Digital government construction is a complex system project, and data sharing is its governance niche. Cross-sectoral data sharing is the core issue of improving governance capacity in the construction of digital governments. Aimed at the dilemma of insufficient data sharing across departments, according to evolutionary game theory (EGT), we refined the game relationship between the data management department and the different government functional departments participating in cross-department data sharing. We used white Gaussian noise as a random perturbation, constructed a tripartite stochastic evolutionary game model, analyzed the stability of the stochastic game system and studied the influence of the main parameters on the evolution of the game system with the help of numerical simulation. The results show that there exists a positive stable point in the process of cross-department data sharing. The external effect of data sharing can be improved by enhancing the investment in data sharing by government functional departments. The accumulation of interagency trust relationships can gradually eliminate the differences in data sharing among different departments. The coordination mechanism of government data sharing and the construction of the “good and bad reviews” system can form an internal and external adjustment mechanism for functional departments and the data management department and can promote multiple departments to participate in cross-department data sharing more actively.

To reveal the interaction and influence mechanism between emergency rescue entities, and to explore and optimize a cooperation mechanism of emergency rescue entities, a tripartite evolutionary game model of emergency rescue cooperation based on government rescue teams, social emergency organizations, and government support institutions was constructed. The stability of each game subject’s strategy choice was explored. Simulation analysis was applied to investigate the influence mechanism of key parameters on the evolution of the game subject’s strategy combination. The research results show that government rescue teams, social emergency organizations, and government support institutions have consistent political demands and rescue targets in emergency rescue cooperation. The game subjects are driving forces for each other to choose positive strategies. The game evolution process of the emergency cooperation model shows a “mobilization-coordination” feature. At the same time, the emergency capital stock formed based on trust relationships, information matching, and institutional norms between game subjects can promote the evolution of the game system toward (1,1,1). In addition, for government organizations with limited emergency resources, the average allocation of emergency resources is not the optimal solution for emergency rescue efficiency. However, it is easier to achieve the overall target of emergency rescue cooperation by investing limited emergency resources in key variables that match the on-site situation. On this basis, combined with the practice of emergency rescues in emergencies, countermeasures and solutions are proposed to optimize the mechanism and improve the efficiency of emergency rescue cooperation.

Emergency science communication is an important emergency activity that can enhance public safety awareness and risk perception ability, optimize health-protective behaviors, and reduce losses from emergencies. Certainly, emergency science communication needs to be multisource information and cross-organization. Moreover, increasing cooperation in emergency science communication is the key to improving the effectiveness of science communication in public health emergencies. To clarify the cooperation relationships among emergency organizations in emergency science communication, emergency science communication cooperation networks (ESCCNs) are constructed on the basis of the social network analysis method, and the practice of emergency science communication in response to COVID-19 in China is taken as the case. Through an interpretation of the characteristics of ESCCNs in the emergency response phase and the ongoing emergency phase, the differences in the cooperation modes of public health emergencies in different phases are analyzed. Moreover, the influence of different emergency phases on the formation of the ESCCN of the whole phase is discussed. With the evolution of the emergency phase, the network tightness, equilibrium and connectivity of the ESCCN all tend to increase, whereas network agglomeration decreases. In the emergency response phase, the core-edge features of the ESCCN are obvious, and emergency science communication organizations (ESCOs) are more inclined to form emergency science communication cooperation with other ESCOs of the same type. However, in the ongoing emergency phase, the cooperation relationships between ESCOs are more balanced, and more diversified cross-group cooperation relationships are formed. The diversification of ESCO types, the closeness of ESCO relationships and the connectivity of ESCCNs are the main factors that promote the formation of the ESCCN of the whole phase. Furthermore, implications for strengthening the efficiency of science popularization cooperation in public health emergencies are proposed in connection to matching dynamic characteristics, optimizing resource allocation and strengthening institutional guarantees.

Natural disasters have obvious cross-regional and compound characteristics. Cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters deepens the diversification of coordination relations and the complexity of interaction modes among emergency response organizations, including horizontal and vertical organizational interactions. In order to clarify the cooperation mechanism of emergency organizations during cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters and to explore the key factors that affect the cooperative relationships of emergency organizations, in this study, a game model is constructed based on evolutionary game theory, which is composed of local, neighboring, and central governments. Then, the stability of the emergency game strategy is analyzed. On this basis, a numerical simulation is used to simulate the dynamic evolution trajectory of the game system. The results show that there is an embedded mutual promotion mechanism that evolves towards a positive emergency strategy combination among the game subjects. The selection strategies of the game subjects show the characteristics of consistency and the following: enhanced cooperation efficiency between local and neighboring governments, emergency capital stock, and shared resources, therefore, guiding social emergency forces to actively participate in emergency operations. Strengthening the emergency dispatching strength of the central government and the effectiveness of central–local emergency dispatching, can support the performance of cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters. Furthermore, the efficiency of cooperation between local and neighboring governments will be enhanced.

Regional integration and pairing assistance are two forms of cross-regional emergency collaboration practice carried out by the Chinese government. Based on the Chinese government’s emergency management practice, evolutionary game models of cross-regional emergency collaboration were constructed. Further, the traditional evolutionary game model was improved by introducing the stochastic process, and Gaussian white noise was introduced as a random disturbance. The stochastic evolutionary game model was constructed, and the existence and stability of the equilibrium solutions of the two kinds of stochastic evolutionary game systems for cross-regional emergency collaboration were verified based on the stability discrimination theorem of stochastic differential equations. We used numerical simulations to simulate the evolution trajectories of the regional integration and the pairing assistance stochastic evolutionary game system. In the regional integration game system, when the efficiency of emergency collaboration, the emergency capital stock, and the externality coefficients are higher, positive emergency strategies are more likely to become the stable state of the game subjects’ strategy selection. In the pairing assistance game system, the efficiency of emergency collaboration, the rewards and benefits from the central government, and the matching degree between governments all had positive effects on the formation of the positive emergency strategies of the game subjects. In addition, the pairing assistance mechanism for sustainable development requires external support from the central government.