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It is well known that strategic consumers can harm firms’ profits by delaying their purchases, to buy at a discounted price. A retailer can induce consumers to purchase at the right price and time by acting on the two components of the consumer’s surplus in each period, that is, the willingness to pay (WTP) and the selling price. We develop a multi-period model to investigate pricing and advertising decisions in a supply chain, in the presence of two types of consumers, namely, myopic and strategic. We assume that the retailer’s advertising positively affects the consumer’s WTP at a decreasing rate over time. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price and its share in the retailer’s advertising cost, while the retailer determines the retail prices during the different periods of the selling season, along with the advertising budget. Our approach makes it possible to determine endogenously the number of price drops during the selling season and the depth of each discount. Assuming decentralized decision-making in the supply chain, we determine the conditions under which the retailer prefers a single-pricing policy to a markdown-pricing policy. We show that the manufacturer has a say in the retailer’s choice through its participation rate in the retailer’s advertising cost. Interestingly, we obtain that an integrated supply chain would, roughly speaking, adopt the same pricing policy as in the decentralized case. To start with, we assume that the WTP is distributed uniformly, and later on, we assess the impact of changing the distribution on the results.
Amir Farshbaf-Geranmayeh; Georges Zaccour. Pricing and advertising in a supply chain in the presence of strategic consumers. Omega 2021, 101, 102239 .
AMA StyleAmir Farshbaf-Geranmayeh, Georges Zaccour. Pricing and advertising in a supply chain in the presence of strategic consumers. Omega. 2021; 101 ():102239.
Chicago/Turabian StyleAmir Farshbaf-Geranmayeh; Georges Zaccour. 2021. "Pricing and advertising in a supply chain in the presence of strategic consumers." Omega 101, no. : 102239.
In this paper, we introduce a class of deterministic finite-horizon two-player nonzero-sum differential games where one player uses ordinaryWe use the word ‘ordinary’ to mean that Player 1 uses control strategies that are piecewise continuous functions of time. controls while the other player uses impulse controls. We formulate the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium for this class of differential games. We specialize these results to linear-quadratic games, and show that the open-loop Nash equilibrium strategies can be computed by solving a constrained non-linear optimization problem. In particular, for the impulse player, the equilibrium timing and level of impulses can be obtained. Furthermore, for the special case of linear-state differential games, we obtain analytical characterization of equilibrium number, timing and the level of impulse in terms of the problem data. We illustrate our results using numerical experiments.
Utsav Sadana; Puduru Viswanadha Reddy; Georges Zaccour. Nash equilibria in nonzero-sum differential games with impulse control. European Journal of Operational Research 2021, 295, 792 -805.
AMA StyleUtsav Sadana, Puduru Viswanadha Reddy, Georges Zaccour. Nash equilibria in nonzero-sum differential games with impulse control. European Journal of Operational Research. 2021; 295 (2):792-805.
Chicago/Turabian StyleUtsav Sadana; Puduru Viswanadha Reddy; Georges Zaccour. 2021. "Nash equilibria in nonzero-sum differential games with impulse control." European Journal of Operational Research 295, no. 2: 792-805.
In this exploratory study, we consider an extended producer responsibility (EPR) regulation in the context where a firm can be penalized by a municipality for each uncollected unit of past sold products. A starting point is that the return rate of used products depends on the available infrastructure and on consumers’ environmental awareness. These two assets can be increased by investing in the infrastructure and in promoting the importance of returning the products instead of throwing them in the garbage. As environmental awareness and infrastructure can only be built through sustained investments over time, we retain a dynamic game model. This game feature accounts for the strategic interactions between the manufacturer and the municipality. A feedback Stackelberg equilibrium is sought, with the municipality acting as leader and the manufacturer as follower. In particular, we look at the scenario where the penalty for uncollected products is dynamic and determined on the basis of the observed states. Among the findings of this paper, we highlight that (i) a more successful collection program is associated with a lower price, and (ii) even in the presence of a penalizing regulation, it could be beneficial for the producer to produce browner products.
Mostafa Pazoki; Georges Zaccour. Dynamic strategic interactions between a municipality and a firm in the presence of an extended producer responsibility regulation. Journal of Cleaner Production 2021, 292, 125966 .
AMA StyleMostafa Pazoki, Georges Zaccour. Dynamic strategic interactions between a municipality and a firm in the presence of an extended producer responsibility regulation. Journal of Cleaner Production. 2021; 292 ():125966.
