Background: Since May 2022, an mpox outbreak affecting primarily men who have sex with men (MSM) has occurred in numerous non-endemic countries worldwide. As MSM frequently reported multiple sexual encounters in this outbreak, reliably determining the time of infection is difficult; consequently, estimation of the incubation period is challenging. Aim: We aimed to provide valid and precise estimates of the incubation period distribution of mpox by using cases associated with early outbreak settings where infection likely occurred. Methods: Colleagues in European countries were invited to provide information on exposure intervals and date of symptom onset for mpox cases who attended a fetish festival in Antwerp, Belgium, a gay pride festival in Gran Canaria, Spain or a particular club in Berlin, Germany, where early mpox outbreaks occurred. Cases of these outbreaks were pooled; doubly censored models using the log-normal, Weibull and Gamma distributions were fitted to estimate the incubation period distribution. Results: We included data on 122 laboratory-confirmed cases from 10 European countries. Depending on the distribution used, the median incubation period ranged between 8 and 9 days, with 5th and 95th percentiles ranging from 2 to 3 and from 20 to 23 days, respectively. The shortest interval that included 50% of incubation periods spanned 8 days (4–11 days). Conclusion: Current public health management of close contacts should consider that in approximately 5% of cases, the incubation period exceeds the commonly used monitoring period of 21 days.

Introduction: Meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is a major cause of healthcare-associated infections. Aim: We describe MRSA colonisation/infection and bacteraemia rate trends in Dutch–German border region hospitals (NL–DE-BRH) in 2012–16. Methods: All 42 NL–DE BRH (8 NL-BRH, 34 DE-BRH) within the cross-border network EurSafety Health-net provided surveillance data (on average ca 620,000 annual hospital admissions, of these 68.0% in Germany). Guidelines defining risk for MRSA colonisation/infection were reviewed. MRSA-related parameters and healthcare utilisation indicators were derived. Medians over the study period were compared between NL- and DE-BRH. Results: Measures for MRSA cases were similar in both countries, however defining patients at risk for MRSA differed. The rate of nasopharyngeal MRSA screening swabs was 14 times higher in DE-BRH than in NL-BRH (42.3 vs 3.0/100 inpatients; p < 0.0001). The MRSA incidence was over seven times higher in DE-BRH than in NL-BRH (1.04 vs 0.14/100 inpatients; p < 0.0001). The nosocomial MRSA incidence-density was higher in DE-BRH than in NL-BRH (0.09 vs 0.03/1,000 patient days; p = 0.0002) and decreased significantly in DE-BRH (p = 0.0184) during the study. The rate of MRSA isolates from blood per 100,000 patient days was almost six times higher in DE-BRH than in NL-BRH (1.55 vs 0.26; p = 0.0041). The patients had longer hospital stays in DE-BRH than in NL-BRH (6.8 vs 4.9; p < 0.0001). DE-BRH catchment area inhabitants appeared to be more frequently hospitalised than their Dutch counterparts. Conclusions: Ongoing IPC efforts allowed MRSA reduction in DE-BRH. Besides IPC, other local factors, including healthcare systems, could influence MRSA epidemiology.

Background: Antimicrobial resistance poses a risk for healthcare, both in the community and hospitals. The spread of multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs) occurs mostly on a local and regional level, following movement of patients, but also occurs across national borders. Aim: The aim of this observational study was to determine the prevalence of MDROs in a European cross-border region to understand differences and improve infection prevention based on real-time routine data and workflows. Methods: Between September 2017 and June 2018, 23 hospitals in the Dutch (NL)–German (DE) cross-border region (BR) participated in the study. During 8 consecutive weeks, patients were screened upon admission to intensive care units (ICUs) for nasal carriage of meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and rectal carriage of vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium/E. faecalis (VRE), third-generation cephalosporin-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (3GCRE) and carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE). All samples were processed in the associated laboratories. Results: A total of 3,365 patients were screened (median age: 68 years (IQR: 57–77); male/female ratio: 59.7/40.3; NL-BR: n = 1,202; DE-BR: n = 2,163). Median screening compliance was 60.4% (NL-BR: 56.9%; DE-BR: 62.9%). MDRO prevalence was higher in DE-BR than in NL-BR, namely 1.7% vs 0.6% for MRSA (p = 0.006), 2.7% vs 0.1% for VRE (p < 0.001) and 6.6% vs 3.6% for 3GCRE (p < 0.001), whereas CRE prevalence was comparable (0.2% in DE-BR vs 0.0% in NL-BR ICUs). Conclusions: This first prospective multicentre screening study in a European cross-border region shows high heterogenicity in MDRO carriage prevalence in NL-BR and DE-BR ICUs. This indicates that the prevalence is probably influenced by the different healthcare structures.

Vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) pose a public health challenge worldwide. While VRE bloodstream infections (VREBI) increase in Germany and Europe, population-based molecular data are scarce. We aimed to analyze the molecular epidemiology, demographic aspects, and geographical distribution of VREBI in the German Federal State of North-Rhine–Westphalia (NRW), located in the German–Dutch–Belgian border area, representing over 20% of Germany’s population. VREBI isolates were collected from hospitals across NRW between 2016 and 2019. Demographic data were gathered and anonymized upon sample collection. Multilocus sequence typing (MLST) and identification of glycopeptide resistance were carried out. Epidemiological analysis and geographical mapping were performed. Single VREBI isolates from 755 patients were analyzed. In total, 38.9% were female, and 80.0% were aged ≥ 60 years. The VREBI incidence per 100,000 inhabitants nearly tripled, from 0.52 (2016) to 1.48 (2019), particularly in male patients aged ≥ 50 years. The proportion of vanB reached 83% (n = 202/243) in 2018, overtaking vanA as the predominant glycopeptide resistance determinant, detected in close relation with ST117 isolates. The proportion of MLST sequence type (ST) 117 peaked in 2018, at 78.2% (n = 190/243). The major role of these emerging strains in invasive infections in central Europe requires novel strategies for their diagnosis, treatment, and prevention.

In October 2024, the first imported mpox clade Ib case was confirmed in Germany in an individual in their thirties returning from Rwanda. In this report we summarise the response from the public health service in North Rhine-Westphalia related to case management, contact tracing and institutional collaborations. Our findings highlight the importance of a coordinated public health response in the management of imported mpox cases and in preventing the transmission of mpox clade Ib in Germany and beyond.

When a person with contagious measles has travelled by aircraft, European guidelines recommend contact tracing of passengers and crew within 5 days of exposure for post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP), and within 12 days of exposure for informing passengers and crew, in order to prevent further transmissions. To be effective, contact tracing requires prompt diagnosis, immediate notification of public health authorities and rapid availability of passenger contact data. We report two events of contact tracing initiated in Germany after two individuals with measles travelled on three international flights. In one event, contact tracing was initiated late because laboratory confirmation of a clinically diagnosed measles case was awaited unnecessarily. Accessing passenger contact data was difficult in both events because of data protection issues with the airline which was not based in Germany. In both events, passengers were not reached in time to provide PEP, and one event resulted in at least two secondary measles cases. As all passengers were reached before the incubation period ended, tertiary cases were most probably prevented. Public health authorities and the transport sector must collaborate to resolve competing legal regulations for infection prevention and data protection, to simplify and accelerate identification of air travellers exposed to communicable diseases.