Henan Province, located in the North China Plain, as one of the most important grain production bases in China, is facing severe challenges of water pressure and sustainable development caused by agricultural production. In this study, water footprint (WF) estimation and sustainability assessment of crop production were carried out for wheat and maize, two major crops in the Henan Province. Based on a set of global WF benchmark values for various crops which were established by previous studies, we calculated a set of benchmark values of blue water footprint (BWF, surface water, and groundwater) for major crops in Henan Province. Four benchmark values were calculated for each crop, and we selected two of them as the optimal and sub-optimal benchmark levels. Additionally, potential blue water savings were estimated by reducing the crop-specific BWF to different benchmark levels. According to our simulations with CROPWAT 8.0, the average annual blue water footprint of wheat production in Henan Province from 2006 to 2016 was 7914 Million m³, of which about 77% is unsustainable, and that of maize production is 703 Million m³, of which about 70% is unsustainable. When reducing the water footprint of wheat production to optimal or sub-optimal benchmark levels, approximately 2742 Million m³ or 375 Million m³ blue water can be saved, and reducing that of maize production to optimal or sub-optimal benchmark levels could save approximately 214 Million m³ or 44 Million m³ blue water.

A water rights trading scheme in China is currently in its initial stage of development, but is without a complete pricing mechanism. This paper proposes a pricing model for transfers of water rights from agriculture to industry in water-deficient areas of China. Both the cost price and the earnings price are considered and incorporated into the model. The cost price includes construction costs, operation and maintenance costs, renewal and reconstruction costs, and economic compensation for ecological damage. The earnings price is calculated according to a reasonable return coefficient and the difference in economic value of the water resources to the buyer and seller. The value of water resources was estimated based on emergy theory in accordance with the principle of mutual benefits equilibrium. This pricing model is then applied to the transfer of surplus water rights arising from agricultural water conservation schemes to industrial uses in the Southbank Ordos Irrigation Zone of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. The results indicate that this pricing model could provide technical support to the scientific and reasonable pricing of water rights transactions in water-deficient areas and that it could play an active role in promoting the healthy development of future water markets.

With the increasingly serious problems of water security and water shortage in the Yellow River Basin, the establishment of a fair and efficient water rights distribution system is an important way to improve water resource utilization efficiency and achieve high-quality development. In this paper, a double-level water rights allocation model of national canals–farmer households in irrigation districts is established. The Gini coefficient method is used to construct the water rights allocation model among farmer households based on the principle of fairness. Finally, the Wulanbuhe Irrigation Area in the Hetao Irrigation District is taken as an example. Results show that the allocated water rights of the national canals in the irrigation district are less than the current; for example, water rights of the Grazing team (4) canal are reduced by 73,000 m³ than before, in which water rights of farmer households 1, 2, 3, and 4 obtain compensation and 5, 6, 7, and 8 are cut by the water rights allocation model and the Gini coefficient is reduced from 0.1968 to 0.1289. The research has fully tapped the water-saving potential of irrigation districts, improved the fairness of initial water rights distribution, and can provide a scientific basis for the development of water rights allocation of irrigation water users in irrigation districts of the Yellow River Basin.

This paper presents a pricing model developed for the Chinese water rights trading market. The model focuses on the transfer of water rights from irrigators to industrial users in areas with limited water resources. Water rights trading is an efficient means of allocating water resources, and the price plays an important role in this market. At present, China lacks formal mechanisms in place for water rights pricing. Therefore, an integrated pricing model is built for situations when agricultural users implement water conservation measures and sell water rights to meet industrial water demand. The model accounts for project construction costs, operation and maintenance costs, renewal and reconstruction expenses, irrigation frequency compensation, and the economic cost of ecological damage. The marginal value of water rights to the industrial water user is also quantified on the basis of the production function accounting for water inputs. The pricing model is applied to an example of water rights trading between irrigators and industrial users in an agricultural area on the Yellow River near Ordos in Inner Mongolia.

China’s water rights transaction is still in the initial stage of development. There is no systematic pricing method for water rights transactions between farmers. This paper puts forward a pricing model of water rights transactions among farmers in water-deficient areas. The price of water rights transaction consists of cost price and earnings price. The earnings price is determined by studying the crop water production function, calculating the crop’s marginal benefit of the two parties, and combining the Cooperative Game Theory. Finally, the pricing model was applied to the water rights transactions among the farmers of Hetao Irrigation District of Bayannaoer City, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Results showed that under the A4 trading strategy, the overall income increased without losing the interests of any farmer. The increasing income of the three farmer households N₁, N₂, and N₃ after the alliance was 8.14 thousand dollars, 4.66 thousand dollars, and 20.33 thousand dollars, respectively, and the water rights transaction prices of N₃ and N₁, N₂ were respectively 0.485 $/m³, 0.565 $/m³. It is estimated that the model can provide a scientific basis for water rights trading between farmers and the efficient use of water resources.