Qianqian Gu

Prof. Qianqian Gu

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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25 August 2024 in Environment, Development and Sustainability
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Journal Article
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QGQianqian Gu
Qianqian Gu
LHLei Hang
Lei Hang
YJYaping Jiang
Yaping Jiang
Low-carbon technology innovation is an important measure to achieve greenhouse gas emission reduction. However, the external policy environment and high investment in innovation are the important factors affecting enterprises’ choice of low-carbon innovation strategies. Although there are many articles on carbon regulation policies, few literatures on the issue of low-carbon technology innovation of enterprises under the compound carbon policy, and the effectiveness of government supervision in the process of policy implementation was ignored. From the perspective of government supervision, this article innovatively proposes a compound carbon policy with carbon trading and carbon tax as a punitive auxiliary means, and considers enterprises’ tolerance to carbon policies. With a game model among participants, the interaction between compound carbon policy, government supervision and enterprise low-carbon innovation strategy is simulated. The results show that when enterprises fear the high transaction costs in the carbon market and have strong motivation to steal emissions, the carbon trading policy has limited incentive effect. In this case, the government can promote enterprise innovation by directly regulating carbon tax rate and maintaining appropriate supervision. Further research shows that the implementation of preferential income tax policy for low-carbon innovative enterprises can reduce the difficulty and regulatory cost of government incentive for enterprise innovation, and strengthen the policy effect of carbon trading. In addition, this article puts forward some ideas to provide help for optimizing China’s low-carbon oriented carbon policies.

21 April 2022 in Algorithms
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Journal Article
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QGQianqian Gu
Qianqian Gu
LHLei Hang
Lei Hang
SSShaorong Sun
Shaorong Sun
The work is devoted to the study of the impact of external control on the strategies of pollutant discharge enterprises and government regulators in the field of environmental protection. The authors construct a model of the relationship between these entities. It is an evolutionary game in which the players are entities that generate pollutants and the government departments that implement pollution supervision. The choice of strategies of both of these entities and the evolutionary stability of the system controlled by different regulatory efforts, i.e., a third party, are analyzed. The authors then verify the evolutionary paths and evolutionary results of the model under different conditions using simulation analysis based on this model. The conducted research shows that the weak power of third-party supervision is not enough to promote the evolution of the behavioral decisions of the government and enterprises. An appropriate increase in the power of third-party supervision will change the choice of the government and enterprises strategies in the short term; however, due to the mutual influence of the strategies between both sides of the game, in this situation, the evolutionary system does not pursue a stable state. The strong power of third-party supervision will push enterprises to choose a pollution control strategy, change the intensity of government supervision, and replace government supervision to a certain extent. It is an interesting example of modeling the relationship of this system on the basis of evolutionary game theory. The findings can be regarded as a theoretical reference for environmental pollution control of enterprises.

31 May 2022 in Sustainability
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Journal Article
Open access
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QGQianqian Gu
Qianqian Gu
LHLei Hang
Lei Hang
Although the Chinese government has issued and revised a series of policies and regulations on intellectual property, infringement still repeatedly occurs. China is in a critical period of economic transformation and upgrading, and the problem of intellectual property infringement is becoming increasingly prominent. Accordingly, in this study, an evolutionary game analysis-based behavioral interaction framework between innovative enterprises and local government regulators, based on evolutionary game theory, was constructed. The strategy choice of both sides of the game and the evolutionary stability of the system were analyzed, and the evolutionary path of each equilibrium point was verified by simulation. The results show that the proposed framework is complex; the dynamic evolutionary system has different evolutionary equilibrium states under different institutional environments. Profit is not the only factor affecting the behavior decision of enterprises; the behavior strategies of governments also have an effect, and the interaction is mutual. Under the government supervision mode, innovative enterprises gradually evolve into the non-infringement strategy under the pressure of external supervision. However, the policy cost of this mode is too high for it to be the optimal solution for regulatory policy. Under the mode of no government supervision, the innovation incentive policy gives enterprises the internal motivation to innovate, results in a relative reduction in the infringement income, and blocks the inducement of infringement. This can effectively control enterprise infringement to realize the sustainable development of enterprises and ultimately achieve the desired objectives of government regulatory policy.