Chicago/Turabian StyleMostafa Pazoki; Georges Zaccour. 2021. "Dynamic strategic interactions between a municipality and a firm in the presence of an extended producer responsibility regulation." Journal of Cleaner Production 292, no. : 125966.
We study the strategic behavior of firms competing in the exploitation of a common-access productive asset, in the presence of pollution externalities. We consider a differential game with two state variables (asset stock and pollution stock), and by using a piecewise-linear approximation of the nonlinear asset growth function, we provide a tractable characterization of the symmetric feedback–Nash equilibrium with asymptotically stable steady state(s). The results show that the firm’s strategy takes three forms depending on the pair of state variables and that different options for the model parameters lead to contrasting outcomes in both the short- and long-run equilibria.
N. Baris Vardar; Georges Zaccour. Exploitation of a Productive Asset in the Presence of Strategic Behavior and Pollution Externalities. Mathematics 2020, 8, 1682 .
AMA StyleN. Baris Vardar, Georges Zaccour. Exploitation of a Productive Asset in the Presence of Strategic Behavior and Pollution Externalities. Mathematics. 2020; 8 (10):1682.
Chicago/Turabian StyleN. Baris Vardar; Georges Zaccour. 2020. "Exploitation of a Productive Asset in the Presence of Strategic Behavior and Pollution Externalities." Mathematics 8, no. 10: 1682.
We consider a firm producing and selling experience products over two periods with private quality information. Consumers strategically decide their purchasing timing driven by the imitation effect, and the firm chooses pricing policy (dynamic or preannounced) and equilibrium type (separating or pooling, through which true quality information is revealed). Results imply that the firm prefers preannounced pricing but consumers prefer dynamic pricing. Under both pricing schemes, the first-period price decreases but the second-period price increases with the imitation effect. A pooling-pooling equilibrium is always preferred, unless the firm is farsighted and the imitation effect is weak under dynamic pricing.
Qiao Zhang; Georges Zaccour; Jianxiong Zhang; Wansheng Tang. Strategic pricing under quality signaling and imitation behaviors in supply chains. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 2020, 142, 102072 .
AMA StyleQiao Zhang, Georges Zaccour, Jianxiong Zhang, Wansheng Tang. Strategic pricing under quality signaling and imitation behaviors in supply chains. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review. 2020; 142 ():102072.
Chicago/Turabian StyleQiao Zhang; Georges Zaccour; Jianxiong Zhang; Wansheng Tang. 2020. "Strategic pricing under quality signaling and imitation behaviors in supply chains." Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 142, no. : 102072.
To cope with ever-increasing demand and ensure food security, agronomic systems have shifted over time from traditional agriculture, based on the organic fertilization of soils, to intensive and specialized farming that use chemical fertilization. This resulted in increased soil productivity in the short term, but caused serious ecological drawbacks over time (degradation of soil quality, pollution of water and air, loss of biodiversity, erosion, etc.), and even reversed the trend of agricultural productivity. In this paper, we propose a viability theory–based model to study the sustainability of an agricultural system subject to climate uncertainty. Our objective is to determine what farming practices and activity sequences restore soil quality to a desired level while ensuring an acceptable level of productivity in the presence of the risk of major climatic disasters. The model is applied to Guadeloupe, an island in the West French Indies. We found that the results are highly sensitive to the direct effect of hurricanes on the soil’s quality, which, in turn, strongly affects the impact of the other parameters and that the export oriented sector is more vulnerable and less resilient to climatic uncertainties than the sector aimed at the local market.
Aïchouche Oubraham; Patrick Saint-Pierre; Georges Zaccour. Viability of Agroecological Systems under Climatic Uncertainty. Sustainability 2020, 12, 5880 .
AMA StyleAïchouche Oubraham, Patrick Saint-Pierre, Georges Zaccour. Viability of Agroecological Systems under Climatic Uncertainty. Sustainability. 2020; 12 (15):5880.
Chicago/Turabian StyleAïchouche Oubraham; Patrick Saint-Pierre; Georges Zaccour. 2020. "Viability of Agroecological Systems under Climatic Uncertainty." Sustainability 12, no. 15: 5880.
