Shaorong Sun

Dr. Shaorong Sun


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 January 2021 in Environmental Science and Pollution Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
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NSNa Sun
Na Sun
SSShaorong Sun
Shaorong Sun
HKHafiz Waqas Kamran
Hafiz Waqas Kamran
MHMuhammed Sajjad Hussain
Muhammed Sajjad Hussain
MNMuhammad Atif Nawaz
Muhammad Atif Nawaz
CNChien Nguyen
Chien Nguyen

21 April 2022 in Algorithms
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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QGQianqian Gu
Qianqian Gu
LHLei Hang
Lei Hang
SSShaorong Sun
Shaorong Sun
The work is devoted to the study of the impact of external control on the strategies of pollutant discharge enterprises and government regulators in the field of environmental protection. The authors construct a model of the relationship between these entities. It is an evolutionary game in which the players are entities that generate pollutants and the government departments that implement pollution supervision. The choice of strategies of both of these entities and the evolutionary stability of the system controlled by different regulatory efforts, i.e., a third party, are analyzed. The authors then verify the evolutionary paths and evolutionary results of the model under different conditions using simulation analysis based on this model. The conducted research shows that the weak power of third-party supervision is not enough to promote the evolution of the behavioral decisions of the government and enterprises. An appropriate increase in the power of third-party supervision will change the choice of the government and enterprises strategies in the short term; however, due to the mutual influence of the strategies between both sides of the game, in this situation, the evolutionary system does not pursue a stable state. The strong power of third-party supervision will push enterprises to choose a pollution control strategy, change the intensity of government supervision, and replace government supervision to a certain extent. It is an interesting example of modeling the relationship of this system on the basis of evolutionary game theory. The findings can be regarded as a theoretical reference for environmental pollution control of enterprises.

1 January 2018
Verified
Book
Closed access
SSShaorong Sun
Shaorong Sun
NSNa Sun
Na Sun


28 August 2018
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
SSShaorong Sun
Shaorong Sun
NSNa Sun
Na Sun

28 August 2018
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
SSShaorong Sun
Shaorong Sun
NSNa Sun
Na Sun