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Services such as delivery, warranty, and product returns that are bundled with various tangible products play a critical role in their market performance. As manufacturers strive to streamline operations and deliver consistent services across channels, this article analytically examines whether those who sell their products directly online and off-line through retailers should direct control, delegate to retailers, or outsource to third parties the delivery of these services. Our main findings are as follows. Manufacturers should not outsource demand-enhancing services to third parties if they do not ensure relatively low operating costs, as they reduce the level of service provided to customers. Assuming no channel partner has a cost advantage in service delivery, manufacturers should directly control the provision of services that are used identically by online and off-line customers. Manufacturers may not be able to directly and cost effectively offer services that are used differently by online and off-line customers. In such a context, depending on the relative sizes of off-line and online market bases, retailers may be considered either as single providers of the service for both online and off-line customers or jointly with manufacturers as providers for off-line customers only. We discuss the implications of these findings.
Guiomar Martín-Herrán; Simon Pierre Sigué. Demand-Enhancing Services for Tangible Products in a Distribution System With Online and Off-Line Channels. Journal of Service Research 2021, 1 .
AMA StyleGuiomar Martín-Herrán, Simon Pierre Sigué. Demand-Enhancing Services for Tangible Products in a Distribution System With Online and Off-Line Channels. Journal of Service Research. 2021; ():1.
Chicago/Turabian StyleGuiomar Martín-Herrán; Simon Pierre Sigué. 2021. "Demand-Enhancing Services for Tangible Products in a Distribution System With Online and Off-Line Channels." Journal of Service Research , no. : 1.
Patrizia Daniele; Cristinca Fulga; Guiomar Martín-Herrán; Vladimir Mazalov; Leon Petrosyan; Bruno M. P. M. Oliveira; Carlos Ramos; Gerhard-Wilhelm Weber; Nikolay Zenkevich. Foreword: Special Issue "EURO 2019: Games in economics, finance and biology". Journal of Dynamics & Games 2021, 8, 1 .
AMA StylePatrizia Daniele, Cristinca Fulga, Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Vladimir Mazalov, Leon Petrosyan, Bruno M. P. M. Oliveira, Carlos Ramos, Gerhard-Wilhelm Weber, Nikolay Zenkevich. Foreword: Special Issue "EURO 2019: Games in economics, finance and biology". Journal of Dynamics & Games. 2021; 8 (2):1.
Chicago/Turabian StylePatrizia Daniele; Cristinca Fulga; Guiomar Martín-Herrán; Vladimir Mazalov; Leon Petrosyan; Bruno M. P. M. Oliveira; Carlos Ramos; Gerhard-Wilhelm Weber; Nikolay Zenkevich. 2021. "Foreword: Special Issue "EURO 2019: Games in economics, finance and biology"." Journal of Dynamics & Games 8, no. 2: 1.
We analyse a differential game with spatially distributed controls to study a multiregional transboundary pollution problem. The dynamics of the state variable (pollution stock) is defined by a two dimensional parabolic partial differential equation. The control variables (emissions) are spatially distributed variables. The model allows for a, possibly large, number of agents with predetermined geographical relationships. For a special functional form previously used in the literature of transboundary pollution dynamic games we analytically characterize the feedback Nash equilibrium. We show that at the equilibrium both the level and the location of emissions of each region depend on the particular geographical relationship among agents. We prove that, even in a simplified model, the geographical considerations can modify the players’ optimal strategies and therefore, the spatial aspects of the model should not be overlooked.
Javier de Frutos; Paula M. López-Pérez; Guiomar Martín-Herrán. Equilibrium strategies in a multiregional transboundary pollution differential game with spatially distributed controls. Automatica 2020, 125, 109411 .
AMA StyleJavier de Frutos, Paula M. López-Pérez, Guiomar Martín-Herrán. Equilibrium strategies in a multiregional transboundary pollution differential game with spatially distributed controls. Automatica. 2020; 125 ():109411.
Chicago/Turabian StyleJavier de Frutos; Paula M. López-Pérez; Guiomar Martín-Herrán. 2020. "Equilibrium strategies in a multiregional transboundary pollution differential game with spatially distributed controls." Automatica 125, no. : 109411.