Many countries have introduced vehicle scrappage programs to motivate consumers to replace their old cars earlier. Since these programs are generally offered over a given period of time, policy makers need to plan for inter-temporal subsidies. Considering a two-period game between strategic consumers and the government, we determine the optimal scrappage subsidy levels. Our results demonstrate that the subsidy level in the second period is higher than in the first, allowing the government to discriminate on price (or subsidy) between consumers with different valuations. In addition, we show that subsidy levels increase with the government’s targeted replacement level. However, when the government target level changes from intermediate to high, the first-period subsidy drops while the second-period subsidy remains unchanged.
Hosain Zaman; Georges Zaccour. Optimal government scrappage subsidies in the presence of strategic consumers. European Journal of Operational Research 2020, 288, 829 -838.
AMA StyleHosain Zaman, Georges Zaccour. Optimal government scrappage subsidies in the presence of strategic consumers. European Journal of Operational Research. 2020; 288 (3):829-838.
Chicago/Turabian StyleHosain Zaman; Georges Zaccour. 2020. "Optimal government scrappage subsidies in the presence of strategic consumers." European Journal of Operational Research 288, no. 3: 829-838.
We determine optimal pricing and order quantity of two substitute products in two markets, one of them is seasonal, with a decreasing market potential over time, and the other is nonseasonal. The two markets are sealed, that is, the prices in one market are irrelevant to consumers in the other market. Still, the two markets are linked through inventories and the order quantity policy. In the paper, we develop a nonlinear model, in which seasonal demand depends on time and on both products' prices, while nonseasonal demand is time‐invariant and is the function of both products' prices. Then, we provide an algorithm to compute the optimal solution. An illustrative example is given along with a sensitivity analysis. Among other results, we obtain that dynamic pricing and accounting for substitution effect lead to more profit. Also, when both ordering and holding costs are high, it is beneficial for the firm to order fewer times in large sizes.
Nadia Rasouli; Mohammad Reza Amin‐Naseri; Georges Zaccour. Pricing and order quantity of substitutes in two inventory‐related markets. International Transactions in Operational Research 2020, 1 .
AMA StyleNadia Rasouli, Mohammad Reza Amin‐Naseri, Georges Zaccour. Pricing and order quantity of substitutes in two inventory‐related markets. International Transactions in Operational Research. 2020; ():1.
Chicago/Turabian StyleNadia Rasouli; Mohammad Reza Amin‐Naseri; Georges Zaccour. 2020. "Pricing and order quantity of substitutes in two inventory‐related markets." International Transactions in Operational Research , no. : 1.
Nonprofit organizations play an important role in providing goods and services in all countries. The objective of this paper is to determine optimal policies for a charity when its managers are imperfectly altruistic. The starting point of our analysis is that the donations a charity receives are a function of its reputation, which is an asset that can be built up over time, not overnight. To account for this important aspect, we propose a dynamic model where the charity can allocate its revenues to three main activities, namely, the program expenditures (charitable projects), information (promotion of its causes, website, etc.) and unproductive consumption benefiting its managers. We compute optimal policies and discuss their implications. We notably find conditions under which imperfectly altruistic managers nevertheless behave ethically. In addition, we show that where they behave non-ethically, advertising and unproductive consumption always move in opposite directions.
Bertrand Crettez; Naila Hayek; Georges Zaccoury. Optimal dynamic management of a charity under imperfect altruism. Omega 2020, 100, 102227 .
AMA StyleBertrand Crettez, Naila Hayek, Georges Zaccoury. Optimal dynamic management of a charity under imperfect altruism. Omega. 2020; 100 ():102227.
Chicago/Turabian StyleBertrand Crettez; Naila Hayek; Georges Zaccoury. 2020. "Optimal dynamic management of a charity under imperfect altruism." Omega 100, no. : 102227.
We consider a luxury supply chain in which one Stackelberg manufacturer sells products to consumers through a retailer. Driven by exclusivity or conformity, consumers are classified as either snobs or conformists, with uncertain preferences about the product. The manufacturer can obtain a private signal on this preference, while the retailer cannot. Results show that the manufacturer makes different market-targeting schedules in response to different signals. Interestingly, the manufacturer may benefit from either a no-information, a private-information, or an information-sharing policy, depending on its market-targeting strategy. Not sharing the manufacturer’s information, however, is preferred by the retailer.
Qiao Zhang; Jing Chen; Georges Zaccour. Market targeting and information sharing with social influences in a luxury supply chain. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 2019, 133, 101822 .
