annabelle K. McIver
LMLarissa A. Meinicke
Larissa A. Meinicke
CMCarroll C. Morgan
Carroll C. Morgan

1 July 2014
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MAMário Alvim
Mário Alvim
KCKonstantinos Chatzikokolakis
Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis
AMAnnabelle Mciver
Annabelle Mciver
CMCarroll Morgan
Carroll Morgan
Catuscia PalamidessiCatuscia Palamidessi
Catuscia Palamidessi
GSGeoffrey Smith
Geoffrey Smith
Protecting sensitive information from improper disclosure is a fundamental security goal. It is complicated, and difficult to achieve, often because of unavoidable or even unpredictable operating conditions that can lead to breaches in planned security defences. An attractive approach is to frame the goal as a quantitative problem, and then to design methods that measure system vulnerabilities in terms of the amount of information they leak. A consequence is that the precise operating conditions, and assumptions about prior knowledge, can play a crucial role in assessing the severity of any measured vunerability. We develop this theme by concentrating on vulnerability measures that are robust in the sense of allowing general leakage bounds to be placed on a program, bounds that apply whatever its operating conditions and whatever the prior knowledge might be. In particular we propose a theory of channel capacity, generalising the Shannon capacity of information theory, that can apply both to additive- and to multiplicative forms of a recently-proposed measure known as g-leakage. Further, we explore the computational aspects of calculating these (new) capacities: one of these scenarios can be solved efficiently by expressing it as a Kantorovich distance, but another turns out to be NP-complete. We also find capacity bounds for arbitrary correlations with data not directly accessed by the channel, as in the scenario of Dalenius's Desideratum.