This paper shows for a class of differential games that the global Stackelberg equilibrium (GSE) coincides with the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium (FSE), although the GSE assumes that the leader/regulator announces at the initial time the regulatory instrument rule she will follow for the rest of the game, while in the FSE, the regulator at any time chooses the optimal level of the regulatory instrument rate. This coincidence is based on the fact that the FSE is calculated using dynamic programming what implies that although the regulator chooses the regulatory instrument rate level that maximizes social welfare, the first-order condition for the maximization of the right-hand side of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation implicitly defines a rule for the regulatory instrument. Then, as the regulatory instrument rule defined by the FSE implements the efficient outcome as the GSE does, the rules defined by both equilibria must be the same. In the second part of the paper, we check that this is the case for two examples. The first is an operations research model, while the second is an economic model. The first example fits in a linear-state differential game structure, while the second example presents a linear-quadratic specification. In both cases the regulatory instrument rules for both equilibria (GSE and FSE) are calculated and identical expressions are obtained.
Guiomar Martín-Herrán; Santiago J. Rubio. On coincidence of feedback and global Stackelberg equilibria in a class of differential games. European Journal of Operational Research 2020, 293, 761 -772.
AMA StyleGuiomar Martín-Herrán, Santiago J. Rubio. On coincidence of feedback and global Stackelberg equilibria in a class of differential games. European Journal of Operational Research. 2020; 293 (2):761-772.
Chicago/Turabian StyleGuiomar Martín-Herrán; Santiago J. Rubio. 2020. "On coincidence of feedback and global Stackelberg equilibria in a class of differential games." European Journal of Operational Research 293, no. 2: 761-772.
We analyze the effect of non-constant discounting on economic growth and social welfare in an endogenous growth model with pollution externalities. For time-consistent agents, who play a game against their future selves, the balanced growth equilibrium is compared to the case of standard exponential discounting. A decaying instantaneous discount rate leads to slower growth in a centralized economy, while its effect for a competitive economy is ambiguous. Interestingly, when comparing the planned and the competitive equilibria, the assumption of non-constant discounting may imply greater social welfare in the market equilibrium under two conditions. First, the pollution externality on utility must be large with respect to the externality on production, so that the central planner slows down growth below the growth rate in the market economy. Secondly, individuals’ degree of impatience should decrease sharply with the time distance from the present. Concerning policy implications, we observe that under log-utility policies may not be necessary, while for an isoelastic utility with an elasticity lower than one, introducing policy instruments is less effective than under constant discounting.
Francisco Cabo; Guiomar Martín-Herrán; María Pilar Martínez-García. Non-constant Discounting, Social Welfare and Endogenous Growth with Pollution Externalities. Environmental and Resource Economics 2020, 76, 369 -403.
AMA StyleFrancisco Cabo, Guiomar Martín-Herrán, María Pilar Martínez-García. Non-constant Discounting, Social Welfare and Endogenous Growth with Pollution Externalities. Environmental and Resource Economics. 2020; 76 (2-3):369-403.
Chicago/Turabian StyleFrancisco Cabo; Guiomar Martín-Herrán; María Pilar Martínez-García. 2020. "Non-constant Discounting, Social Welfare and Endogenous Growth with Pollution Externalities." Environmental and Resource Economics 76, no. 2-3: 369-403.
Carmen Arguedas; Francisco Cabo; Guiomar Martín-Herrán. Enforcing regulatory standards in stock pollution problems. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 2020, 100, 1 .
AMA StyleCarmen Arguedas, Francisco Cabo, Guiomar Martín-Herrán. Enforcing regulatory standards in stock pollution problems. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2020; 100 ():1.
Chicago/Turabian StyleCarmen Arguedas; Francisco Cabo; Guiomar Martín-Herrán. 2020. "Enforcing regulatory standards in stock pollution problems." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 100, no. : 1.
We analyze an endogenous growth model considering agents with an isoelastic utility. Preferences are characterized by a utility affected by a negative externality, and a level of impatience which decays with the time distance from the present. Agents who cannot commit the actions of their future selves, play a game against them. The stationary equilibrium of this game defines a balanced growth path with a slower growth when played by subsequent central planners than when played by decision makers in the market economy. First, we prove that the fast growing market economy implies higher welfare if the negative externality is small, while the centralized economy is welfare improving above a given threshold for the externality (obtained for a specific family of non-constant discount functions). Secondly, we observe that this threshold increases with the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption. Therefore, the greater this elasticity the more likely it is that the externality lies below this threshold, where policy interventions would not be adequate. Finally, as one would expect, the range of values of the externality for which the market equilibrium provides higher welfare widens the more different from constant discounting time preferences are, due either to a wider range of variation for the instantaneous discount rates or because these decay more slowly.