AMA StyleQiao Zhang, Jing Chen, Georges Zaccour. Market targeting and information sharing with social influences in a luxury supply chain. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review. 2019; 133 ():101822.
Chicago/Turabian StyleQiao Zhang; Jing Chen; Georges Zaccour. 2019. "Market targeting and information sharing with social influences in a luxury supply chain." Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 133, no. : 101822.
We consider two charities whose revenues are used on advertising to attract market share, on administrative expenditures to manage the charity, and on program expenditures. Assuming a finite planning horizon, we seek to answer the following research question: are there any circumstances under which the charities devote less funds to their programs when they cooperate than when they compete? We obtain that this may well be the case for some parameter values. In particular, if the charities are myopic, that is, if they disregard the future benefits they can earn after the current planning cycle, then they will always spend less on their social programs when they cooperate than when they do not.
Bertrand Crettez; Naila Hayek; Georges Zaccour. Do charities spend more on their social programs when they cooperate than when they compete? European Journal of Operational Research 2019, 283, 1055 -1063.
AMA StyleBertrand Crettez, Naila Hayek, Georges Zaccour. Do charities spend more on their social programs when they cooperate than when they compete? European Journal of Operational Research. 2019; 283 (3):1055-1063.
Chicago/Turabian StyleBertrand Crettez; Naila Hayek; Georges Zaccour. 2019. "Do charities spend more on their social programs when they cooperate than when they compete?" European Journal of Operational Research 283, no. 3: 1055-1063.
We consider a fishery described by two state variables, namely, the stock of fish and its marine environmental quality, operationalized as an index of habitat extent and quality, which influences the growth rate and the carrying capacity (MEQ). Assuming that myopic fishing agents exploit the fishery, we characterize and contrast the steady‐state values in two scenarios: (a) a scenario where the agents (correctly) perceive that the MEQ is nonconstant and (b) a scenario where they behave as if the MEQ is a given constant. Not unexpectedly, the harvest rates differ across the two scenarios and consequently lead to different steady states. Interestingly, for some parameter values, we obtain that assuming a constant MEQ has a conservation flavor, that is, it results in a larger stock of fish and higher MEQ in the steady‐state. We show that there exists a steady‐state solution to the planner's problem and that it can be supported by a large number of appropriately designed tax schemes, while the approach path to the steady‐state depends on the implemented tax scheme. We also discuss the implications for optimal regulation under open access when habitat matters Recommendations for Resource Managers We take into account the marine environmental quality (MEQ) in a fishery model and assess how it affects harvesting behavior and the fish stock. For some parameter values, we obtain that assuming a constant MEQ has a conservation flavor, that is, it results in a larger stock of fish and higher MEQ in the steady‐state. We show that there exists a steady‐state solution to the planner's problem that can be supported by different tax schemes.
Ngo Van Long; Mabel Tidball; Georges Zaccour. Optimal harvesting and taxation when accounting for the marine environmental quality of the fishery. Natural Resource Modeling 2019, 33, 1 .
AMA StyleNgo Van Long, Mabel Tidball, Georges Zaccour. Optimal harvesting and taxation when accounting for the marine environmental quality of the fishery. Natural Resource Modeling. 2019; 33 (3):1.
Chicago/Turabian StyleNgo Van Long; Mabel Tidball; Georges Zaccour. 2019. "Optimal harvesting and taxation when accounting for the marine environmental quality of the fishery." Natural Resource Modeling 33, no. 3: 1.
In this paper, we revisit the problem of existence of an optimal dynamic pricing strategy when the demand depends on a reference price. Using alternative assumptions and technique to those typically used in the literature, we show the existence of a unique pricing policy parametrized in the initial value of the reference price. Our main results are as follows: if this value is low enough, then the best option is to implement a penetration pricing. If it is high enough, then price skimming is optimal. If the initial reference price has an intermediate value, then constant pricing throughout the planning horizon is optimal.
Bertrand Crettez; Naila Hayek; Georges Zaccour. Existence and characterization of optimal dynamic pricing strategies with reference-price effects. Central European Journal of Operations Research 2019, 28, 441 -459.
AMA StyleBertrand Crettez, Naila Hayek, Georges Zaccour. Existence and characterization of optimal dynamic pricing strategies with reference-price effects. Central European Journal of Operations Research. 2019; 28 (2):441-459.
