This paper corrected the long‐term misunderstanding of the land utilization efficiency concept. The Undesirable‐Window‐DEA model, Dagum Gini coefficient, and spatial panel autoregressive model with fixed effect were used to explore the spatial heterogeneity and influencing factors of urban construction land utilization efficiency in China from 2004 to 2016. The results show the following: (1) China’s overall utilization of urban construction land is still at a low level. It decreased first and then rose, with a “flat V‐shaped” evolution pattern. (2) During the study period, the Gini coefficient of urban construction land utilization efficiency for all provinces decreased first, then rose, and decreased again. The utilization efficiency Gini coefficients within provincial grouping were eastern region (0.063), central region (0.101), and western region (0.128). The Gini coefficients within provincial grouping were central versus western (0.121), eastern versus western (0.161), and eastern versus central (0.168). For the contribution to overall inequality of land utilization efficiency, the inequality within groups contributes the most (57.57%), and the inequality between groups accounts for about 25.62%. The overall efficiency is improved, with an evolution pattern of “difference narrowed–differences expanded–difference narrowed.” (3) “economic development,” “industrial structure,” “research development investment,” and “land urbanization level” have significantly positive effect on urban construction land utilization efficiency, while other factors have a negative effect, including “urbanization level of population,” “urban population density,” “cultivated field resources level,” “government influence level,” “land urbanization level,” and “financial dependence level.” This study could provide theoretical support for the implementation of cross‐provincial/regional urban construction land quotes reallocation and differential construction land management policies.

The rent of farmland transfer represents the economic realization of farmland contracts and management rights of agricultural households. A three-stage dynamic game model with three players is constructed in this paper to study the mechanism causing an increase in farmland transfer rent. Based on the theory of producer equilibrium and production possibility boundaries, this paper studies the restraining effect of high rent on grain production and analyzes the factors that prevent the decline in grain production at present. Combined with the process of farmland transfer in a village, both the mechanism causing an increase in farmland transfer rent and the restraining effect of high rent on grain production are empirically analyzed. The conclusion is as follows: the basic direction of farmland transfer is from farmers with a low production capacity to farmers with a high production capacity, and the rent level is determined by the transferors with high production capacity; about half of the economies of scale profits and two-thirds of transferees’ subsidies are converted into farmland transfer rents. High farmland transfer rent reinforces “nongrain” and “nonagricultural” behaviors. Finally, it is suggested that farmers should be given vocational training in agricultural production, “farmland transfer tax” should be levied on excessive farmland transfer rent, and transferees should be subsidized for grain production.

The purpose of the paper is to study how the interests of farmland transfer be distributed among the government, contractors, and farmland transferees. The process of the paper is to analyze the evolutionary stability strategies of the government, contractors, and farmland transferees by building a three-party evolutionary game model; in order to identify the equilibrium point of the three-party evolutionary game, an example of interest distribution in a village in Anhui Province is used to analyze and simulate the three-party evolutionary game. The conclusions of the paper are as follows: the combination of a one-party subsidy, transferring farmland, and grain production is the ideal equilibrium result in the three-party game; farmland transfer rent is the a crucial factor of interest balance among the three parties; only if the farmland transfer rental price is larger than the sum of the contractor’s self-farming incomes and subsidies and lower than the grain income of the transferee can the three parties realize the equilibrium of interest distribution. The suggestions of the paper are that the government should carry out the system of “retirement allowance” and transform “subsidy” to “allowance” to protect the interests of contractors, and the government should promote farmland transfer and encourage grain production by controlling the fluctuation range of farmland transfer rent.

Whether Marx’s economics and Marxist political economy can be formalized using mathematics is a controversial and divisive issue. From studying the text of Capital and its manuscripts, it emerges that Marx’s research on the capitalist mode of production involves the application of mathematical methods. Marx creates a set of symbols related to the social production of capitalism, and on that basis constructs an economic model corresponding to his theoretical analysis. Obviously, the mathematical method is an integral part of Marx’s economic methodology. In a certain sense, using mathematical methods to study and formalize Marx’s economics is in line with Marx’s approach to economic topics. However, the formalization of Marx’s economics must strictly observe the relevant principles; otherwise, it will lead to serious problems.

Purpose: Karl Marx's social capital reproduction theory is his significant contribution to economics. The purpose of this paper is to review the contributions of the exploration of Chinese economists (especially Professor Liu Guoguang) in the concretization of Marx’s social capital reproduction theory combined with socialist construction since 1949.Design/methodology/approach: During this process, Professor Liu Guoguang, a famous Chinese Marxist economist, has made an outstanding contribution by creating a Marxist social capital reproduction model with Chinese characteristics and a distinctive Marxist economic growth model. Professor Liu's exploration is still of crucial practical significance to building a socialist market economy today.Findings: The process and achievements in the sinicization exploration of Marx's social capital reproduction theory were reviewed. With the reform and opening up, fundamental changes have occurred in China's economic system – the centralized planned economic system has been transformed into a socialist market economic system.Originality/value: The planned management of the national economy is replaced by a macro-regulation system characterized by gross control gradually, and the concepts of agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry, and their intercorrelation are no longer applied in theory and policy. However, the sinicization exploration of Marx's social capital reproduction theory in the older generation of Marxist economists represented by Liu is not only of historical significance but also of important practical significance.

Michio Morishima's recapitulation and study of Marxian economics by means of mathematical methods focus primarily on the typical themes such as the labor theory of value, the theory of exploitation, the transformation problem, the theory of reproduction and so on, which provides a new mathematical perspective for understanding Marxian economics. However, Morishima's understanding of Marxian economics is full of contradictions: on the one hand, he speaks highly of Marxian economics, believing that Marx has conducted pioneering work in and made innovative contributions to general equilibrium theory, dynamic general equilibrium theory, contemporary economic growth theory, input–output analysis and the dual dualities of commodity production society and the like important fields and front subjects of modern economics, in particular Morishima, employing mathematical methods, has proved the objectivity of values and the sufficiency and necessity of exploitation to capitalism; on the other hand, Morishima attempts to integrate Marxian economics into orthodox economics, and finally contends abandoning the labor theory of value, the theory of exploitation (the theory of surplus value) and the theory of the breakdown of capitalism. The work of Morishima shows that formalized Marxian economics must follow the logic of Marxian economics, otherwise, replacing the logic of economics with the logic of mathematics will lead to erroneous results.