Francisco Cabo; Guiomar Martín-Herrán; María-Pilar Martínez-García. Present bias and the inefficiency of the centralized economy: The role of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Economic Modelling 2020, 93, 702 -716.
AMA StyleFrancisco Cabo, Guiomar Martín-Herrán, María-Pilar Martínez-García. Present bias and the inefficiency of the centralized economy: The role of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Economic Modelling. 2020; 93 ():702-716.
Chicago/Turabian StyleFrancisco Cabo; Guiomar Martín-Herrán; María-Pilar Martínez-García. 2020. "Present bias and the inefficiency of the centralized economy: The role of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution." Economic Modelling 93, no. : 702-716.
Javier de Frutos; Guiomar Martín-Herrán. Spatial effects and strategic behavior in a multiregional transboundary pollution dynamic game. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 2019, 97, 182 -207.
AMA StyleJavier de Frutos, Guiomar Martín-Herrán. Spatial effects and strategic behavior in a multiregional transboundary pollution dynamic game. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2019; 97 ():182-207.
Chicago/Turabian StyleJavier de Frutos; Guiomar Martín-Herrán. 2019. "Spatial effects and strategic behavior in a multiregional transboundary pollution dynamic game." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 97, no. : 182-207.
In this paper we apply non-linear incentive strategies to sustain over time an agreement. We illustrate the use of these strategies in a linear-quadratic transboundary pollution differential game. The incentive strategies are constructed in such a way that in the long run the pollution stock (the state variable) is close to the steady state of the pollution stock under the cooperative mode of play. The non-linear incentive functions depend on the emission rates (control variables) of both players and on the current value of the pollution stock. The credibility of the incentive equilibrium strategies is analyzed and the performance of open-loop and feedback incentive strategies is compared in their role of helping to sustain an agreement over time. We present numerical experiments to illustrate the results.
Javier de Frutos; Guiomar Martín-Herrán. Non-linear Incentive Equilibrium Strategies for a Transboundary Pollution Differential Game. Data Science for Nano Image Analysis 2019, 187 -204.
AMA StyleJavier de Frutos, Guiomar Martín-Herrán. Non-linear Incentive Equilibrium Strategies for a Transboundary Pollution Differential Game. Data Science for Nano Image Analysis. 2019; ():187-204.
Chicago/Turabian StyleJavier de Frutos; Guiomar Martín-Herrán. 2019. "Non-linear Incentive Equilibrium Strategies for a Transboundary Pollution Differential Game." Data Science for Nano Image Analysis , no. : 187-204.
This paper investigates how two competing manufacturers should invest in defensive and offensive advertising in a two‐segment market and whether they should each adopt a decentralized or an integrated channel if their goal is to maximize total channel profits. We find that manufacturers in decentralized channels can exclusively undertake either of the two types of advertising or combine the two at the equilibrium. In integrated channels, they can either combine the two or exclusively undertake defensive advertising. When multiple equilibria exist, strategies that combine both types of advertising should be preferred to exclusive defensive advertising strategies, which are better than exclusive offensive advertising strategies. Also, total channel profits are higher in decentralized channels than in integrated channels when the brands are moderately or highly substitutable. Conversely, total channel profits of integrated channels are higher than those of decentralized channels in areas where the brands are relatively differentiated and the offensive advertising retaliatory capacity of the rival is stronger. Theoretical and managerial implications of these findings are discussed.
Guiomar Martín‐Herrán; Simon P. Sigué. Manufacturer defensive and offensive advertising in competing distribution channels. International Transactions in Operational Research 2019, 27, 958 -983.
AMA StyleGuiomar Martín‐Herrán, Simon P. Sigué. Manufacturer defensive and offensive advertising in competing distribution channels. International Transactions in Operational Research. 2019; 27 (2):958-983.
Chicago/Turabian StyleGuiomar Martín‐Herrán; Simon P. Sigué. 2019. "Manufacturer defensive and offensive advertising in competing distribution channels." International Transactions in Operational Research 27, no. 2: 958-983.
