'Feilong Yu

Prof. 'Feilong Yu

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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20 December 2024 in Atmosphere
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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CYChengyue Yu
Chengyue Yu
Guoping TuGuoping Tu
Guoping Tu
'Y'Feilong Yu
'Feilong Yu
This paper examines control and cooperation mechanisms for trans-regional air pollution using differential game theory. This study focuses on analyzing pollution control pathways in regions characterized by asymmetric economic development. Three models are constructed: the Nash non-cooperative game, the pollution control cost compensation mechanism, and the collaborative cooperation mechanism. These models are used to investigate optimal pollution control strategies for various regions. The findings indicate that the collaborative cooperation model substantially reduces pollution emissions and enhances overall benefits. Additionally, the pollution control cost compensation mechanism alleviates the burden of pollution control on less developed regions. Numerical analysis confirms the effectiveness of the proposed models and offers theoretical foundations and policy recommendations for regional cooperation in pollution prevention.

11 November 2024 in Water
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
Guoping TuGuoping Tu
Guoping Tu
CYChengyue Yu
Chengyue Yu
'Y'Feilong Yu
'Feilong Yu
This paper, based on differential game theory, examines governance models and cooperative strategies for managing cross-border water pollution in regions with uneven economic development. To address cross-regional water pollution, three differential game models are constructed under different scenarios: the Nash noncooperative mechanism, the pollution control cost compensation mechanism, and the collaborative cooperation mechanism. This study analyzes the dynamic changes in pollution emissions, governance investments, and economic returns within each model. The results indicate that the collaborative cooperation mechanism is the most effective, as it significantly reduces pollution emissions, maximizes overall regional benefits, and achieves Pareto optimality. In comparison, the pollution control cost compensation mechanism is suboptimal under certain conditions, while the Nash noncooperative mechanism is the least efficient, resulting in the highest pollution emissions. Furthermore, the research explores the influence of cooperation costs on the selection of governance models. It finds that high cooperation costs reduce local governments’ willingness to engage in collaborative cooperation. However, an appropriate compensation mechanism can effectively encourage less-developed regions to participate. Numerical analysis confirms the dynamic evolution of pollution stocks and economic returns under different models, and provides corresponding policy recommendations. This paper offers theoretical insights and practical guidance for cross-regional water pollution management, highlighting the importance of regional cooperation and cost-sharing in environmental governance.