Xiaofei Pan

Dr. Xiaofei Pan

Faculty of Business, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, University of Wollongong, Northfields Ave Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 October 2020 in Journal of Banking & Finance
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Xiaofei PanXiaofei Pan
Xiaofei Pan
GTGary Gang Tian
Gary Gang Tian

1 July 2019 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XCXiaping Cao
Xiaping Cao
MLMichael Lemmon
Michael Lemmon
Xiaofei PanXiaofei Pan
Xiaofei Pan
MQMeijun Qian
Meijun Qian
GTGary Tian
Gary Tian
Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that managers’ career concerns can serve as an important source of implicit economic incentives. We examine how incentives for political promotion are related to compensation policy and firm performance in Chinese state-owned enterprises. We find that the likelihood that the CEO receives a political promotion is positively related to firm performance. We also find that CEOs with a higher likelihood of political promotion have lower pay levels and lower pay–performance sensitivity. Overall, the evidence suggests that competition in the political job market helps mitigate weak monetary incentives for CEOs in China. Data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2966 . This paper was accepted by Lauren Cohen, finance.

1 January 2018 in Journal of Banking & Finance
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
QLQigui Liu
Qigui Liu
Xiaofei PanXiaofei Pan
Xiaofei Pan
GTGary Gang Tian
Gary Gang Tian

1 February 2017 in Journal of Corporate Finance
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XCXiaping Cao
Xiaping Cao
Xiaofei PanXiaofei Pan
Xiaofei Pan
MQMeijun Qian
Meijun Qian
GTGary Gang Tian
Gary Gang Tian

8 October 2015 in European Accounting Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KHKu He
Ku He
Xiaofei PanXiaofei Pan
Xiaofei Pan
GTGary Tian
Gary Tian
This paper investigates how legal liability influences audit quality and audit fees, particularly in the presence of government intervention. Since 2010, all Chinese audit firms were required to transform from a structure of limited liability company (LLC) to limited liability partnership (LLP), which removes the cap on the liability exposure of negligent auditors. By adopting this natural experiment, we document the following findings: first, after audit firms reorganize as LLPs, auditors are more likely to (1) issue modified audit opinions and going-concern opinions, (2) constrain clients’ earnings management, and (3) charge a premium in audit fees, which suggest that exerting unlimited legal liability on negligent auditors improves both audit quality and audit fees. Second, the effect of the LLP adoption is more pronounced when auditors are from local audit firms, and clients are controlled by local governments. Further analyses suggest that the stock prices of clients positively react to the reform event, which indicates that LLP adoption improves the overall value of audits. In summary, our empirical findings are consistent with the argument that legal liability is able to effectively shape auditor behavior in emerging markets where the other institutional mechanisms are relatively weaker and government intervention is heavy.

1 June 2016 in Journal of Banking & Finance
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Xiaofei PanXiaofei Pan
Xiaofei Pan
GTGary Gang Tian
Gary Gang Tian