We analyze a transboundary pollution differential game where, in addition to the standard temporal dimension, a spatial dimension is introduced to capture the geographical relationships among regions. Each region behaves strategically and maximizes its welfare net of environmental damage caused by the pollutant stock. The emission-output ratio is reduced by investment in region specific clean technology which evolves over time. The spatio-temporal dynamics of the pollutant stock is described by a parabolic partial differential equation. Using aggregate variables we study the feedback Nash equilibrium of a discrete-space model which could be seen as a space discretization of the continuous-space model. The discrete-space model presents the three main features of the original formulation: the model is truly dynamic; the agents behave strategically; and the model incorporates spatial aspects. For special functional forms previously used in the literature we analytically characterize the feedback Nash equilibrium and evaluate the impact of the introduction of the spatial dimension in the economic-environmental model. We show that our spatial model is a generalization of the model that disregards the spatial aspects. We analytically show that as the parameter describing how pollution diffuses among regions tends to infinity the equilibrium policies converge to those in the non-spatial setting. In the non-cooperative framework the spatially non-myopic behavior prescribes lower equilibrium emission rates, and consequently a lower global pollution stock. This is compatible with greater long-run welfares. In the cooperative framework, although the strategic interaction among the players does not exist, the only decision-maker still makes spatially strategic decisions.
Javier de Frutos; Guiomar Martín-Herrán. Spatial vs. non-spatial transboundary pollution control in a class of cooperative and non-cooperative dynamic games. European Journal of Operational Research 2019, 276, 379 -394.
AMA StyleJavier de Frutos, Guiomar Martín-Herrán. Spatial vs. non-spatial transboundary pollution control in a class of cooperative and non-cooperative dynamic games. European Journal of Operational Research. 2019; 276 (1):379-394.
Chicago/Turabian StyleJavier de Frutos; Guiomar Martín-Herrán. 2019. "Spatial vs. non-spatial transboundary pollution control in a class of cooperative and non-cooperative dynamic games." European Journal of Operational Research 276, no. 1: 379-394.
Most of the cooperative advertising literature has focused on studying the effects of such programs considering marketing variables. This paper integrates production and inventory management with pricing and advertising considerations to assess the effects of cooperative advertising programs in bilateral monopolies. We consider a supply chain where a Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) along with a consignment contract is implemented to coordinate the chain. We develop and solve a differential model for two games. The first one is a benchmark scenario where no cooperative advertising is offered, while the manufacturer offers the cooperative program in the second game. The main results show that cooperative advertising programs, usually considered as successful marketing initiatives, can be very difficult to implement in a supply chain undertaking a VMI policy with a consignment contract, in which operations and marketing interface is taken into account. A cooperative program mainly hurts the manufacturer’s profits, and can be profit-Pareto-improving only in a few cases. Although the retailer is generally willing to receive a support from the manufacturer, she can opt for a non-cooperative program when the largest part of the supply chain profits goes to the manufacturer. We developed several special cases to strengthen our findings.
Pietro De Giovanni; Salma Karray; Guiomar Martín-Herrán. Vendor Management Inventory with consignment contracts and the benefits of cooperative advertising. European Journal of Operational Research 2019, 272, 465 -480.
AMA StylePietro De Giovanni, Salma Karray, Guiomar Martín-Herrán. Vendor Management Inventory with consignment contracts and the benefits of cooperative advertising. European Journal of Operational Research. 2019; 272 (2):465-480.
Chicago/Turabian StylePietro De Giovanni; Salma Karray; Guiomar Martín-Herrán. 2019. "Vendor Management Inventory with consignment contracts and the benefits of cooperative advertising." European Journal of Operational Research 272, no. 2: 465-480.
This paper investigates whether manufacturers can use the timing (sequence) of their pricing and advertising decisions to benefit from or to deter store brand (SB) introductions. We develop and solve six sequential game theoretic models for a bilateral channel where different timing of these decisions are considered before and after the retailer introduces a store brand. Comparisons of equilibrium solutions across games show that the sequence of pricing and advertising decisions in the channel significantly impacts the profitability of a store brand entry by the retailer. Such impact depends on: (1) whether each channel member decides on pricing and advertising simultaneously or sequentially prior to the SB entry, (2) whether the timing chosen for these decisions changes following the SB introduction, and (3) the intensity of competition between the store and national brands. In particular, the SB entry leads to losses for the manufacturer when the sequence of advertising and pricing decisions is kept unchanged after the SB entry even when it is much differentiated from the NB. These results offer new perspectives on the effects of store brand entry in distribution channels, and suggest that for low levels of competition intensity between the NB and the SB, the manufacturer can either prevent or benefit from the retailer’s brand given an adjustment in the sequence of the manufacturer’s decisions.
Salma Karray; Guiomar Martín-Herrán. Fighting store brands through the strategic timing of pricing and advertising decisions. European Journal of Operational Research 2018, 275, 635 -647.
