In the construction of ecological civilization, green innovation has become an important driving force for the sustainable development of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This paper uses panel data of state-owned listed enterprises from 2008 to 2019 to explore mixed-ownership reform’s influence on the green transformation of SOEs and its specific mechanisms. The results show that the diversity of mixed shareholders, the depth of mixed equity, and the restriction of mixed equity significantly promote the SOEs’ green innovation. Moreover, there are distinctions in the impact of the shareholding ratio of heterogeneous shareholders on green innovation. Only the increase in the shareholding ratio of foreign shareholders has a positive correlation with green innovation. The mechanism tests indicate that the mixed-ownership reform plays a governance role in the green transformation of SOEs by optimizing the reasonable allocation of environmental protection subsidies and propelling environmental social responsibility’s active performance. Our study further subdivides the significant promotion effect of mixed-ownership reform on green innovation, finding that it only exists in the SOEs in heavily polluting industries and regions with a high degree of marketization. Finally, we find that the ownership structure adjustment caused by the mixed-ownership reform has improved SOEs’ environmental management system and facilitated its sustainable development capabilities.
In recent years, the innovation of state-owned listed enterprises has gained substantial momentum in academic research due to their vital role in sustainable economic development. This article examines and evaluates the influence of mixed-ownership reform on the innovation strategy of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) from the two dimensions of ownership structure adjustment and control right allocation. We extend extant research in that: The diversity of mixed shareholders, the depth of mixed equity, and the control of mixed equity can significantly promote the exploratory innovation investment of SOEs. Our study investigates the impact of the shareholding ratio of foreign investors, natural persons, and institutional investors. The empirical results found a significant positive correlation between the increase of the shareholding ratio of institutional investors and the exploratory and exploitative innovation investment. On the other hand, private shareholders’ shareholding ratio has no impact on the innovation strategy choices of SOEs. Specifically, the results proved that the promotion of exploratory innovation investment by mixed-ownership reform is more significant in SOEs controlled by the central government or in competitive industries. To a large extent, this promotion is achieved by improving the proportion of executives with a professional R&D background in SOEs.
Leveraging from the online search index of Chinese listed companies from 2012 to 2018, we empirically test the relationship between investors’ attention and corporate innovation performance for the first time. The main results are as follows: (1) investors’ attention significantly improves listed companies’ innovation performance, which is reflected in the increase of patent applications. This indicates that investors’ active information collection behaviour affects China’s economic development by promoting enterprise innovation. (2) This paper’s conclusion remains intact after a battery of robustness checks, such as alternative measures of key variables and empirical specifications and a series of endogenous treatment. (3) The mechanisms tests show that: “information asymmetry”, “financing constraint”, and “agency cost” are supported. In other words, with the increase of investors’ attention, not only the information asymmetry is reduced, which greatly improved the information environment of the capital market, but also the external financing constraints of enterprises are alleviated. The opportunistic management behaviour is effectively suppressed, thus motivating the corporate innovation incentives and improving the corporate innovation of input, output and quality. (4) Further research shows that investor attention to listed companies also improves the efficiency of capital allocation. This paper’s conclusion shows that investors’ initiative information acquisition behaviour can improve enterprises innovation performance, thus providing a driving force for China’s economic development.