Guoping Tu

Prof. Dr. Guoping Tu

Nanchang University,Nanchang
orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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9 February 2021 in Land
Verified
Journal Article
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Jing PengJing Peng
Jing Peng
YLYanhong Liu
Yanhong Liu
Qi WangQi Wang
Qi Wang
Guoping TuGuoping Tu
Guoping Tu
XHXinjian Huang
Xinjian Huang
Compared with traditional urbanization, new urbanization is more closely aligned with China’s basic national conditions and reflects the basic goal of sustainable development. As the main method of new urbanization, in situ urbanization can make up for the shortcomings of traditional urbanization. The establishment of national new urbanization pilot areas is an important element of the new urbanization policy. This paper tests the policy effect of the National New-type Urbanization Plan (2014–2020) on in situ urban development through the establishment of pilot areas. We found the following: (1) In the central region, the establishment of new urbanization pilot areas has not played a significant role in promoting the process of in situ urbanization. By dividing the central cities into Yangtze River and non–Yangtze River Economic Belt areas, we also find that the effect of the new urbanization policy is not obvious, for these cities are not located in the Yangtze River Economic Belt. (2) The central cities located in the Yangtze River Economic Belt have seen significant policy effects due to their advantages in transportation, resources, industry, labor, etc. The establishment of new urbanization pilot areas has a significant promoting effect on the process of in situ urbanization.

2 August 2019 in Kybernetes
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Jing PengJing Peng
Jing Peng
Guoping TuGuoping Tu
Guoping Tu
YLYanhong Liu
Yanhong Liu
HZHao Zhang
Hao Zhang
BLBibing Leng
Bibing Leng
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to provide a feasible scheme for local governments to regulate corporate environmental data fraud and to discuss whether the influence of the construction of online information disclosure platform on the environmental behavior of enterprises is better than the offline spot check.Design/methodology/approach: Under the background of changing environmental fees into taxes in China, this paper conducts evolutionary game analysis between local governments and enterprises in view of the existing problem of environmental data fraud. Furthermore, through the introduction of government information disclosure platform, this paper discusses the impact of the integration of direct government regulation and indirect public concern regulation on the evolution of environmental behavior of both sides. Finally, the evolutionary game is simulated by adopting system dynamics to analyses the implementation effect of different cases on the game process and game equilibrium.Findings: The results showed that the introduction of information disclosure platform mechanism can effectively suppress the fluctuations existing in the game play and stabilize the game. Moreover, it is worth noting that the regulatory effect of local governments investing part of the monitoring cost in the construction of online information platform is proved to be better than that of putting all the monitoring cost into offline investigation. While optimizing the monitoring cost allocation, the local government still needs to attach great importance to organically combine the attention of the public and media with the governmental official platform.Practical implications: The obtained results confirm that the proposed model can assist local government in refining the effects of their environmental regulatory decisions, especially in the case of corporate data fraud under environmental tax enforcement.Originality/value: Previous literature only suggested that local governments should reduce the cost of supervision to change the corporate behavior to a better direction, but no further in-depth study. Thus, this study fills the gap by discussing the positive transformation effect of local government cost allocation scheme on corporate environmental behavior.

24 March 2022 in Symmetry
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Journal Article
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SLShuying Li
Shuying Li
Guoping TuGuoping Tu
Guoping Tu
Uncertainty is common in miscellaneous decision-making problems, including bi-matrix games. The uncertainty of bi-matrix games is caused by the complexity of the game environment and the limitations of players’ cognition rather than the asymmetry of information. Therefore, it is hard for players to precisely give their crisp payoff values. In this paper, a new method considering the acceptance degree that the general intuitionistic fuzzy constraints may be violated is developed to solve general intuitionistic fuzzy bi-matrix games (GIFBMGs). In the method, a new asymmetric general intuitionistic fuzzy number (GIFN) and its cut sets are firstly defined. Then, the order relationship of GIFNs and the definitions of α and β-bi-matrix games are proposed. Afterwards, the constructed general intuitionistic fuzzy quadratic program is converted into an interval bi-objective program on the basis of the order relationship of GIFNs. Furthermore, the interval bi-objective program is converted into a multi-objective quadratic program based on the combination of interval order relationship and the player’s acceptance degree. A goal programming approach is put forward to solve the multi-objective quadratic program. Finally, the validity of the proposed method is verified with a numerical example for corporate environmental behavior (CEB), and some comparative analyses are conducted to show the superiority of the proposed method.