AMA StyleSalma Karray, Guiomar Martín-Herrán. Fighting store brands through the strategic timing of pricing and advertising decisions. European Journal of Operational Research. 2018; 275 (2):635-647.
Chicago/Turabian StyleSalma Karray; Guiomar Martín-Herrán. 2018. "Fighting store brands through the strategic timing of pricing and advertising decisions." European Journal of Operational Research 275, no. 2: 635-647.
While it is well established that travel costs impact on customer preference toward local service providers, research about how this situation affects competitive marketing strategies remains sparse. This article investigates, in a local market with two competing service providers, whether service providers should undertake defensive marketing (DM), targeted at the nearest customers who typically prefer their offering for convenience and/or offensive marketing, directed to relatively remote customers who favor the rival as the closest alternative. We find that the service providers can exclusively undertake either DM or offensive marketing or combine the two in a full differentiated strategy at the equilibrium. We compare the outcomes of these three strategic options to identify the conditions under which they are worth implementing. Main findings suggest that service providers are better off undertaking offensive marketing alone when their rival’s retaliatory offensive capacity is weak and customers incur small travel costs. Otherwise, service providers may exclusively undertake DM or combine it with offensive marketing when travel costs become significant. Also, service providers should not invest in any marketing activity when they have no market power, like in the case of two adjacent outlets in a mall. Finally, the implications of these findings are discussed.
Guiomar Martín-Herrán; Simon Pierre Sigué. Offensive and Defensive Marketing in Spatial Competition. Journal of Service Research 2018, 22, 189 -201.
AMA StyleGuiomar Martín-Herrán, Simon Pierre Sigué. Offensive and Defensive Marketing in Spatial Competition. Journal of Service Research. 2018; 22 (2):189-201.
Chicago/Turabian StyleGuiomar Martín-Herrán; Simon Pierre Sigué. 2018. "Offensive and Defensive Marketing in Spatial Competition." Journal of Service Research 22, no. 2: 189-201.
This paper characterizes the optimal tax rule to regulate a polluting monopoly when the firm has the possibility of investing in an abatement technology and the environmental damages are caused by a stock pollutant. The optimal policy is given by the stagewise feedback Stackelberg equilibrium of a dynamic policy game between a regulator and a monopolist. The regulator playing as the leader chooses an emission tax to maximize net social welfare, and the monopolist acting as the follower selects the output and the investment in abatement technology to maximize profits. We find that the optimal tax has two components. The first component is negative and equal to the gap between the marginal revenue and the price caused by the firm market power; the second component is given by the difference between the social and private shadow prices of the pollution stock. Considering a linear-quadratic model we show that if marginal environmental damages are constant, the difference between social and private shadow prices is positive and the optimal policy consists of taxing emissions at a constant rate if the marginal damages are large enough. However, if the marginal environmental damages are increasing the numerical exercises carried out show that this difference is negative at the steady state and the optimal policy gives the firm a subsidy when approaching the steady state regardless of the importance of the environmental damages. This result is explained by the negative effect that abatement technology accumulation has on the tax. Finally, it can be pointed out that although both models yield different predictions about the sign of the optimal policy the dynamics is globally stable for both cases.
Guiomar Martín-Herrán; Santiago Rubio. Second-best taxation for a polluting monopoly with abatement investment. Energy Economics 2018, 73, 178 -193.
AMA StyleGuiomar Martín-Herrán, Santiago Rubio. Second-best taxation for a polluting monopoly with abatement investment. Energy Economics. 2018; 73 ():178-193.
Chicago/Turabian StyleGuiomar Martín-Herrán; Santiago Rubio. 2018. "Second-best taxation for a polluting monopoly with abatement investment." Energy Economics 73, no. : 178-193.
In this paper, we characterize the optimal environmental policy for a polluting monopoly that devotes resources to abatement activities when damages are caused by a stock pollutant. With this aim, we calculate the stagewise feedback Stackelberg equilibrium of a (differential) policy game where the regulator is the leader and the monopolist is the follower. Our analysis shows that the first-best policy consists of applying a Pigouvian tax and a subsidy on production equal to the difference between the price and the marginal revenue. However, for a stock pollutant, the Pigouvian tax is not equal to the marginal damages but is given by the difference between the social and private valuation of the pollution stock. On the other hand, if a second-best emission tax is used, the tax is lower than the Pigouvian tax and the difference decreases with the price elasticity of the demand. Finally, we find that taxes and standards are equivalent in a second-best setting. In the second part of the paper, we solve a linear-quadratic differential game and we obtain that the first-best tax increases with the pollution stock whereas the subsidy decreases. Moreover, the tax is negative for low values of the pollution stock, i.e., for low values of the pollution stock, we obtain that the social valuation of the stock is lower than the private valuation. Furthermore, when a second-best policy is applied, the steady-state pollution stock is lower than the steady-state pollution stock associated with the efficient outcome.
