With the increasingly serious problems of water security and water shortage in the Yellow River Basin, the establishment of a fair and efficient water rights distribution system is an important way to improve water resource utilization efficiency and achieve high-quality development. In this paper, a double-level water rights allocation model of national canals–farmer households in irrigation districts is established. The Gini coefficient method is used to construct the water rights allocation model among farmer households based on the principle of fairness. Finally, the Wulanbuhe Irrigation Area in the Hetao Irrigation District is taken as an example. Results show that the allocated water rights of the national canals in the irrigation district are less than the current; for example, water rights of the Grazing team (4) canal are reduced by 73,000 m³ than before, in which water rights of farmer households 1, 2, 3, and 4 obtain compensation and 5, 6, 7, and 8 are cut by the water rights allocation model and the Gini coefficient is reduced from 0.1968 to 0.1289. The research has fully tapped the water-saving potential of irrigation districts, improved the fairness of initial water rights distribution, and can provide a scientific basis for the development of water rights allocation of irrigation water users in irrigation districts of the Yellow River Basin.

China’s water rights transaction is still in the initial stage of development. There is no systematic pricing method for water rights transactions between farmers. This paper puts forward a pricing model of water rights transactions among farmers in water-deficient areas. The price of water rights transaction consists of cost price and earnings price. The earnings price is determined by studying the crop water production function, calculating the crop’s marginal benefit of the two parties, and combining the Cooperative Game Theory. Finally, the pricing model was applied to the water rights transactions among the farmers of Hetao Irrigation District of Bayannaoer City, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Results showed that under the A4 trading strategy, the overall income increased without losing the interests of any farmer. The increasing income of the three farmer households N₁, N₂, and N₃ after the alliance was 8.14 thousand dollars, 4.66 thousand dollars, and 20.33 thousand dollars, respectively, and the water rights transaction prices of N₃ and N₁, N₂ were respectively 0.485 $/m³, 0.565 $/m³. It is estimated that the model can provide a scientific basis for water rights trading between farmers and the efficient use of water resources.