26 March 2022 in Mathematics
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SLShuying Li
Shuying Li
Guoping TuGuoping Tu
Guoping Tu
Game theory is a powerful tool in modeling strategic interaction among rational players. However, as practical problems become more complex, uncertainty inevitably appears in the game. Due to the advantages of probabilistic linguistic term sets (PLTSs) in comprehensively and flexibly portraying uncertainty, fuzziness and hesitancy, this paper uses PLTSs to express players’ payoff values, and aims to develop an integrated method based on fuzzy envelope and prospect theory (PT) under a probabilistic linguistic environment for solving matrix games. In this method, an improved probabilistic ordered weighted averaging (POWA) operator is defined. Then, a novel trapezoidal fuzzy envelope for PLTSs is proposed and some related theorems are analyzed. Next, based on the defined cosine distance measure for PLTSs, the players’ psychological behavior in the game is considered by establishing the prospect value function. Besides, the applicability and practicability of the proposed method is verified with an example from the development strategy of Sanjiangyuan National Nature Reserve (SNNR) in China. Finally, some comparative analyses are carried out to illustrate the superiority of the proposed method. In order to improve the application of this proposed method, a decision support system (DSS) based on it is designed.

20 December 2024 in Atmosphere
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CYChengyue Yu
Chengyue Yu
Guoping TuGuoping Tu
Guoping Tu
'Y'Feilong Yu
'Feilong Yu
This paper examines control and cooperation mechanisms for trans-regional air pollution using differential game theory. This study focuses on analyzing pollution control pathways in regions characterized by asymmetric economic development. Three models are constructed: the Nash non-cooperative game, the pollution control cost compensation mechanism, and the collaborative cooperation mechanism. These models are used to investigate optimal pollution control strategies for various regions. The findings indicate that the collaborative cooperation model substantially reduces pollution emissions and enhances overall benefits. Additionally, the pollution control cost compensation mechanism alleviates the burden of pollution control on less developed regions. Numerical analysis confirms the effectiveness of the proposed models and offers theoretical foundations and policy recommendations for regional cooperation in pollution prevention.

11 November 2024 in Water
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Journal Article
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Guoping TuGuoping Tu
Guoping Tu
CYChengyue Yu
Chengyue Yu
'Y'Feilong Yu
'Feilong Yu
This paper, based on differential game theory, examines governance models and cooperative strategies for managing cross-border water pollution in regions with uneven economic development. To address cross-regional water pollution, three differential game models are constructed under different scenarios: the Nash noncooperative mechanism, the pollution control cost compensation mechanism, and the collaborative cooperation mechanism. This study analyzes the dynamic changes in pollution emissions, governance investments, and economic returns within each model. The results indicate that the collaborative cooperation mechanism is the most effective, as it significantly reduces pollution emissions, maximizes overall regional benefits, and achieves Pareto optimality. In comparison, the pollution control cost compensation mechanism is suboptimal under certain conditions, while the Nash noncooperative mechanism is the least efficient, resulting in the highest pollution emissions. Furthermore, the research explores the influence of cooperation costs on the selection of governance models. It finds that high cooperation costs reduce local governments’ willingness to engage in collaborative cooperation. However, an appropriate compensation mechanism can effectively encourage less-developed regions to participate. Numerical analysis confirms the dynamic evolution of pollution stocks and economic returns under different models, and provides corresponding policy recommendations. This paper offers theoretical insights and practical guidance for cross-regional water pollution management, highlighting the importance of regional cooperation and cost-sharing in environmental governance.