Guiomar Martín-Herrán; Santiago J. Rubio. Optimal Environmental Policy for a Polluting Monopoly with Abatement Costs: Taxes Versus Standards. Environmental Modeling & Assessment 2018, 23, 671 -689.
AMA StyleGuiomar Martín-Herrán, Santiago J. Rubio. Optimal Environmental Policy for a Polluting Monopoly with Abatement Costs: Taxes Versus Standards. Environmental Modeling & Assessment. 2018; 23 (6):671-689.
Chicago/Turabian StyleGuiomar Martín-Herrán; Santiago J. Rubio. 2018. "Optimal Environmental Policy for a Polluting Monopoly with Abatement Costs: Taxes Versus Standards." Environmental Modeling & Assessment 23, no. 6: 671-689.
This paper revisits the problem of how to select an equilibrium in a differential game in the case of multiplicity of Nash equilibria. Most of the previous applied dynamic games literature has considered pre-play negotiations between players, implicitly or explicitly, with the aim of reaching an agreement on the selection of the pair of strategies. The main objective of this paper is to determine what would be the equilibrium to be played without pre-play communications. We study the linear and nonlinear Markov perfect Nash equilibria for a class of well-known models in the literature if pre-play communications are eliminated. We analyze both symmetric and nonsymmetric strategies. We show that the nonlinear strategies are not always the optimal strategies implemented when pre-play communications are removed. We conclude that in the presence of multiple equilibria and without pre-play communications the equilibria actually implemented are symmetric piecewise linear Markov perfect Nash equilibria at least for a range of initial values of the state variable.
Javier De Frutos; Guiomar Martín-Herrán. Selection of a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in a Class of Differential Games. Dynamic Games and Applications 2018, 8, 620 -636.
AMA StyleJavier De Frutos, Guiomar Martín-Herrán. Selection of a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in a Class of Differential Games. Dynamic Games and Applications. 2018; 8 (3):620-636.
Chicago/Turabian StyleJavier De Frutos; Guiomar Martín-Herrán. 2018. "Selection of a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in a Class of Differential Games." Dynamic Games and Applications 8, no. 3: 620-636.
Guiomar Martin-Herran; Simon P. Sigué. Retailer and manufacturer advertising scheduling in a marketing channel. Journal of Business Research 2017, 78, 93 -100.
AMA StyleGuiomar Martin-Herran, Simon P. Sigué. Retailer and manufacturer advertising scheduling in a marketing channel. Journal of Business Research. 2017; 78 ():93-100.
Chicago/Turabian StyleGuiomar Martin-Herran; Simon P. Sigué. 2017. "Retailer and manufacturer advertising scheduling in a marketing channel." Journal of Business Research 78, no. : 93-100.
Salma Karray; Guiomar Martín-Herrán; Georges Zaccour. Assessing the profitability of cooperative advertising programs in competing channels. International Journal of Production Economics 2017, 187, 142 -158.
AMA StyleSalma Karray, Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Georges Zaccour. Assessing the profitability of cooperative advertising programs in competing channels. International Journal of Production Economics. 2017; 187 ():142-158.
Chicago/Turabian StyleSalma Karray; Guiomar Martín-Herrán; Georges Zaccour. 2017. "Assessing the profitability of cooperative advertising programs in competing channels." International Journal of Production Economics 187, no. : 142-158.
Salma Karray; Guiomar Martin-Herran; Simon-Pierre Sigué. Cooperative advertising for competing manufacturers: The impact of long-term promotional effects. International Journal of Production Economics 2017, 184, 21 -32.
AMA StyleSalma Karray, Guiomar Martin-Herran, Simon-Pierre Sigué. Cooperative advertising for competing manufacturers: The impact of long-term promotional effects. International Journal of Production Economics. 2017; 184 ():21-32.
Chicago/Turabian StyleSalma Karray; Guiomar Martin-Herran; Simon-Pierre Sigué. 2017. "Cooperative advertising for competing manufacturers: The impact of long-term promotional effects." International Journal of Production Economics 184, no. : 21-32.