In the construction of ecological civilization, green innovation has become an important driving force for the sustainable development of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This paper uses panel data of state-owned listed enterprises from 2008 to 2019 to explore mixed-ownership reform’s influence on the green transformation of SOEs and its specific mechanisms. The results show that the diversity of mixed shareholders, the depth of mixed equity, and the restriction of mixed equity significantly promote the SOEs’ green innovation. Moreover, there are distinctions in the impact of the shareholding ratio of heterogeneous shareholders on green innovation. Only the increase in the shareholding ratio of foreign shareholders has a positive correlation with green innovation. The mechanism tests indicate that the mixed-ownership reform plays a governance role in the green transformation of SOEs by optimizing the reasonable allocation of environmental protection subsidies and propelling environmental social responsibility’s active performance. Our study further subdivides the significant promotion effect of mixed-ownership reform on green innovation, finding that it only exists in the SOEs in heavily polluting industries and regions with a high degree of marketization. Finally, we find that the ownership structure adjustment caused by the mixed-ownership reform has improved SOEs’ environmental management system and facilitated its sustainable development capabilities.

The purpose of innovation is to consume fewer natural resources in order to create sustainable performance; therefore, innovation can ease the pressure of the ecological load and promote the sustainable development of the economy. Taking the 269 enterprises listed on the main board of the electronic information industry from 2010 to 2019 as samples, using the threshold panel data model, the nonlinear relationship between the knowledge-based network structure hole and the short-term and long-term innovation performance of the enterprises were studied, and the threshold effect of R&D investment intensity was discussed. When the R&D investment intensity is from 1.96% to 15.96%, the knowledge-based network structure hole has a significant positive impact on short-term innovation performance. When the R&D investment intensity is from 5.72% to 10.64%, the knowledge-based network structure hole has a significant positive effect on long-term innovation performance. Lower R&D investment intensity can make the knowledge-based network structure hole promote the increase of short term innovation performance, but to make the knowledge-based network structure hole have a positive impact on long term innovation performance, the R&D investment intensity should be increased by more than 5.72%. When R&D investment intensity is not higher than 15.96%, the knowledge-based network structure hole has a significant positive impact on short term innovation performance, but to make the knowledge-based network structure hole maintain the positive effect on long term innovation performance, R&D investment intensity should not exceed 10.64%. Therefore, enterprises should be guided to optimize the knowledge-based network structure according to the R&D investment intensity in order to improve the short term and long-term innovation performance of an enterprise. These research results can help enterprises to save resources and promote the sustainable development of the economy.

In recent years, the innovation of state-owned listed enterprises has gained substantial momentum in academic research due to their vital role in sustainable economic development. This article examines and evaluates the influence of mixed-ownership reform on the innovation strategy of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) from the two dimensions of ownership structure adjustment and control right allocation. We extend extant research in that: The diversity of mixed shareholders, the depth of mixed equity, and the control of mixed equity can significantly promote the exploratory innovation investment of SOEs. Our study investigates the impact of the shareholding ratio of foreign investors, natural persons, and institutional investors. The empirical results found a significant positive correlation between the increase of the shareholding ratio of institutional investors and the exploratory and exploitative innovation investment. On the other hand, private shareholders’ shareholding ratio has no impact on the innovation strategy choices of SOEs. Specifically, the results proved that the promotion of exploratory innovation investment by mixed-ownership reform is more significant in SOEs controlled by the central government or in competitive industries. To a large extent, this promotion is achieved by improving the proportion of executives with a professional R&D background in SOEs.

The strategic choice of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is crucial to the sustainable development of China’s economy. This paper explores the impact of mixed-ownership reform on the strategic choice of SOEs from the shareholder power and the board power. We find that the greater the diversity of mixed shareholders, the depth of mixed equity, the control of mixed equity, and the excess control of mixed equity, the higher the degree of mixed-ownership reform, and the more likely it is to promote SOEs to choose the prospector strategy. The mechanism test states that the impact of mixed-ownership reform on enterprise strategy is achieved through the balance effect between non-state-owned shareholders and state-owned controlling shareholders with the same power, and the synergy effect between different powers of non-state shareholders. Further research indicates that the mixed-ownership reform has a stronger driving effect on the prospector strategy in SOEs under strict external supervision, competitive industries, and local areas. This study clarifies the governance logic of non-state-owned shareholders on the strategic positioning of SOEs by dual control rights, and it provides empirical evidence for the formulation of enterprises’ market-oriented strategic objectives.

Leveraging from the online search index of Chinese listed companies from 2012 to 2018, we empirically test the relationship between investors’ attention and corporate innovation performance for the first time. The main results are as follows: (1) investors’ attention significantly improves listed companies’ innovation performance, which is reflected in the increase of patent applications. This indicates that investors’ active information collection behaviour affects China’s economic development by promoting enterprise innovation. (2) This paper’s conclusion remains intact after a battery of robustness checks, such as alternative measures of key variables and empirical specifications and a series of endogenous treatment. (3) The mechanisms tests show that: “information asymmetry”, “financing constraint”, and “agency cost” are supported. In other words, with the increase of investors’ attention, not only the information asymmetry is reduced, which greatly improved the information environment of the capital market, but also the external financing constraints of enterprises are alleviated. The opportunistic management behaviour is effectively suppressed, thus motivating the corporate innovation incentives and improving the corporate innovation of input, output and quality. (4) Further research shows that investor attention to listed companies also improves the efficiency of capital allocation. This paper’s conclusion shows that investors’ initiative information acquisition behaviour can improve enterprises innovation performance, thus providing a driving force for China’s economic development.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are the leading force in the national economy. The main goal of mixed-ownership reform is to enhance the SOEs’ independent innovation capability, thereby bringing high-quality development of the national economy. Based on the baseline regression and mediation effect model, this study explores the impact of mixed-ownership reform on exploratory innovation of SOEs from ownership structure adjustment and control rights allocation. The results show that the diversity of mixed shareholders, the depth of mixed equity, and the control of mixed equity significantly increase the SOEs’ exploratory innovation investment. And the shareholding ratio of heterogeneous shareholders has a differentiated influence on exploratory innovation. The mediation effect test indicates that the promotion effect of mixed-ownership reform of SOEs in the ownership structure dimension is achieved by reducing the second-type agency conflict and easing the financing constraints. In contrast, the promotion effect in the control rights allocation dimension is achieved by lowering the first-type agency conflict. The findings demonstrate that the mixed-ownership reform have positive effect on the SOEs’ exploratory innovation investment, and the different dimensions of mixed-ownership reform have disparate function routes to exploratory innovation. This study provides guidance for SOEs on how drive national innovation development through mixed-ownership reform. SOEs should guarantee the rights of non-state-owned capital to hold shares and appoint directors, improve internal governance mechanisms, so as to accelerate the development of exploratory innovation activities.