Chicago/Turabian StyleBertrand Crettez; Naila Hayek; Georges Zaccour. 2019. "Existence and characterization of optimal dynamic pricing strategies with reference-price effects." Central European Journal of Operations Research 28, no. 2: 441-459.
In this paper, we suggest a new approach called the return function to deal with the determination of Bayesian–Nash equilibria in games of incomplete information. Whereas in the traditional approach players reply to each others’ strategies, here each player replies to his own return function. In short, given a player’s choice of action and the other players’ strategies, the return function of that given player is the probability distribution of the outcome. Interestingly, we show that the dynamics of best-reply strategies, which are hard to compute in practice, are mapped to an observable and easier-to-compute dynamics of return functions. We propose a new algorithm for computing Bayesian–Nash equilibria, and illustrate its implementation on a cake-cutting problem. Finally, we prove the convergence of the dynamics of return functions to the Bayesian–Nash equilibrium under fairly general topological assumptions.
Lê Nguyên Hoang; François Soumis; Georges Zaccour. The return function: A new computable perspective on Bayesian–Nash equilibria. European Journal of Operational Research 2019, 279, 471 -485.
AMA StyleLê Nguyên Hoang, François Soumis, Georges Zaccour. The return function: A new computable perspective on Bayesian–Nash equilibria. European Journal of Operational Research. 2019; 279 (2):471-485.
Chicago/Turabian StyleLê Nguyên Hoang; François Soumis; Georges Zaccour. 2019. "The return function: A new computable perspective on Bayesian–Nash equilibria." European Journal of Operational Research 279, no. 2: 471-485.
We consider the problem of efficiently managing a fishery where pollution externalities are present. The open‐access bionomic model is analyzed in an equation/nrm12216-math-0001.png‐player differential game framework with two‐state variables, that is, the fish stock and the pollution stock. We characterize the noncooperative feedback‐Nash equilibrium and cooperative solution, and define an egalitarian sharing rule to allocate the joint welfare maximizing payoff over an infinite time horizon, and show that this rule is time consistent. Recommendations for Resource Managers ● Cooperation in management of a fishery where pollution externalities are present yields a higher payoff over time as compared to the noncooperative behavior. ● The dividend of cooperation can be allocated among the fisherpersons according to an egalitarian sharing rule. ● This allocation is time‐consistent, that is, no player will be tempted to deviate from cooperation as time goes by, and the initial agreement is sustainable.
Ilyass Dahmouni; Baris Vardar; Georges Zaccour. A fair and time‐consistent sharing of the joint exploitation payoff of a fishery. Natural Resource Modeling 2019, e12216 .
AMA StyleIlyass Dahmouni, Baris Vardar, Georges Zaccour. A fair and time‐consistent sharing of the joint exploitation payoff of a fishery. Natural Resource Modeling. 2019; ():e12216.
Chicago/Turabian StyleIlyass Dahmouni; Baris Vardar; Georges Zaccour. 2019. "A fair and time‐consistent sharing of the joint exploitation payoff of a fishery." Natural Resource Modeling , no. : e12216.
A private bad is a commodity that causes its owner disutility. We study the bilateral exchange of a bad for a good that provides utility. Considering the exchange price to be fixed, we determine the first-best choice of a single agent and study its properties, then investigate the equilibrium strategies of the two-player game. We characterize the normalized equilibrium à la Rosen (1965), and also provide a Pareto optimal allocation scheme that is beneficial and fair for the two players.
Baris Vardar; Georges Zaccour. Strategic bilateral exchange of a bad. Operations Research Letters 2019, 47, 235 -240.
AMA StyleBaris Vardar, Georges Zaccour. Strategic bilateral exchange of a bad. Operations Research Letters. 2019; 47 (4):235-240.
Chicago/Turabian StyleBaris Vardar; Georges Zaccour. 2019. "Strategic bilateral exchange of a bad." Operations Research Letters 47, no. 4: 235-240.
This paper surveys two key issues in closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) research: return functions and coordination mechanisms. The return function provides the rule according to which end-of-life/use products are returned to a collector. The coordination mechanisms consist of the adoption of a certain mechanism (e.g., a contract) to align the closed-loop supply chain members’ objectives. We describe latest thinking in these two major CLSC-related fields and suggest future research directions to be undertaken.
Pietro De Giovanni; Georges Zaccour. A selective survey of game-theoretic models of closed-loop supply chains. 4OR 2019, 17, 1 -44.
