Michael Lemmon

Michael Lemmon

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Michael Lemmon

BlackRock, San Francisco, California 94102

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

17Years (2010-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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28 April 2010 in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
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Journal Article
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MLMichael Lemmon
Michael Lemmon
MRMichael R. Roberts
Michael R. Roberts
We examine how shocks to the supply of credit impact corporate financing and investment using the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.; the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989; and regulatory changes in the insurance industry as an exogenous contraction in the supply of below-investment-grade credit after 1989. A difference-in-differences empirical strategy reveals that substitution to bank debt and alternative sources of capital (e.g., equity, cash balances, and trade credit) was limited, leading to an almost one-for-one decline in net investment with the decline in net debt issuances. Despite this sharp change in behavior, corporate leverage ratios remained relatively stable, a result of the contemporaneous decline in debt issuances and investment. Overall, our findings highlight how even large firms with access to public credit markets are susceptible to fluctuations in the supply of capital.

17 August 2010 in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
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MLMichael L. Lemmon
Michael L. Lemmon
JZJaime F. Zender
Jaime F. Zender
We examine the impact of explicitly incorporating a measure of debt capacity in recent tests of competing theories of capital structure. Our main results are that if external funds are required, in the absence of debt capacity concerns, debt appears to be preferred to equity. Concerns over debt capacity largely explain the use of new external equity financing by publicly traded firms. Finally, we present evidence that reconciles the frequent equity issues by small, high-growth firms with the pecking order. After accounting for debt capacity, the pecking order theory appears to give a good description of financing behavior for a large sample of firms examined over an extended time period.

1 July 2019 in Management Science
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Journal Article
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XCXiaping Cao
Xiaping Cao
MLMichael Lemmon
Michael Lemmon
Xiaofei PanXiaofei Pan
Xiaofei Pan
MQMeijun Qian
Meijun Qian
GTGary Tian
Gary Tian
Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that managers’ career concerns can serve as an important source of implicit economic incentives. We examine how incentives for political promotion are related to compensation policy and firm performance in Chinese state-owned enterprises. We find that the likelihood that the CEO receives a political promotion is positively related to firm performance. We also find that CEOs with a higher likelihood of political promotion have lower pay levels and lower pay–performance sensitivity. Overall, the evidence suggests that competition in the political job market helps mitigate weak monetary incentives for CEOs in China. Data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2966 . This paper was accepted by Lauren Cohen, finance.

29 December 2016 in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
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Journal Article
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MKMadhuparna Kolay
Madhuparna Kolay
MLMichael Lemmon
Michael Lemmon
ETElizabeth Tashjian
Elizabeth Tashjian
We document that suppliers to purely financially distressed companies that are highly likely to reorganize in bankruptcy incur little or no spillover costs. In contrast, suppliers to economically distressed firms experience large losses in market value that are linked to proxies for the cost of replacing the bankrupt customers. Suppliers experience increased selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses and lower margins in the year following the bankruptcy of their trading partners, which we link to proxies for partner replacement costs. Suppliers continue to extend trade credit to firms that are healthier and in situations where the cost of replacing the partner is higher.

5 October 2018 in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
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Journal Article
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MLMichael L. Lemmon
Michael L. Lemmon
JZJaime F. Zender
Jaime F. Zender
Capital structure choice based on costs associated with asymmetric information is examined in order to present a new perspective on the standard pecking order and trade-off theories. In the model, both the face value of debt and the restrictiveness of the associated debt covenants are chosen as part of the financial structure, allowing a more complete characterization of this decision. Debt structure choice balances ex ante adverse selection against ex post moral hazard, providing a natural integration of the pecking order and trade-off theories and the development of interesting empirical implications.