AMA StylePietro De Giovanni, Georges Zaccour. A selective survey of game-theoretic models of closed-loop supply chains. 4OR. 2019; 17 (1):1-44.
Chicago/Turabian StylePietro De Giovanni; Georges Zaccour. 2019. "A selective survey of game-theoretic models of closed-loop supply chains." 4OR 17, no. 1: 1-44.
This work considers a dual-channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells an experience product through its retailer and directly to consumers. The market potential is stochastic, and the two agents receive different signals about its value. The manufacturer invests in product’s quality, and this investment cannot be observed by the retailer. We look at two information-sharing scenarios, i.e., one-sided and two-sided sharing, and compute and contrast the equilibrium outcomes. In particular, we characterize the conditions under which the manufacturer prefers to give up its wholesale pricing power, to avoid information leakage. It is shown that the manufacturer would like to give up the pricing power if the exogenous wholesale price is moderate. Moreover, such willingness increases with the manufacturer’s information accuracy under one-sided information-sharing mechanism, but shrinks under two-sided information-sharing mode. Additionally, it is found that information leakage discourages the retailer from sharing the information, but encourages the manufacturer to do that.
Qiao Zhang; Wansheng Tang; Georges Zaccour; Jianxiong Zhang. Should a manufacturer give up pricing power in a vertical information-sharing channel? European Journal of Operational Research 2019, 276, 910 -928.
AMA StyleQiao Zhang, Wansheng Tang, Georges Zaccour, Jianxiong Zhang. Should a manufacturer give up pricing power in a vertical information-sharing channel? European Journal of Operational Research. 2019; 276 (3):910-928.
Chicago/Turabian StyleQiao Zhang; Wansheng Tang; Georges Zaccour; Jianxiong Zhang. 2019. "Should a manufacturer give up pricing power in a vertical information-sharing channel?" European Journal of Operational Research 276, no. 3: 910-928.
We consider the problem of pricing and advertising a one-time entertainment event. Three pricing policies are characterized and contrasted, namely, dynamic price (DP), constant price (CP) and two-market price (TMP). In this last scenario, the selling season is composed of a regular price period and a last-minute price period, with the switching date between the two markets being determined endogenously. We show that the price is monotonically increasing over time in the DP scenario and that the last-minute price is larger than the regular price in the TMP scenario. In all three cases, advertising is non-increasing over time, which is a feature often encountered in finite-horizon dynamic optimization advertising models. Finally, we compute the cost of simplification, which is the difference in profits under dynamic pricing and constant pricing. Among other results, we obtain that this loss is independent of the market size and increasing in the number of available tickets.
Steffen Jørgensen; Georges Zaccour. Optimal pricing and advertising policies for a one-time entertainment event. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 2019, 100, 395 -416.
AMA StyleSteffen Jørgensen, Georges Zaccour. Optimal pricing and advertising policies for a one-time entertainment event. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. 2019; 100 ():395-416.
Chicago/Turabian StyleSteffen Jørgensen; Georges Zaccour. 2019. "Optimal pricing and advertising policies for a one-time entertainment event." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 100, no. : 395-416.
In this paper, we consider a two-species fishery model where the species can have different biological interactions, namely, competitive, symbiotic or prey-predator relationships. Each species is harvested by a group of fisherpersons. We characterize and compare equilibrium harvesting strategies, steady-state stocks and total discounted utilities under different modes of play, that is, noncooperation in both groups, cooperation in each of the groups and cooperation in only one group of fisherpersons. Our main results are as follows: (i) In all scenarios, the equilibrium strategy of an agent fishing either species consists of harvesting, in each period, a proportion of the available stock. (ii) The dividend of cooperation in a given group is increasing with the number of members in that group. (iii) Coordination between agents fishing a given species may be detrimental (biologically and economically) to the other species.
Michèle Breton; Ilyass Dahmouni; Georges Zaccour. Equilibria in a two-species fishery. Mathematical Biosciences 2019, 309, 78 -91.
AMA StyleMichèle Breton, Ilyass Dahmouni, Georges Zaccour. Equilibria in a two-species fishery. Mathematical Biosciences. 2019; 309 ():78-91.
Chicago/Turabian StyleMichèle Breton; Ilyass Dahmouni; Georges Zaccour. 2019. "Equilibria in a two-species fishery." Mathematical Biosciences 309, no. : 78-91.